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Roper et al.: Criminal Law

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
I.

NEW EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
STANDARD-PREJUDICE REQUIRED

A.

INTRODUCTION

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cooper v. Fitzharris, I
expressly adopted the standard of "reasonably competent and effective representation" of counsel, thus joining the majority of
other circuits in abandoning the "farce and mockery of justice"
standard. 2 The standard is derived from modern notions of the
sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The
court further held that once defendant has shown that counsel
was ineffective, relief will be granted only when defendant was
prejudiced by counsel's conduct. 3 By requiring prejudice, the
court places a heavy burden on a defendant who first must prove
ineffective counsel, and then must prove prejudice.
Troy Cooper, a state prisoner convicted of burglary, assault, robbery and rape, filed a habeas corpus petition. He alleged that he had not been afforded effective assistance of counsel at trial. Cooper cited counsel's failure to object to admission
of certain evidence that was gathered as a result of an allegedly
unlawful search of his home and person, failure to move to
supress his statements to the police, failure to object to testimony regarding his identification at the pre-indictment lineup,
and failure to inform him of his right to appeal. 4 Cooper also
criticized his attorney's failure to stipulate to his prior burglary
conviction. 5
The district court dismissed the petition on the grounds that
the challenged acts and omissions of counsel were neither prejudicial nor did they reduce Cooper's trial to a "farce and mockery" of justice. The court of appeals reversed and remanded to
the district court for a factual determination as to whether
1. 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir., Dec. 1978) (per Browning, J.) (en bane), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 974 (1979).
2. See cases cited at note 29 infra.
3. 586 F.2d at 1328.
4.Id.
5.Id.
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Cooper was deprived of his sixth amendment right to reasonably
effective assistance of counsel during his state trial. 8
On rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit traced the development of the doctrine of effective assistance of counsel and held:
(1) the sixth amendment requires that persons accused of crimes
be afforded "reasonably competent and effective representation"; and (2) the accused must establish that counsel's errors
prejudiced the defense. 7
B.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL

In 1932, the Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama,8 first recognized the right to effective assistance of counsel. Without directly addressing the question of what constitutes ineffective representation, Powell nonetheless became the foundation for
defendants to challenge their convictions on the grounds of defense counsel's incompetence. s In Powell, the Court recognized
that the duty to provide counsel "is not discharged by an assignment at such time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of
the case."IO The Court indicated the right to counsel was a fundamental right, protected also in state courts by virtue of the
fourteenth amendment due process clause."
Thirty years after the Powell decision, the Supreme Court
articulated the right to effective counsel in Gideon v. Wainwright. 12 Gideon represents the first step by the Supreme Court
6. 551 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1977).
7. 586 F.2d at 1327.
8. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
9. See generally Bazelon, The Defectiue Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 1
(1973); Simpson, Standards of Attorney Competency in the Fifth Circuit, 54 TEX. L. REV.
1801 (1976); Comment, Ineffectiue Representation as a Basis for Relief from Conuiction:
Principles for Appellate Reuiew, 13 COLUM. J. L. Soc. PROB. 1 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Ineffectiue Representation]; Comment, The Right to Competent Defense Counsel: Emergence of a Sixth Amendment Standard of Reuiew on Appeal and the Persistence
of the "Sham and Farce" Rule in California, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 355 (1975); Comment, Defects in Ineffectiue Assistance Standards Used by State Courts, 50 U. OF COLO.
L. REV. 389 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Defects]; Comment, Criminal Law: Effectiue
Assistance of Kansas Counsel, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 635 (1979) (hereinafter cited as Criminal

Law).
10. 287 U.S. at 71 (emphasis added).
11. Id. See also Note, Effectiue Assistance of Counsel: A Constitutional Right in
Transition, 10 VAL. U. L. REV. 509 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Effectiue Assistance].
12. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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toward a stricter demand that appointed counsel render effective
representation. 13 The Court stated that the source of the right to
assistance of counsel was the sixth amendment, which is made
obligatory on the states by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. U In Gideon, the Court recognized the importance of the right to counsel and held that assistance of counsel
in criminal cases is a necessity rather than a luxury.15 When
Gideon made the sixth amendment directly applicable to the
states, the circuit courts were forced to re-evaluate their due
process standards for ineffective counsel claims in light of the
stricter sixth amendment requirements. lo Gideon clarified the
Powell principles; the sixth amendment right to counsel was
deemed a fundamental right and not just a necessary aspect of
due process. 17
A problem that resulted from Gideon was that, although
Gideon emphasized the importance of the right to counsel as a
sixth amendment right, it did not have immediate impact on
cases alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. I8 Courts continued to apply general due process concepts either directly through
the fifth and fourteenth amendments or indirectly through the
sixth amendment. 19
Powell and Gideon were instrumental in establishing the
right of a criminal defendant to effective assistance of counsel.
The decisions, however, offered little guidance on the quality of
the assistance that makes that right'meaningful. 20 Gideon was
also the precursor of the Supreme Court's decision in McMann v.
Richardson. 21 McMann extended the sixth amendment guarantees of effective assistance of counsel by specifically stating that
the right to counsel means "effective assistance of counsel."22
While the Court rejected defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,23 the Court nevertheless recognized the inherent
13. See Effective Assistance, supra note 11, at 510.
14. 372 U.S. at 343.
15. [d. at 344-45.
16. See Effective Assistance, supra note 11, at 515.
17. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. at 342.
18. See Effective Assistance, supra note 11, at 510-15.
19. [d.
20. See Ineffective Representation, supra note 9, at 6.
21. 397 U.S. 759 (1970). See generally Criminal Law, supra note 9, at 636.
22. 397 U.S. at 771. See also Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955); Glasser v.

United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1942); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940).
23. 397 U.S. at 773-74. In McMann, the prisoner alleged counsel's ineffectiveness
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risk that the good faith evaluations of a reasonably competent
attorney will tum out to be mistaken either as to the facts or as
to what a court's judgment might be on a given set of facts.24
The Court concluded that counsel's advice should be within the
range of competence demanded by attorneys in criminal cases. 25
Thus, the McMann Court alluded to minimum levels of
competency.
An issue unresolved by the McMann Court was an explanation of the duties which defense counsel must perform in order to
be considered competent. No subsequent Supreme Court case
has resolved this issue, thereby leading to the inevitable result
that lower courts have developed their own standards for determining the minimum degree of competency necessary for effective assistance of counsel.
The "Farce and Mockery of Justice" Standard: The Due Process
Right to Counsel

Based on the Court's ruling in Powell, a standard developed
based on the fourteenth amendment due process clause. 28 This
standard holds that representation is ineffective only where it
reduces the trial to a "farce and mockery of justice" such that it
shocks the conscience of the court. '1:1 The defendant bears the
burden of showing that defense counsel's conduct reduced the
entire trial to a "farce and mockery of justice" so as to deprive
the defendant of his or h~r day in court. 28
because counsel suggested that the prisoner enter a guilty plea based on the erroneous
belief that the prisoner's confession was admissible.
24. Id. at 770-71.
25. Id. The "reasonably competent" attorney standards appear to have been derived
from McMann when it stated that counsel's advice be "within the range of competence"
of other criminal attorneys. Id. The Court, however, left to the state and lower federal
courts the responsibility to establish specific standards.
26. See generally Effective Assistance, supra note 11, at 516. For a general discussion
tracing the development of the farce and mockery standard see Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in Criminal Cases: Departures from Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L.
REv. 927 (1973); Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNElL L. REV. 1077 (1973);
Simpson, supra note 9; Strazzella, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims: New Uses,
New Problems, 19 ARIz. L. REv. 443 (1977); Ineffective Representation, supra note 9;
Effective Assistance, supra note 11.
27. 586 F.2d at 1328. One of the first cases to articulate the "farce and mockery"
standard was Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889
(1945); see also Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 445 (1940).
28. Judge Bazelon has stated that "the mockery test requires such a minimal level
of performance from counsel that it is itself a mockery of the sixth amendment,"
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Several problems are created by linking effective assistance
of counsel to the due process clause. A finding of unfairness in
the conduct of the trial due to ineffective representation would
require a reversal on the ground that defendant was deprived of
due process. On the other hand, if the result of the trial was otherwise fair to the defendant, the conviction would be upheld, despite the lack of effective assistance of counsel. Furthermore, the
underlying determination of whether an attorney had been effective is entirely subjective, thus providing no clear guidance by
which to measure an attorney's representation. It is, therefore,
not surprising that the Ninth Circuit in Cooper has joined the
other circuits in rejecting the "farce and mockery of justice"
standard and adopting the "reasonably competent and effective
representation" standard based on the sixth amendment.29
The "Reasonably Competent" and "Effective Representation"
Standards

Since the McMann decision, which directly linked the right
to effective assistance of counsel to the sixth amendment, lower
courts have developed their own standards based on the sixth
amendment. 3o Although no one sixth amendment standard has
been consistently applied, two types of standards have
emerged. 31
"Reasonably effective assistance under the circumstances of
Bazelon, supra note 9, at 28-29; see also Ineffective Representation, supra note 9, at 26;
Defects, supra note 9, at 400.
29. See cases cited at note 39 infra; currently the First, Second and Tenth Circuits
still follow the "farce and mockery of justice" standard. See, e.g., United States v.
Wright, 573 F.2d 681, 683-84 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Burbar, 567 F.2d 192, 202
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 872 (1977); United States v. Riebold, 557 F.2d 697, 70203 (10th Cir. 1977). The First and Second Circuits have begun to waver. The First Circuit left open the possibility of adopting a more lenient standard used by the Fifth and
Sixth Circuits which looks to "reasonably effective assistance." Compare United States
v. Wright, 573 F.2d at 684 with United States v. Yelardy, 567 F.2d 863, 886 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 842 (1978) and United States v. Carter, 566 F.2d 1265, 1272 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978). The Second Circuit has refrained from specifically adopting, but has made reference to the District of Columbia's more stringent standard of "reasonably competent assistance of an attorney acting as his diligent conscientious advocate." Compare United States v. Williams, 575 F.2d 388, 393 (2d Cir. 1978)
and United States v. Tolliver, 569 F.2d 724, 731 (2d Cir. 1978) with United States v.
DeCoster, 487 F. 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
30. Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d at 1329. See also Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d
730 (3d Cir. 1970); see generally Effective Assistance, supra note 11, at 530-37.
31. Although courts have characterized their standards by different names, generally
the standards fall into two categories.
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the case" is the first standard. 32 Courts which have adopted this
standard determine reasonableness by hindsight rather than by
considering defense counsel's conduct at the time legal services
were rendered. 33 If subsequent events at trial minimize the unreasonableness of defense counsel's actions, counsel's representation is found to be effective. 34 Defendant is required to show a
causal relationship between defense counsel's unreasonable conduct and the resulting unfair tria1. 35
This standard also presents problems. The hindsight approach of the standard limits the examination of counsel's actions to the cold record which does not contain a complete catalog of counsel's actions. In addition, a case by case analysis of
the standard may cause unfair and uneven results. Finally, the
standard places a heavy burden on the defendant to prove the
causal connection between the attorney's actions and the unfair
tria1. 38
"Reasonably competent assistance" is the second standard.
Courts that use the "reasonably competent" standard describe
minimum duties and guidelines that a defense attorney must
perform. 37 By creating duties and guidelines, these courts do not
have to determine whether counsel was reasonable in each case
as they do with the "reasonably effective assistance under the
circumstances of the case" test. Rather, defendant must only
show that the attorney violated a guideline or failed to perform a
duty in order to show inadequate representation. 3s
32. See generally, Defects, supra note 9, at 402.
33.Id.
34.Id.
35.Id.
36. Id. at 403.
37. Several courts have adopted the ABA Standards as guidelines. ABA STANDARDS
RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION fuNCTION AND THE DEFENSE fuNCTION § 4.1 (Approved draft
1971) reads as follows:
It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation
of the circumstances of the case and to explore all avenues
leading to facts relevant to guilt and degree of guilt or penalty.
The investigation should always include efforts to secure infor·
mation in the possession of the prosecution and law enforce·
ment authorities. The duty to investigate exists regardless of
the accused's admissions or statements to the lawyer of the
facts constituting guilt or his stated desired to plead guilty.
See McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 216·17 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v.
DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1203·04 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
38. See Ineffective Representation, supra note 9, at 53; Defects, supra note 9, at 404.
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The problems that arise from applying the "reasonably competent assistance" standard are (1) the inflexibility of a minimal
list of specific duties may serve only to create more elaborate
rituals to satisfy sixth amendments requirements, and (2) there
is a danger that the guidelines will be viewed as the maximum
performance an attorney has to give rather than the minimum
performance. 39
C.

THE Cooper ANALYSIS AND ADOPTION OF REASONABLY
EFFECTIVE AND COMPETENT DEFENSE STANDARD

In Cooper, the Ninth Circuit traced the development of the
"farce and mockery of justice" standard and noted that there
has been a gradual shift toward the "reasonably· effective assistance of counsel" standard. 40 The court also observed that there
has been confusion in the use of the term"· Finally, the court
stated: "[W]e believe the differences are of sufficient importance
. . . to justify deliberate rejection of the 'farce and mockery'
verbiage in favor of a statement of the test in terms of reasonably effective and competent defense representation."42 The
court's adoption of the "reasonably effective and competent defense representation" standard was based on the following: (1)
the standard links both the sixth amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel and general requirements of due process; (2) the standard focuses inquiry on the subject matter of
,the sixth amendment guarantee, i.e., counsel's performance; and
(3) the standard avoids the misleading implication that all that
is relevant to a determination of counsel's performance is what
occurred at trial and is in the record. 43
39. See Bazelon, supra note 9, at 33.
40. 586 F.2d at 1329 & n.6. The "farce and mockery" standard has been abandoned
by most of the circuits. Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543-44 (4th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 665-66 (8th Cir. 1976); United States ex rei. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir. 1975); Herring v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125, 128
(5th Cir. 1974); Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974); United States
v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973)opinion after remand, No. 72-1283 (D.C.
Cir. Oct. 19, 1976), rehearing en bane granted, No 72-1293 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 17, 1977);
Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3d Cir. 1970) (en banc).
41. 586 F.2d at 1329. See, e.g., de Kaplany v. Enomoto, 540 F.2d 975, 987 (9th Cir.
1976) (en banc) (interchangeable use of the terms "farce and mockery of justice" and
"reasonably effective assistance"); United States v. Miramon, 470 F.2d 1362, 1363 (9th
Cir. 1972) (synonymous use of the two standards); Leano v. United States, 457 F.2d 1208,
1209 (9th Cir. 1972) (sYnonymous use of the two standards); Kruchten v. Eyman, 406
F.2d 304, 312 (9th Cir. 1969) (interchangeable use of the two terms).
42. 586 F.2d at 1329.
43. [d. The court further stated that the "reasonably effective and competent defense representation" test is an objective standard as opposed to the "farce and mockery
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The Ninth Circuit's adoption of the "reasonably effective
and competent defense representation" standard is, in effect, a
combination of the two general tests that circuit courts have developed under the sixth amendment analysis of the right to
counsel. But, in combining the standards, i.e., "reasonablyeffective assistance under the circumstances of the case" and "reasonably competent assistance," the Ninth Circuit failed to identify what the necessary elements are to assert ineffective
assistance of counsel.
The "reasonably effective assistance under the circumstances of the case" standard generally requires an examination
of the trial by hindsight. u In Cooper, however, the court explicitly stated that its standard was designed to avoid the misleading implication that all that is relevant is what occurred at trial
and appears on the face of the record,45 Whatever else is necessary, in addition to the events at trial and what appears on the
record, is left undefined by the Cooper court.
The "reasonably competent assistance" standard generally
delineates specific duties and guidelines. 4ft In Cooper, the court
recognized that some courts have "particularized elements of
minimal performance."47 While acknowledging that such a
checklist might enhance the objectivity of the general standard,48
the court opted for a less rigid approach. In so doing, the Cooper
court adopted the McMann rule that the determination of counsel's competency should be "left to the good sense and discretion
the trial courts."49 However, the Ninth Circuit's failure to suggest guidelines in Cooper has the potential of confusing lower
courts. For example, a court may combine elements of both standards, decide to favor one standard over another, or fashion its
own test, unrelated to the precedents established in other
circuits.
of justice" standard which is "peculiarly subjective." [d. See also Marzullo v. Maryland.
561 F.2d 540. 544 (4th Cir. 1977).
44. See Defects. supra note 9. at 403.
45. 586 F.2d at 1329.
46. See text accompanying notes 37 & 38 supra.
47. 586 F.2d at 1330. See also United States v. DeCoster. 487 F.2d 1197. 1203·04
(D.C. Cir. 1973). opinion after remand. No. 72·1283 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19. 1976). rehearing
en bane granted. No. 72·1293 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 17. 1977). Coles v. Peyton. 389 F.2d 224.
226 (4th Cir.). eert. denied. 393 U.S. 849 (1968).
48. 586 F .2d at 1330.
49. [d .• quoting McMann v. Richardson. 397 U.S. at 771.
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Finally, the court proceeded to define the constitutional
standard of "reasonably effective and competent defense representation," holding that the "fact that counsel erred is not alone
enough to establish a denial of the constitutional right."50 Since,
infallible representation is not guaranteed by the Constitution,51
the accused "assumes the risk of ordinary error in . . . his attorney's assessment of the law and facts .... "52 To rise to the level
of a constitutional violation "[d]efense counsel's errors or omissions must reflect a failure to exercise the skill, judgment, or diligence of a reasonably competent criminal defense attorney-they must be errors a reasonably competent attorney
acting as a diligent conscientious advocate would not have made,
"53

D.

THE

Cooper

COURT'S REQUIREMENT OF PREJUDICE

The requirement of preju_dice based on claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel was the major area of controversy confronted by the Cooper court. Other circuit courts have disagreed
on whether a separate showing of prejudice is required. M This
precise issue has not been addressed by the Supreme Court. The
Ninth Circuit's majority opinion in Cooper held that a showing
of prejudice is required where a claim of ineffective counsel is
based on an attorney's specific acts and omissions. 55 However,
where counsel is not present or has been prevented from carrying
out a vital function, automatic reversal is required. 58
The dissenting opinion rejects the majority's distinction and
bases its theory on procedural fairness. 57 Once a defendant has
made a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance, the dissent
50. 586 F.2d at 1330.
51. [d. See also Rivera v. United States, 318 F.2d 606, 608 (9th Cir.1963).
52. 586 F.2d at 1330 quoting McMann·v. Richardson, 397 U.S. at 774. The Cooper
court, in developing the constitutional standard further discussed the importance of
counsel's ability to reasonably foresee that prejudice might arise as a result of his or her
actions. [d. at 1330-31 n. 10. See generally Effective Assistance, supra note 11, at 542-44.
53. 586 F.2d at 1330.
54. See, e.g., McQueen v. Swensen, 498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974) (prejudice required);
Beasley V. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974) (automatic reversal-no showing of
prejudice); United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973), opinion after remand, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 1976), rehearing en bane granted, No. 72-1293
(D.C. Cir. Mar. 17, 1977) (counsel must conform with ABA standards quoted at note 37
supra).

55. 586 F.2d at 1331.
56. [d. at 1332.
57. [d. at 1334.
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asserts that automatic reversal should be required. 58 The remainder of this Note will focus on the reasoning of both opinions, analyzing their merits and weaknesses.

The Majority Opinion
The. majority held that a showing of prejudice is required
when claims of ineffective assistance of counsel rest on specific
acts and omissions of counsel at tria1. 5v The court distinguished
cases like Cooper, based on specific acts and omissions, from
cases where no counsel is present or where counsel has been prevented from carrying out vital functions. Based on several Supreme Court cases where counsel's effective assistance was prevented, the court would not require a showing of prejudice.
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis with Chambers u. Maroney,80 in which the defense counsel met with the defendant
only a few minutes before trial. As a result of the belated appearance, counsel failed to object to certain adverse evidence.
The defendant petitioned for habeas corpus relief asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. The petition was dismissed on the
ground that the defendant had not been prejudiced. The Supreme Court affirmed, stating, "we are not disposed to fashion a
per se rule requiring reversal of every conviction following tardy
appointment of counsel in all cases. "81
I

This particular language in the Chambers opinion has been
criticized as being ambiguous,82 and therefore, subject to various
interpretations. 83 Specifically, in Cooper, the majority interprets
58.ld.
59. Id. at 1331.
60. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
61. Id. at 53·54.
62. See generally Ineffective Representations, supra note 9, at 76.
63. The majority and the dissent cite the following circuit court cases for differing
propositions. United States ex rei. Green v. Rundle, 434 F.2d 1112 (3d Cir. 1970) (the
Third Circuit considered the impact of counsel's failure to investigate an alibi defense);
United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066 (3d Cir. 1966) (the Court held that the absence
of counsel on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.) See also McQueen v. Swenson, 560 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1977); Cheely v. United
States, 535 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1976); Loftis v. Estelle, 515 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1975).
The majority cites Rundle and Crowley as holding, in line with Chambers, that reo
versal is not required where the defendant suffered no prejudice from that error. 580 F.2d
at 1331 n.11. The dissent, on the other hand, stated that the Third Circuit in Rundle and
Crowley expre88ly adopted the automatic reversal rule for constitutionally ineffective
counsel cases. Id. at 1337 n.6. According to the dissent, Rundle held that where an attor.
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the Chambers rejection of a per se automatic reversal rule in all
tardy appointment cases as standing for the proposition that,
where counsel's specific acts and omissions have not prejudiced
the defense, counsel's performance will be viewed as harmless error. 64 Thus, the Cooper court rejects a per se rule of automatic
reversal and embraces the harmless error doctrine, which measures the prejudicial effect of trial court error, assuming that
some trial errors are too insignificant to require reversal of the
trial judgment. 65
The Cooper court distinguished Gideon v. Wainwright 68
where no defense counsel was present. In Gideon, the defendant
was charged with a non-capital felony. He appeared in state
court with neither funds nor counsel and therefore, asked the
court to appoint an attorney. Since state law only required the
appointment of counsel on charges of capital offe~ses, the court
denied his request. Upon exhaustion of defendant's state court
remedies, the United States Supreme Court held that the right
of an indigent defendant in a criminal trial to have the assistance of counsel is a fundamental right, made obligatory upon
the states by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 67
Next, the Cooper court distinguished a series of Supreme
Court cases which warranted automatic reversal. In these cases,
the court pointed out that counsel was prevented from carrying
out a vital function. In Powell v. Alabama,68 the trial court judge
generously appointed "all the members of the bar" to represent
the defendants. 6D The Supreme Court found that since no lawyer
was designated to represent the defendants from their arraignment until trial, the period when vital consultation, investigation and preparation occur, defendants were not afforded the
ney's failure cannot be determined, ineffective assistance is presumed and reversal is reo
quired. Id. The dissent further counters the majority's interpretation of Crowley, stating
that the Third Circuit limited the consideration of harmless error to the particular fact
situation where counsel is absent for a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Id.
64. 586 F.2d at 1331·32.
65. 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 851 (1969). See generally Mause,
Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implications of Chapman v. California, 53 MINN. L.
REv. 519 (1969); Comment, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and the Harmless Error
Rule: The Eighth Circuit Abandons Chapman, 43 GEO. WASKo L. REv. 1384 (1975).
66. 372 U.S. 335 (1942).
67. Id. at 339.
GB. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
69. Id. at 49.
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right to counsel "in any real sense."70
In Geders v. United States,71 a court order prevented counsel
from conferring with the defendant during an overnight recess.
The Supreme Court examined the seventeen hour recess and
held that the court order deprived the defendant of his right to
counseU2 Central to the court's holding was the fact that it is
common practice for an accused to confer with counsel during
such extended recesses to discuss the events of the. day's trial.
In Herring v. New York,73 a state statute granted the judge
in a non-jury criminal trial the power to deny counsel the.opportunity to make a final summation. The Supreme Court found
that "no aspect of [our adversary fact-finding process] could be
more important than" the right of the defense to make a closing
argument. 74 Thus, the Court held that a total denial of the opportunity to make a closing argument, in a jury or non-jury
criminal trial, contravenes the right to the assistance of counsel
that the sixth amendment guarantees. 75
In Glasser v. United States 78 and Holloway v. Arkansas,77 defense counsel represented multiple defendants who allegedly had
conflicting interests. In Glasser, the Supreme Court held that a
defendant is entitled to the undivided assistance of counsel. 78
Since counsel's representation "was not as effective as it might
have been if the appointment had not been made," the Court
held that defendant was denied his sixth amendment right to the
effective assistance of counsel. 78 In Holloway, the Supreme Court
affirmed Glasser, holding that a court's failure to appoint separate counsel upon timely motions by defense counsel, deprives a
70.
71.
72.
73.

1d. at 57.
425 U.S. 80 (1976).
1d.. at 91.
422 U.S. 853 (1975).
1d. at 862.
1d. at 857-59.
315 U.S. 60 (1942).
435 U.S. 475 (1978).
315 U.S. at 75.
1d. at 76. The Glasser Court held that "the 'assistance of counsel' guaranteed by

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
the Sixth Amendment contemplates that such assistance be untrammeled and
unimpaired by a court order requiring that one lawyer should simultaneously represent
conflicting interests." 1d. at 70.
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defendant of the sixth amendment right to assistance of
counse1. 80
In all of the above cases, reversal was automatic because the
harm resulted from what the attorney was prevented from doing.
Such harm could not be determined from the record since it either occurred before there was a record or because it was not
reflected in the record. 81 The Cooper court, quoting Holloway,
stated: "[T]hus an inquiry into a claim of harmless error would
require ... unguided speculation."82 However, the harmless error rule should apply when specific acts and omissions occur at
trial and their scope is readily identifiable from the record. 83
Since the reviewing court can determine with some confidence,
and without mere speculation, if the error prejudiced the outcome of the trial. 8.
The Cooper court asserted another reason for granting relief
only upon a showing of prejudice. The type of trial errors asserted by Cooper i.e., counsel's failure to object to the admission
of evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution, were of the
type that could have been reviewed on direct appeal, as plain
error,85 or in the alternative, could have justified collateral attack. 88 Both situations would have required a showing of
prejudice. 87 Therefore, the court reasoned that if these errors
could escape a showing of prejudice by attacking them solely
SO. 435 U.S. at 484-85. For a general discussion of the Holloway decision, see Note,
The Sixth Amendment and the Right to Separate Counsel, 16 Houe. L. REv. 209 (1978);
Comment, Multiple Criminal Representation Examined: Holloway v. Arkansas, 40 OHIO
ST. L. REv. 251 (1979).
81. 586 F.2d at 1332.
82.Id.
83. Id. In Cooper, the court examined the defendant's specifie allegations and found
that 1) all of the alleged errors were readily identifiiable from the record, and 2) the
allegation of counsel's failure to stipulate to a prior conviction was Cooper's only meritorious allegation and was not prejudicial enough to warrant reversal. See text accompanying notes 90 to 93.
84.Id.
85. Id. at 1333. For general background material on the plain error doctrine, see 10
J. MOORE FEDERAL PRACTICE § 103.41 (2d ed. 1976). See text accompanying notes 126-128
infra.
86. 586 F.2d at 1333. For general background material on the collateral attack doctrine, see 2 C. WRIGHT, supra note 65, at § 593. See also Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?
Collateral Attack in Criminol Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142 (1970).
87. 586 F.2d at 1333. For a discussion of the prejudice requirement under the plain
doctrine, see 10 J. MOORE, supra note 85. For a discussion of the prejudice requirement
under the collateral attack doctrine, see Wainwright v. Sykes, 423 U.S. 72 (1977).
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under a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the doctrines
of plain error or collateral attack would be undermined.
Finally, the court added two cautionary comments: 1)
prejudice may result from the cumulative effect of multiple deficiencies; and 2) the requirement of prejudice does not mean that .
relief is only available if defendants would have been acquitted
but for counsel's mistakes. 8s
Having defined the new Ninth Circuit standard and the requirement of prejudice where ineffective assistance claims are
based on specific act and omissions, the court applied the standard to the Cooper facts. sa Cooper alleged counsel's failure
to object to the admission of the fruits of the warrantless
searches of his home and person. The court found no merit
to Cooper's allegation claiming counsel's failure to suppress
the fruits of a warantless arrest, since the court found probable
cause for the arrest and consent to the search. 90 Cooper further
alleged counsel's failure to move to supress his statements made
to the police and failure to object to testimony regarding defendant's identification at the pre-indictment lineup. Because the
confession and line-up occurred prior to the Escobedo and Wade
decisions, the court again found no merit to Cooper's claims: the
interrogation was proper under pre-Escobedo standards, which
existed at the time of trial; the pre-indictment lineup was proper
under pre-United States v. Wade standards.
Cooper also claimed counsel's failure to inform him of his
right to appeal. The court determined however, that Cooper
knew of his right to appeal independent of counsel. 91 Lastly,
Cooper criticized his attorney's failure to stipulate to his prior
burglary conviction. The court found that the only additional
fact to come before the jury because of counsel's failure to stipulate was that probation on the earlier conviction had been revoked and that the prejudice from this additional information
was slight. 92 Therefore, the court held that even if counsel was
negligent in this respect, the error was not prejudicial. 93 The
88. 586 F.2d at 1333.

89.1d.
9O.1d.

91. 1d.
92.1d.
93.1d.
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court concluded that none of the Cooper allegations were prejudicial and therefore, affirmed the judgment dismissing Cooper's
habeas petition.
The Dissenting Opinion

Judge Hufstedler, writing for the dissent,94 concurred with
the majority's new standard requiring "reasonably competent
and effective representation," but vigorously dissented on the requirement of prejudice. The dissent argued that the right to assistance of counsel is so fundamental that failure to provide constitutionally adequate counsel at trial demands automatic
reversal. 95 The dissent launched three major attacks against the
majority opinion: (1) circuit courts have not denied relief based
on failure to show prejudice; (2) there is no viable distinction
between situations where counsel is denied, or prevented from
carrying out a vital function and where counsel's alleged ineffectiveness is based on specific acts and omissions; and (3) the
requirement of prejudice underlying the plain error and collateral attack doctrines would not be undermined by requiring automatic reversal.
The dissent's theory, underlying its automatic reversal rule,
proposed that the sixth amendment not only embraces the right
to counsel,98 but also the right to effective assistance of counsel. 97
The dissent stated: "The Sixth Amendment right to counsel
proscribes with equal force denials of reasonably competent and
effective counsel, for '[i]t has long been recognized that the right
to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.' "98
The overriding concern in the right to counsel cases99 was enunciated in Chapman u. California,loo where the Supreme Court
stated that the right to counsel was among the "constitutional
rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be
treated as harmless error . . . . "101 Therefore, the dissent rea94. Judges Ely and Hug joined Judge Hufstedler's dissenting opinion.
95. [d. at 1334.
96. [d.

97. [d. at 1335. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977); Beasley v. United States, 491, F.2d 687 (6th Cir.
1974).
98. 586 F.2d at 1338, quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. at 771 n.14.
99. E.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
100. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
101. [d. at 23.
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soned, a sixth amendment violation, such as a violation of the
right to effective assistance of counsel, always requires automatic
reversal. 102
The dissent cited recent Supreme Court cases l03 which reaffirmed the Chapman automatic reversal rule. 104 However, these
are the same cases the majority opinion in Cooper used to support its analysis. Where the majority characterized Herring,
Geders and Holloway as warranting automatic rev.ersal,105 since
counsel was prevented from carrying out a vital function, the
dissent characterized these same cases as holding that automatic
reversal applies regardless of any absence or presence of
prejudice. loe The dissent found further support in Holloway,
which reaffirmed the "general rule" of automatic reversal for violations of the right to effective assistance of counsel. Therefore,
the dissent argued: "The right to effective assistance of counsel
is more than a right to be free from prejudicial trial errors. The
right to competent counsel is also based on considerations of procedural fairness that apply regardless of the strength of the case
against the accused."107
The dissent recognized that refusal to grant automatic reversal would impair defendants' right to the very presence of
counsel because defendants, faced with overwhelming evidence
of guilt, might never be able to demonstrate prejudice from the
absence of counsel. Since this type of situation goes to the very
heart of fundamental fairness of criminal proceedings, courts
should not look to whether prejudice resulted or was shown. 108
The dissent contended that the Supreme Court's decision in
Chambers v. Maroneyl09 does not undermine the automatic reversal rule. According to the dissent, Chambers dealt only with
the issue of what constitutes constitutionally ineffective counsel;
102. 586 F.2d at 1335.
103. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978); Geders v. United States, 425 U.S.
80 (1976); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1976).
104. The Chapman automatic reversal rule holds that certain constitutional rights,
such as the right to counsel, are so basic to a fair trial, that a denial of those rights can
never be treated as harmless error. Chapman v. California, 380 U.S. 18, 23 n.8 (1967).
105. See text accompanying notes 71 to 84 supra.
106. 586 F.2d at 1335.
107. [d.
108. [d.
109. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
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it did not determine whether or not a defendant need show
prejudice. Furthermore, the dissent finds misleading the majority's analysis of appellate decisions in line with Chambers, as not
requiring reversal where prejudice is not shown. l1° The dissent
states that neither Chambers nor the circuit court decisions require a separate showing of prejudice lll apart from the overall
demonstration that trial counsel did not conform to the constitutional standard of competency. The dissent states that, "[o]nce
trial counsel has been held to have been constitutionally ineffective, no circuit has denied relief because the error was
harmless." 112
The dissent rejected the majority's application of the automatic reversal rule to only those situations where there is no
counselor where counsel is prevented from carrying out vital
functions. The dissent found no reason to distinguish between
situations where there is no counselor counsel is prevented from
carrying out vital functions, from situations where counsel is incompetent. 1I3 Despite the fact that automatic reversal is premised, in part, on the difficulty of assessing the prejudicial impact, this should not justify restricting the rule to situations
where counsel is prevented from performing. In all situations, assessing the prejudicial impact of the situations is difficult and
results in speculation. The dissent argued that there will always
be cases of specific acts or omissions where the cold record will
not truly reflect counsel's performance or the effect of counsel's
errors.
The dissent also found no merit in the majority's argument
110. The dissent argued that since the circuit court cases did not expressly require a
separate showing of prejudice, these cases did not support the majority's holding. 586
F.2d at 1336·37.
111. [d. at 1336 & 1337 n.6.
112. [d. at 1338.
113. The dissent stated:
Defendants represented by incompetent attorneys surely are at
least as bad off as defendants with competent counsel who are
barred from presenting closing argument at a bench trial. A
holding that pro forma appointment of counsel is sufficient to
remove Sixth Amendment violations from the automatic rever·
sal rule would undermine the purpose of Gideon.
[d. at 1338. The dissent further quotes from the original Cooper panel that "the purpose
of Gideon was not merely to supply criminal defendants with warm bodies, but rather to
guarantee reasonable competent representation." [d. at n.11, quoting Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
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that automatic reversal would undermine the requirement of
prejudice, included in the plain error and collateral attack doctrines. The dissent's interpretation is that the requirement of
prejudice included in both doctrines is permissible when counsel
is competent, since then the defendant could have knowingly
waived his rights and thus a requirement of prejudice may be
justifiable. However, when counsel is incompetent, the underlying "waiver" may not have been knowing,, 14 To protect the defendant from unknowingly waiving his right to appeal because of
incompetent counsel, automatic reversal should be adopted.
Lastly, the dissent notes that the majority did not determine who should bear the burden of proving prejudice. If a
harmless error approach is taken, the dissent advocates that,
under Chapman v. California,1I5 someone other than the preson
prejudiced must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
was harmless.

E.

CRITIQUE

Portions of each opmIOn in Cooper make important and
meritorious legal arguments. 1I8 Both opinions, however, also have
significant gaps within their reasonings and thus create analytical problems. The remainder of the Note will examine the major
areas of conflict and the weaknesses of each opinion. These areas
include: (1) the distinction between vital function and claims and
specific act and omission claims; (2) the effect of automatic reversalon the plain error and collateral attack doctrines; (3) the interpretation of precedent; and (4) the procedural fairness theory.

Vital Functions as Distinguished From Specific Acts and
Omissions
The essence of the majority's argument is that automatic re114. 586 F.2d at 1339.
115. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). In Chapman, the Supreme Court stated: "[c]onstitutional
error. . . casts on someone other than the person prejudiced by it a burden to show that
it was harmless." [d. at 24. The Court further stated that the prosecution bears the bur·
den of proving that the constitutional error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."
[d. See also United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1968).
116. The majority opinion discusses the vital function/specific acts and omissions
distinction, 586 F.2d at 1332; and the possibility of circumventing the prejudice requirement included within the plain error/collateral attack doctrines, id. at 1333. The dissent
argues against the majority's plain error/collateral attack position, id. at 1339; then in·
terpretes precedent, id. at 1335·38 and discusses procedural fairness, id. at 1335.
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versal is required only when no counsel appears or where counsel
is prevented from performing vital functions. While the majority
does not expressly define the distinction, it cites cases it considers are properly within the automatic reversal rule.1I7 The majority seems to view specific acts and omissions as errors that occur
in the course of the trial that will appear in the record. liS The
rationale for the vital functions/specific acts distinction is that
"when no counsel is provided, or counsel is prevented from discharging his normal functions, the evil lies in what the attorney
does not do, and is either not readily apparent in the record, or
occurs at a time when no record is made."lIg Where there is a
claim relating to a specific act and omission "the error occurs at
trial and its scope is readily identifiable."'20
The majority's distinction makes sense especially where
claims of ineffectiveness of counsel are based on facts similar to
those in Cooper.121 Practically speaking, there is an obvious difference in magnitude between counsel being prevented from
making a closing argument or conferring with the client, and
counsel making a tactical error, such as failing to stipulate to a
prior conviction.
The dissent, however, raises the issue that the line between
failure to perform vital functions and failure to perform specific
acts and omissions is not clear.'22 There are situations that could
conceivably fall into both categories. For instance, a court might
prevent the attorney from making a clear objection, thereby preserving the defendant's right to appeal. Likewise, a court might
deny a request to make an offer of proof. A judge might deny a
continuance so that pre-trial investigation or additional client
conference could not be conducted. 'These situations could be
viewed as either specific errors by the attorney or as a court
117. For a discussion of the cases cited by' the majority, see text accompanying notes
66 to 80 supra.
118. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978); Geders v. United States, 425
U.S. 80 (1976); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932).
119. 586 F.2d at 1332, quoting Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U ..S. at 490.
120. [d.
121. See text accompanying notes 4 & 5 supra.
122. 586 F.2d at 1338. The dissent states: "It makes little sense to distinguish between cases where counsel is denied and cases where counsel is incompetent because representation by incompetent counsel may be little or no better than no representation at
all." 1d.
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preventing an attorney from performing vital functions. Since
under Cooper this distinction makes the difference between having to show prejudice or being automatically reversed without
such a showing, clarity is needed for uniform application in the
trial courts. While the extreme cases may clearly fall in one category or the other, the closer cases will undoubtedly create
problems of interpretation. To this extent, the automatic reversal rule is preferable since it would ensure consistency in trial
court treatment of the basic procedural right to a fair trial. I23
Plain Error and Collateral Attack

The majority is concerned that if prejudice is not required
the criminal defendant will be encouraged to make claims of ineffective assistance in order to skirt traditional review processes
where prejudice is required. 124 The majority asserts that if
prejudice is not required the doctrines of plain error and collateral attack would be undermined. m
Plain errors are errors or defects affecting substantial rights
that were not brought to the attention of the court by objection
at trial. I28 Where no objection is made, an appellate court will
reverse a trial judgment only where the errors are obvious,l27 or if
they affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicifil proceeding. 128 The error must be shown to prejudice the defendant's case. Thus, if the error was "harmless," even if it is
obvious, the result will not be reversed.
Collateral attack,l29 which the Cooper dissent refers to as the
Wainwright v. Sykes doctrine,130 originates with a habeas corpus
petition. A state prisoner claims that state remedies have been
exhausted without a decision on the merits of a federal constitutional claim because of his failure to comply with the state pro123. See text accompanying notes 96 to 102 supra, and notes 157 to 166 infra.
124. 586 F.2d at 1333.
125. Id.
126. 10 J. MOORE, supra note 85, at § 103.41.
127. Id.; see also United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157. 160 (1936).
128. 10 J. MOORE, supra note 85, at 0 103.41.
129. See generally Goodman & Sollett, Wainwright v. Sykes: The Lower Federal
Courts Respond. 30 HAsTINGS L.J. 1683 (1979); Tague, Federal Habeas Corpus and Inef·
fective Representation of Counsel: The Supreme Has Work to Do. 31 STAN. L. REv. 1
(1978); Note, Federal Habeas Corpus: Further Erosion of Its Efficacy as a Remedy for
State Incarceration. 24 Loy. L. REv. 251 (1978).
130. 586 F.2d at 1339.
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cedural rules on how the claim must be raised, i.e., where state
law requires a trial objection and counsel failed to make one. 131
In order to assert this type of collateral attack, the defendant
must show cause for the failure to object at the time and actual
prejudice .132
The majority basically argues that if prejudice is not required for specific act and omission claims, defendants will overwhelmingly choose to assert ineffective assistance claims to
avoid the extra showing of prejudice required on direct l33 appeal
or collateral attack on the underlying constitutional violation.
Thus, the court will be faced with large numbers of ineffective
assistance petitions which would have been subject to a
prejudice test on appeal. The court will have to rule on those
cases where errors below could have been held harmless on the
merits of the underlying claim.
The dissent disagrees, contending that both these theories
are based on defendant knowingly waiving his or her rights and
then later raising a claim for relief. ls4 However, if counsel was
inadequate, defendant may not have been aware of his rights
and therefore could not be said to have knowingly waived
them. 135 Waiver depends on personal participation and proceeds
on the premise that the law should strive to guard against the
individual's inadvertent or uninformed loss of a valuable right. 13B
To protect the defendant from unknowingly waiving such important rights because of incompetent counsel, automatic reversal
should be applied upon prima facie showing of ineffectiveness. 137
Furthermore, the dissent points out that trial courts will be
able to distinguish between true ineffective assistance cases and
claims that are in reality underlying substantive assertions that
should go up on direct appeal or collateral attack. 13s The dissent
131. See note 129 supra.
132. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
133. 586 F.2d at 1333.
134. [d. at 1339. See generally Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, Procedural Default and
the Burger Court, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 473 (1978).
135. United States v. Marshall, 488 F.2d 1169 (9th Cir. 1973).
136. See Spritzer, supra note 134, at 513, 514.
137. 586 F.2d at 1337.
138. [d. at 1340 n.16. The dissent stated:
The majority's fear that collateral attack rules will be undermined must rest on a distrust of the ability of courts to distinguish genuine claims of inadequate counsel and disguised col-
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points out that for ineffective assistance claims, the defendant
must show why the attorney was incompetent,139 Such a showing
is not required on appeal of the underlying claim. Thus trial
courts will be able to identify those claims which are brought
merely to circumvent the prejudice requirement because a prima
facie showing of ineffectiveness will not be made out.
With rulings on this prejudice issue being so recent, it is difficult to assess whether the majority's concerns will manifest
themselves in practice. Additionally, there is no way to assess
the dissent's conclusion that even if defendants do increasingly
rely on habeas ineffective assistance claims, trial courts will be
able to separate the real from the contrived claims. Perhaps the
experience of the circuit courts who have ruled on this issue
could be utilized to resolve this conflict.

Interpretation of Precedent
Throughout the opinion the majority and the dissent rely on
the same cases l40 for differing propositions. UI It is this difference
in interpretation that determines the ultimate result in the majority's and dissent's positions on the requirement of prejudice.
Generally speaking, the majority reads the sixth amendment
precedent narrowly, while the dissenting judges read the same
cases much more broadly.
The majority claims that courts of appeals have regularly
held that "reversal is not required where the defendant suffered·
prejudice as a result of the asserted trial errors. . . . "142 The
dissent responded that "once trial counsel has been held to have
been constitutionally ineffective, no circuit has denied relief belateral attack. Since the majority presumes courts to be
capable of determining the more subjective issue of prejudice,
it is curious that they would distrust the ability of judges to
apply the objective standard of attorney competence.
[d.
139. [d.

140. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853
(1975); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932).
141. Compare the majority's use of the cases cited in note 141 supra, 586 F.2d at
1331-32 with the dissent's use of the same cases, id. at 1336-38.
142. [d. at 1331.
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cause the error was harmless."u3 Both of these positions are
overstated.
The majority failed to recognize or refute the analysis of the
Third and Sixth Circuits which have adopted the automatic reversal doctrine. The Third Circuit in Moore v. United States, 144
indicates that prejudice is one relevant factor, but is not a prerequisite to prevail on ineffective assistance claims. The Sixth
Circuit in Beasley v. United States l45 stated that "[h]armless error tests do not apply in regard to the deprivation of a procedural right so fundamental as the effective assistance of counsel."
The dissent is incorrect to state that no circuit has denied
relief because the error was harmless. First, the dissent failed to
address the Third Circuit's holding in United States ex rel.
Chambers v. Maroneyl48 which denied defendant's habeas corpus
petition on the ground that "the sum and substance of the case
is that [defendant] was not prejudiced by the late appointment
of counsel." Chambers was subsequently affirmed by the United
States Supreme Court.147 Second, the dissent ignored the cases
from the Eighth Circuit which has had a requirement of prejudice since 1975. 148
The dissent also states that "neither Chambers nor the circuit court decisions require any showing of prejudice apart from
the demonstration that trial counsel did not conform to the constitutional standard of competency."I" This blanket statement is
143. [d. at 1338.

144. 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970).
145. 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974).
146. 408 F.2d 1186, 1196 (3d Cir. 1969), aff'd, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). The Third Circuit
in Chambers interpreted its previous decision, United States ex reI. Mathis V. Rundle,
394 F.2d 748 (3d Cir. 1968) which held that denial of effective assistance of counsel could
be presumed from a showing of belated appointment unless the prosecution proved that
the defense had not been prejudiced by the tardy appointment. 408 F.2d at 1186. The
Third Circuit, in Chambers construed this to mean the inherent prejudice due to late
appointment of counsel may be properly overcome either 1) by evidence produced by the
state in an evidentiary hearing showing that there was no prejudice, or 2) by adequate
affirmative proof otherwise appearing in the record demonstrating that the appellant was
not prejudiced. [d. at 1190. Mathis has since been overruled by Moore V. United States,
432 F.2d 730, 73 (3d Cir. 1970). See note 152 infra.
147. Chambers V. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
148. 510 F.2d 356, 358 (8th Cir. 1975). See also McQueen V. Swenson, 560 F.2d 959,
960 (8th Cir. 1977), rev'g 425 F. Supp. 373 (E.D. Mo. 1976); t.Jnited States V. Easter, 539
F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1976); Thomas V. Wyrick, 535 F.2d 407, 414 (8th Cir. 1976).
149. 586 F.2d at 1336-37. The majority and dissent clearly use the Supreme Court's
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not supported by the cases cited. 150 The dissent correctly notes
that the whole issue of prejudice may be a factor to be considered in weighing whether the defendant has sufficiently shown
ineffectiveness. 151
The first series of cases that the dissent relies on for this
proposition are from the Third and Sixth Circuit, both of which
have adopted the automatic reversal rule.152 Further, all of these
cases involve absence of any counselor failure of counsel to perform a vital function, situations which the majority agrees would
warrant automatic reversal. 153
The dissent does cite two Fourth Circuit cases that are concerned with the first, bad advice concerning entering of a guilty
plea and second, an attorney's errors during jury selection. 154
decision in Chamber's for differing propositions. The majority interprets the Chamber's
rejection of a per se automatic reversal rule as holding that where counsel's performance
has not prejudiced the defense, counsel's alleged errors will be harmless. See text accompanying note 60-65 supra. The dissent, on the other hand, finds the sole issue in Chambers not whether a separate showing is required, but rather what constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel. [d. at 1336; see text accompanying notes 109-112 supra. Judge Hufstedler's view is strengthened by the fact that Chambers is not cited in any of the circuit
court decisions that the majority interprets as requiring a separate showing of prejudice.
[d. at 1337.
150. See note 148 supra.
151. 586 F.2d at 1337-38.
152. E.g., Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974) and text accompanying note 145 supra; Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730,737 (3d Cir. 1970). Moore
expressly overruled United States ex rei. Mathis v. Rundle, 394 F.2d 748 (3d Cir. 1968).
The dissent states that the Third Circuit in Moore expressly adopts the automatic reversal rule. 586 F.2d at 1336 n.5. However, the relevant language in Moore states the following: "[T]he ultimate issue is not whether a defendant was prejudiced by his counsel's act
or omission, but whether counsel's performance was at the level of normal competency.
That the client was prejudiced by a failure in performance is of course evidentiary on the
issue." 432 F.2d at 737. Although the language impliedly adopts the automatic reversal
rule, there is nothing in the opinion that expressly adopts the rule. Because it overruled
Mathis, Moore stands for the proposition that prejudice is no longer presumed, but rather
may be one of the factors in determining if counsel was ineffective. 432 F.2d at 735.
For other cases in the Third and Sixth Circuits, see, e.g .. United States v. Sumlin,
567 F.2d 684, 689 (6th Cir. 1977) (ineffective assistance of counsel during FBI interrogation was "of a different type altogether than those that deal with errors at trial or in trial
preparation."); United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066 (3d Cir. 1976) (limits application
of harmless error on denial of counsel at a hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty
plea); United States ex rei. Green v. Rundle, 434 F.2d 1112 (3d Cir. 1970) (failure to
investigate an alibi-ineffectiveness presumed and reversal required).
153. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
154. Tolliver v. United States, 563 F.2d 1117, 1121 (4th Cir. 1977) (flagrant misadvice resulting from "neglect or ignorance rather than from informed, professional deliberation" deprived defendant of effective assistance of counsel); Marzullo v. Maryland, 561
F.2d 540, 547 (4th Cir. 1977) (representation during jury selection was "outside the range
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/8
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Both of these cases do deal with specific acts and omissions and
there was no inquiry into prejudice. The dissent, however, neglects to point out the other circuits that do have prejudice requirements. 155 Thus, in their respective zeal, neither majority nor
dissent honestly portrays the present state of the law. In reality,
the circuit courts are split not two, but three ways on this very
difficult issue, with cogent arguments being made on all sides. 156
Ultimately, the resolution of the question depends on social policy considerations and on an analysis of the sixth amendment.
Procedural Fairness

The sixth amendment provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of Counsel for his defense."157 The right to the assistance of
counsel has been described as "necessary to insure fundamental
human rights to life and liberty."158 There can be no question
that the right to counsel is at the very core of the right to a fair
trial. In Chapman, the high court acknowledged that a violation
of this fundamental right could never be harmless; therefore, a
showing of prejudice is not required. 159
The Cooper dissent's strongest argument, that procedural
fairness requires automatic reversal, is entirely ignored by the
Cooper majority.160 This policy argument relies heavily on Chapman for the proposition that sixth amendment right to counsel
violations cannot be harmless. When Chapman's holding is combined with the rule of McMann which equates the right to counsel with the right to effective counsel,161 the resultant constituof competence expected of attorneys in criminal cases" and therefore deprived defen·
dant of effective representation).
155. See note 148 supra.
156. See note 54 supra.
157. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
158. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938); see also Avery v. Alabama, 308
U.S. 444 (1940).
159. 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967).
160. The majority deals with procedural fairness as an afterthought in one line near
the end of their opinion. They acknowledge, .. [tlhe guilty as well as the innocent are
entitled to a fair trial, and' [tlhe assistance of trial counsel is often a requisite to the
very existence of a fair trial.'" 586 F.2d at 1333, quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25, 31 (1972).
161. In McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), the Supreme Court held that
the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel. [d. at 771. In McMann,
the defendants entered guilty pleas which they claimed were the result of coerced
confessions.
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tional imperative points strongly towards automatic reversal for
all ineffective assistance cases.162
Additionally, since the sixth amendment protects procedural fairness, its provisions apply equally to innocent and guilty
defendants. 183 If, as McMann suggests, effective assistance is a
foundational element of a fair trial, then effective assistance
should be available to innocent and guilty alike. The Cooper dissent correctly notes that a showing of prejudice will be an insurmountable barrier to remedying a constitutional violation of this
right for defendants whose guilt is clear.'84 It will also be a difficult burden for defendants whose innocence is unclear. The
prejudice showing required by the majority in Cooper thus
makes obtaining a remedy for ineffective counsel more difficult
for those whose guilt is clear or whose innocence is unclear, when
procedural fairness should be equally available to all who are accused of crime. The standard of review of ineffectiveness claims
should enable all defendants on an equal basis to remedy their
constitutional deprivation of competent counsel.
In Gideon, Justice Black eloquently wrote:
The right of one charged with crime to counsel
may not be deemed fundamental and essential to
fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From
the very beginning, our state and national consti·
tutions and laws have laid great emphasis on pro·
cedural and substantive safeguards designed to
assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in
which every defendant stands equal before the
law.'15

Since McMann held that criminal defendants are constitutionally entitled to the "effective assistance of competent counsel," 188 perhaps the procedural safeguards Justice Black discussed necessitate automatic reversal for ineffective assistance
violations despite the precedent to the contrary.
162. The majority agrees that automatic reversal is constitutionally required where
no counsel appears or where counsel is prevented from performing a vital funtion. 586
F.2d at 1332. Thus, the dissent is only arguing for extension of this rule to specific acts
and omissions cases.
163. See note 160 supra. See also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963).
164. 586 F.2d at 1335.
165. 372 U.S. at 344.
166. 397 U.S. at 771.
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CONCLUSION

The significance of Cooper lies in its rejection of the "farce
and mockery of justice" standard and its endorsement of the
"reasonably competent and effective assistance of counsel" standard. Adoption of the standard should lead to a more objective
view of what constitutes effective assistance of counsel. The
court, however, by combining both the "reasonably effective assistance of counsel" standard and the "reasonably competent assistance" standard has left room for confusion among the lower
courts since no guidelines were established as to what the level of
attorney ineffectiveness should be.
The more controversial portion of the Cooper opinion is its
adoption of the prejudice requirement. Using a two-step analysis, a defendant must first prove ineffective assistance of counsel
and second, must prove that the outcome of his or her trial was
prejudiced by the ineffectiveness of counsel. The dissent makes a
persuasive policy argument for automatic reversal based on the
need to assure all criminal defendants a fair trial. Since the circuit courts are split in several directions, the ultimate resolution
of this conflict awaits Supreme Court review.
Catherine A. Yanni

II.

"RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT
ORGANIZATIONS": THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ENDORSEMENT OF POPULAR DECISION

A.

INTRODUCTION

In 1970, Congress passed the Organized Crime Control Act
(OCCA-70), aimed at "the eradication of organized crime in the
United States."· Title IX of this Act, "Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations" [RICO], 2 provides stiff penalties for
1. Statement of Findings and Purpose of the Organized Crime Control Act, 84 Stat.
923 (1970). See also McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S. 30) or its Critics: Which
Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55, 141 (1970) (Written by Senator
McClellan who, in conjunction with Senator Hruska, introduced legislation later incorporated into RICO).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976). OCCA-70 also includes Title I, Special Grand Jury,
18 U.S.C. §§ 3331-3334; Title II, General Immunity, id. at §§ 6001-6005; Title III, Recalcitrant Witnesses, 28 U.S.C. § 1826; Title IV, False Declarations, 18 U.S.C. § 1623; Title
V, Protected Facilities for Housing Government Witnesses, id. at § 3481; Title VI, Deposi-
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those who participate in the affairs of an "enterprise"3 through a
"pattern of racketeering activity"· or collection of unlawful debt. 5
tions. 18 U.S.C. § 3503; Title VII, Litigation Concerning Sources of Evidence, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3504; Title vm, Syndicated Gambling, 18 U.S.C. § 1511; Title X, Dangerous Special
Offender Sentencing, id. at §§ 3575-78; Title XI, Regulation of Explosives, id. at §§ 841848; Title XII, National Commission on Individual Rights, id. at § 3331 note, 84 Stat. 960.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976) defines "enterprise" as: "any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity."
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1976) defines "pattern of racketeering activity" as: "at least
two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this
chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)
(1976) defines "racketeering activity" as follows:
(A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling,
arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or
other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any
act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of
Title 18, United States Code: section 201 (relating to bribery),
section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and
473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft
from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section
659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from
pension and welfare funds), section 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail
fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the
obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1951
(relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion),
section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to
interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section
1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955
(relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of
stolen property), sections 2341-46 (relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave
traffic), (C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United
States Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments
and loans to labor organizations), or section 501(c) (relating to
embezzlement from union funds), or (D) any offense involving
bankruptcy fraud, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous
drugs, punishable under any law of the United States.
5. "Unlawful debt" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(6) (1976) as:
[Aj debt (A) incurred or contracted in gambling activity
which was in violation of the law of the United States. . . and
(B) which was incurred in connection with the business of gambling . . . or the business of lending money or a thing of value
at a rate usurious under State or Federal law, where the usu-
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Sanctions for RICO violations are often much harsher than the
sanctions provided by state and federal law for the numerous
predicate offenses defining "racketeering activity."e Because the
definitional language in section 1961 of the Act is subject to varying interpretations, questions have arisen as to the proper application of the statute, and in fact, the constitutionality of RICO
has been challenged on a number of grounds. 7
In United States v. Rone,8 a Ninth Circuit panel dealt with
the issue of whether two criminal conspirators, acting in concert
to commit various offenses, could be termed a RICO "enterprise"
and thus fall within the am bit of the statute. Defendant Rone and
co-defendant Little associated together for purposes of committing several acts of murder and extortion, and ultimately were
convicted of the substantive RICO offense and the concomitant
rious rate is at least twice the enforceable rate.
These definitions are utilized in the substantive offense section of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962
(1976):
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any
income derived . . . from a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt. . . to use. . . any part
of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition
of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any
enterprise which is engaged in or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce . . . . (b) It shall be unlawful
for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain,
directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise
which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
or foreign commerce. (c) It shall be unlawful for any person
employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or
the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce,
to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct
of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity or collection of unlawful debt.
6. For instance, two acts of mail fraud are punishable by a $2,000 fine and ten years
imprisonment, with no forfeiture. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976). For comparable punishment
under RICO, see note 41 infra and accompanying text.
7. RICO has been subject to five constitutional challenges: vagueness, lack of authority under the commerce clause, violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws,
violation of the protection against double jeopardy, and violation of the eighth amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. None have been upheld. See
Atkinson, "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations," 18 U.S. C. §§ 1961-68:
Broadest of the Federal Criminal Statutes, 69 J. OF CRIM. L. AND CRIM. I, 4-9 (1978).
Although the Supreme Court has yet to hear a RICO case, the court, in a footnote to
Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975), commented on RICO and the rationale
behind the statute. 420 U.S. at 787 n.19.
8. 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. June 1979) (per Foley, D.J., sitting by designation; the other
panel members were Ely and Wallace, JJ.).
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conspiracy.s On appeal, defendants urged that their convictions
should be reversed, arguing that only legitimate businesses conducted through a pattern of racketeering activity fall within the
meaning of "enterprise," and here the prosecution failed to show
that defendants associated with such a business. lo The majority
of the panel disagreed, holding that a RICO "enterprise" could
indeed include purely illicit organizations. It
B.

"ENTERPRISE" UNDER RICO

Four sister circuits have agreed that the broad sword of RICO
is aimed at those who participate in the affairs of unlawful organizations through a pattern of racketeering activity.12 Central to
this position is the idea that if Congress intended to limit
"enterprise" to lawful business, it could have "inserted a single
word of restriction,"13 and that the use of "any" in modifying
"enterprise" mandates a broad reading of the statutory requirement. U Additionally, unlike the typical penal statute which is
strictly construed,15 RICO explicitly provides that "provisions of
this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
purpose."la "Enterprise" has been held to include a state governmental unit,17 a foreign business,18 a police departm~nt, IS and the
9. Both defendants were also convicted of two counts of extortion (18 U.S.C. § 894);
defendant Hone alone was convicted of possession of an unregistered firearm (18 U .S.C. §
5861(d)) and possession of a firearm which was not identified by a serial number (18
U.S.C. § 5861(i)).
10. 598 F.2d at 568.
11. [d.
12. United States v. Aleman, No. 78-1782, slip op. at 8-10 (7th Cir. Oct. 30, 1979);
United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246,1248-49 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
933 (1979); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 891-98 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1021 (1978); United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); United States v.
Morris, 532 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
Contra, United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260, 263 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 58-59 (D. Conn. 1975). Moeller was subsequently overruled by
United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d at 107 n.6.
13. United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d at 106.
14. United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d at 898. But see United States v. Hone, 598 F.2d
564, 574 (9th Cir. 1979) (Ely, J., dissenting).
15. United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411 (1973); see also Rewis v. United
States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971).
16. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970).
17. United States v. Frumento, 405 F. Supp. 23 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
18. United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied. 419 U.S. 1105
(1975).
19. United States v. Brown. 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1977).
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narcotics bureau of a police department;20 the majority rationale
sees no reason to exclude criminal associations from this category.
All the cases cited by the Rone court assert that this broad reading of "enterprise" comports with the legislative intent underlying Title IX.21 Thus the de facto association of the defendants in
Rone constituted a RICO "enterprise," the affairs of which were
conducted through racketeering activity; indeed, the primary
purpose of the "enterprise" was to commit such unlawful acts.
The requisite nexus of the "enterprise" to interstate commerce
would exist if the jury found any of three assertions to be true. 22
The dissenting opinion in Rone, written by Judge Ely, relies
heavily on the reasoning of Judge Van Graafeiland in his dissenting opinion to United States v. Altese. 23 That is, absent clear
Congressional intent, federal criminal jurisdiction should not extend to every illicit venture which, in some minimal fashion,
affects interstate commerce. 24 While such action may be constitutionally permissible, the intent of the lawmakers in drafting
RICO was quite the opposite, as an examination of relevant legislative history demonstrates. 25 RICO was intended to operate as a
business regulatory statute, but this function is not served if the
"enterprise" being "protected" is an illegitimate organization,
possibly even an individual bandit. 28
20. United States v. Ohlson, 552 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977).
21. See, e.g., 84 Stat. 923 (1970) (stating the desire to "seek the eradication of organized crime"). See note 12 supra.
22. To constitute a violation of § 1962, the enterprise in question must affect interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976). The jury in Rone could have found
this nexus by concluding either: (1) the company operated by a murder victim bought
steel manufactured outside Caifornia; or (2) defendants received and cashed another
murder victim's Social Security checks issued in Alabama; or (3) defendants engaged in
extortionate collection of debts. 598 F.2d at 573. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146
(1971); United States v. Phillips, 577 F.2d 495, 501 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 364 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976).
23. 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
24. 542 F.2d at 107. C{. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546
(1935) (if the commerce clause reached all enterprises having merely an "indirect" effect
upon interstate commerce, the "authority of the state over its domesitc concerns would
exist only by sufferance of the federal government"). See also United States v. Sutton,
605 F.2d 260, 270 (6th Cir. 1979) ..
25. See S. REp. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. REp. No. 91-1549,
reprinted in (1970) U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4007, 4032-36; United States v. Moeller,
402 F. Supp. 49, 59 (D. Conn. 1975). See generally Comment, Organized Crime and the
Infiltration of Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies for "Criminal Activity", 124 U. PA.
L. REV. 124, 204-206 (1975).
26. See United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 612-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 527
F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976); Comment, Title IX of the
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This line of reasoning has not impressed the majority view,
which has admitted that, although the infiltration of legitimate
business was a major concern, "Congress also intended to prohibit any pattern of racketeering activity in or affecting commerce."27 This sweeping rationale ignores the doctrine of ejusdem
generis, a rule of statutory interpretation which "warns against
expansively interpreting broad language which immediately follows narrow and specific terms."28 Applied to RICO, the broad
language "any ... group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity"29 interpreted in light of the preceding
specific terms yields the result that all RICO "enterprises" must
be, by definition, legitimate. And it is true that the specific terms
"partnership, corporation, [and] association"30 connote legitimate organizations.
There is also a doctrine of statutory interpretation which
resolves ambiguities in penal statutes to the benefit of the defendant,31 although this canon of lenity should not be used to violate
the clear intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. 32 The
minority view argues for the application of the canon of lenity in
RICO: the doctrine would not run counter to legislative intent,33
thus given the ambiguity of "enterprise" all doubts should be
resolved in favor of a potential defendant, and the narrow construction of the word should be favored. However, the weight of
authority protests that such a reading of the statute "leaves a
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970: An Analysis of Issues Arising in its Interpretation,
27 DEPAUL L. REV. 89, 98-99 (1977). Since by definition an individual can be an
"enterprise", it follows that if "enterprise" includes criminal ventures as well as legitimate
businesses, RICO can conceivably be stretched to punish lone criminals having no connection with any organization. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976).
27. United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1974). The Cappetto
court also asserts that, while § 1962(a) deals with infiltration of legitimate businesses,
subsections (b) and (c) are aimed at illegal organizations. But there seems to be no
rational basis for the distinction, since the same definition of "enterprise" applies in all
three subsections. See 542 F.2d at 110 n.5; see also note 5 supra.
28. United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d at 107 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting); United
States v. Insco, 496 F.2d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 1974). See also 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.17, at 103 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1973).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976). See note 3 supra.
30.Id.
3!. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971); United States v. CamposSerrano, 404 U.S. 293, 297 (1971); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971); United
States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 680 (2d Cir. 1973).
32. United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 26 (1948); United States v. Gaskin, 320 U.S.
527,530 (1944). See also 2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 28, § 47.22 at 118.
33. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
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loophole for illegitimate business to escape its coverage."34
C.

"PATI'ERN

OF

RACKETEERING

ACTIVITY"

UNDER RICO

To establish a RICO violation the prosecution must show
participation in an enterprise through a "pattern of racketeering
activity," which is defined as "two acts of racketeering activity,
one of which occurred after the effective date of [the statute (i.e.,
1970)], and the last of which occurred within ten years . . . after
the commission of a prior act."35 The question is raised whether
there must be a relationship between the two acts of racketeering
activity. Since the "target of Title IX is. . . not sporadic activitY,"38 and that it is "this factor of continuity, plus relationship,
which combine to produce a pattern,"37 the requirement of a relationship between the predicate acts seems plausible enough. One
line of cases holds that the "acts must have been connected with
each other by some common scheme, plan or motive so as to
constitute a pattern, "38 but more recent authority only requires
that both predicate crimes be related to the affairs of the enterprise. 3u In Rone, the three murders and two acts of extortion forming the pattern of racketeering activity flowed naturally from the
existence of the RICO "enterprise," i.e., the defendants themselves, thus the prosecution had no problem in establishing such
an obvious nexus.4°
34. United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d at 106·07.
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1976). See note 4 supra.
36. S. REP. No. 91·617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. at 158 (1969).
37. [d.

38. United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 527 F.2d
237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976); United States v. White, 386 F. Supp.
882, 883·84 (E.D. Wis. 1974). See also United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855, 860-61 (7th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
39. United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1375 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v.
Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 889 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1021 (1978); United States v.
Nerone, 563 F.2d 836, 852 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778,
783 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
Nerone involved a casino gambling operation conducted upon the premises of a mobile horne park (the corrupted "enterprise" as alleged by the government), but conviction
under § 1962 (c) were reversed because the government failed to prove that the proceeds
of the casino operation were invested in the mobile horne park corporation. However, the
court indicated that the prosecution could have chosen the gambling association itself as
the "enterprise." 563 F.2d at 851-52. Compare with United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260,
264 n.1 (6th Cir. 1979).
40. 598 F.2d at 566-67.
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CRIMINAL FORFEITURE PENALTIES UNDER RICO

Violations of RICO are punishable by a fine of not more than
$25,000, imprisonment for not more than twenty years and forfeiture of any interest acquired or maintained in violation of the
statute.4I The latter sanction is unique in modern federal criminal
law, because forfeiture is imposed directly on an individual defendant rather than through a separate in rem proceeding.42 To provide procedural mechanisms for implementing the forfeiture provision of RICO, three additions to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure were made in 1972}3 The statute also allows district
courts to enter restraining orders and prohibitions to prevent the
transfer of property or other interest subject to forfeiture. 44 In one
recent case, the Second Circuit affirmed an order imposing conditional forfeiture upon the defendant's property; the defendant
was offered the option of redeeming his seized corporation within
six months of judgment, by payment of cash or other property
satisfactory to the Attorney General having a value of $100,000.45
The language in section 1963 is subject to varied interpretations, causing one court to remark that "[t]he scope of the statute is indeed without precise boundaries."4ft Several courts, however, have upheld the constitutionality of the forfeiture provision,47 even though it is not clear what interests or property rights
are subject to forfeiture. The Fifth Circuit has held that a union
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1976). Cf. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2) (1976) (providing for the
forfeiture of interests acquired through participation in a narcotics enterprise). RICO also
provides for discovery and civil remedies, including private treble damage actions by
persons injured by racketeering activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1976).
42. United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 396 (2d Cir. 1979).
43. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(2) provides that "the indictment or the information shall
allege the extent of the interest or property subject to forfeiture"; Rule 31(e) provides for
a special verdict to be returned as to the extent of the interest or property subject to
forfeiture; Rule 32(b)(2) authorizes the "Attorney General to seize the interest or property
subject to forfeiture, fixing such terms and conditions as the court shall deem proper."
See also United States v. Hall, 521 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1975)(indictment quashed because
of government's failure to allege the extent of the interest subject to forfeiture pursuant
to Rule 7(c)(2)).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b) (1976). In United States V. Scalzitti, 408 F. Supp. 1014 (W.O.
Pa. 1975), the court ruled that an injunction prohibiting the defendant from transferring
his business assets did not deprive him of his presumption of innocence, but only served
to maintain the "status quo." [d. at 1015.
45. United States V. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 397 (2d Cir. 1979).
46. United States V. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 992 (5th Cir. 1977).
47. United States V. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105
(1975); United States v. Scalzitti, 408 F. Supp. 1014 (w.n. Pa. 1975); United States V.
Amato, 367_ F. Supp. 547, 549 (S.n.N.Y. 1973).
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officer's position is an "interest" subject to forfeiture, although
the defendant was not barred from holding future positions in the
management of the union. 48 Similarly, if funds derived from racketeeringactivity are mixed with "clean" money and both bankrolls are used to operate a legi~imate business, what part, if any,
of the business is subject to forfeiture? In recognizing this problem the Second Circuit rejected the appellant's claim that the
forfeiture provision violated the eighth amendment's ban on cruel
and unusual punishment, holding that section 1963 permitted the
trial court sufficient flexibility in avoiding "draconian (and perhaps potentially unconstitutional) applications of the forfeiture
provision," and that "where the provision for forfeiture is keyed.
to the magnitude of a defendant's criminal enterprise, as it is in
RICO, the punishment is at least in some rough way proportional
to the crime."49

E.

THE ANALYSIS IN

United States v. Rone

In Rone, the government proved that the defendants committed three brutal murders and two acts of extortion; from this
standpoint, the long prison terms were a just result. It is doubtful,
however, that the defendants should have been prosecuted under
the RICO statute, because to prosecute this case under that statute, the government had to stretch the term "enterprise" to encompass virtually all patterns of racketeering activity; if this be
the meaning of the key word, "enterprise" becomes a redundancy, and one wonders why Congress did not simply prohibit
"patterns of racketeering activity."50 The fact that "enterprise"
is separately defined and separately integrated into the statute
indicates that the word was meant to have meaning independent
of "pattern of racketeering activity," hence its definition is most
likely to include only legitimate organizations.
Aside from considerations of common-sense statutory construction, the Rone majority exhibits poor analysis and faulty
. application of precedent. Three examples will suffice to illustrate
this point.

Rone cites United States v. Cappetto 51 to bolster its conten48.
49.
50.
51.

United States
United States
United States
502 F.2d 1351

v. Rubin; 559 F .2d at 990-92.
v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 397 (2d Cir. 1979).
v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260, 265-66 (6th Cir. 1979).
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
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tion that "enterprise" includes purely illegal associations. In
Cappetto, the Seventh Circuit rejected the argument advanced
by appellants that their illegal gambling association was not an
"enterprise" under RICO, citing United States v. Parness 52 for the
proposition that the key word was to be interpreted broadly. Yet
in Parness the question before the court was whether the infiltration of a legitimate foreign business by Americans through acts
committed in the United States fell within the ambit of RICO;
the fact that the court answered this question in the affirmative
does not stretch the meaning of "enterprise" to include illegal
associations. Thus in Cappetto the court's reliance upon the holding in Parness is misplaced; in Rone, a fortiori, the court's reliance upon Cappetto is misplaced.
This reliance upon Cappetto is faulty for another reason. In
support of its holding that an illegal gambling operation was a
RICO "enterprise," the court in Cappetto cited a Senate Committee Report which noted that "the Federal Government must
... prohibit directly substantial business enterprises of gambling."53 Thus, the court reasoned, Congress must view illegal
gambling as "enterprises" within the meaning of RICO.54 Yet the
cited Committee Report actually referred to Title VIII of OCCA70, not Title IX. Title VIII was meant to deal specifically with
illegal gambling operations; the fact that it is part of the same
omnibus act as Title IX does not necessarily mean that the two
titles were enacted with the same congressional intent. 55
The majority in Rone also cites United States v. Altese58 to
support the view that a RICO "enterprise" can be an illegitimate
business. The court in Altese held that the large scale gambling
operation conducted by defendants was a RICO "enterprise" citing a recent Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Campanale, 57 as
authority for this proposition. But in Campanale the court held
only that section 1962 applied to small businesses as well as to
larger concerns; thus the legitimate business involved, Pronto
Loading and Unloading Company, could not escape RICO'S net
merely because it was not a large corporation. 58 Nowhere in the
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

503
502
502
See
542
518
518

F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
F.2d at 1358, quoting S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 72·73 (1969).
F.2d at 1358.
United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 60 (D. Conn. 1975).
F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976).
F.2d at 364.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/8

36

Roper et al.: Criminal Law

1980]

CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE

111

opinion is it suggested that the result would have been the same
if an illegal organization had been the "enterprise" at issue.
The third leg in the Rone court's tripod of authority, United
States v. Elliott, 59 similarly fails to bear the weight of close scrutiny. In Elliott, the RICO "enterprise" consisted of five criminals
associated together for purposes of committing various acts of
murder, arson, and theft; the court took great pains to compare
this gang of ruffians to a large business conglomerate. 8o The
Elliott court cites United States v. Hawes" as stating that
"Congress gave the term 'enterprise' a very broad meaning,"82 yet
the court in Hawes supported this assertion by citing United
States u. Parness,83 United States v. Cappetto,84 and United
States u. Campanale. 85 Furthermore, the "enterprise" at issue in
Hawes, Peach State Distributing Company, was a legitimate
business dealing in jukeboxes arid penny arcade amusements;
this business acted as a front for illegal gambling operations.
Arguably, then, Hawes falls within the ambit of the very activities Congress was attempting to deal with in enacting Title IX,
namely, the infiltration of legitimate business through racketeering activity.

F.

CONCLUSION

Certainly the panel in Rone was faced with two very dangerous defendants. Yet in blindly following erroneous application of
precedent, contrary to clear legislative intent, and against
common-sense statutory interpretation, the Ninth Circuit created authority for far-ranging future RICO prosecutions. Because
the key word "enterprise" has such an expansive meaning in this
circuit, the statute is capable of reaching even the smallest petty
crook, provided the pattern of racketeering activity in some small
way affects interstate or foreign commerce. Here the discretion of
the prosecutor is all-important. Hopefully the prosecutors in the
Ninth Circuit will heed the warning of a recent decision in the
Second Circuit: "[T]he potentially broad reach of RICO poses
59. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1021 (1978).
SO. 571 F.2d at 898. See generally Note, Elliott v. United States: Conspiracy Law and
the Judicial Pursuit of Organized Crime Through RICO, 65 VA. L. REV. 109 (1979).
61. 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976).
62. 571 F.2d at 897, quoting United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d at 479 (5th Cir. 1976).
63. 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
64. 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
65. 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied. 423 U.S. 1050 (1976).
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a danger of abuse where a prosecutor attempts to apply the statute to situations for which it was not primarily intended. Therefore, we caution against undue prosecutorial zeal in invoking
~ICO."88

Lee R. Roper

III.

A.

"PROFILE" STOPS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: REASONABLE SUSPICION OR INARTICULATE HUNCHES?
INTRODUCTION

In United States v. Cortez, I officers of the United States
border patrol set up an observation post adjacent to a highway
in the desert of southern Arizona, in the belief that a certain
suspected alien smuggler would be operating in the area that
night. The officers decided that in watching for the smuggler~s
vehicle they would concentrate only on a certain class of vehicles,
including vans, campers and pickup trucks; within that class only
vehicles which passed the post travelling westward and returned
approximately ninety minutes later travelling eastward would be
targeted for investigation. 2 During the period of observation the
officers spotted two vehicles in the "profile" class, both campers,
one of which returned a short time later, heading east. T~is ,
camper was stopped and six illegal aliens were found inside; the
owner/driver of the camper and the smuggler were convicted of
knowingly transporting illegal aliens. A Ninth Circuit panel reversed, holding that the border patrol officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop defendants,. and that the intrusion vio- .
lated the defendants' rights under the fourth amendment.
I

Clearly law enforcement agencies are sifting through past
experience and constructing criminal "profiles" to be used in
detecting anti-social conduct. The central question is whether
such a behavioral model can be utilized to make an investigative
stop of a citizen absent other indicia of criminal activity. The
seminal case of Terry v. Ohio 3 and the "founded suspicion" doc66. United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 395-96 (2d Cir. 1979).
1. 595 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. Apr., 1979) (per Hug, J.; the other panel members were
Chambers and Ferguson, JJ.).
2. [d. at 506.
3. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, a Cleveland plainclothes detective became suspicious
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/8
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trine of the Ninth Circuit will be discussed, followed by an analysis of particular "profiles" considered in light of case law and
applicable fourth amendment standards.
B.

THE FRAMEWORK OF

Terry v. Ohio

All seizures of the person, including those involving only a
brief detention short of arrest, fall within the protection of the
fourth amendment: and plainly such seizures must at least meet
the requirement of "reasonableness."5 What is reasonable in any
particular case involves a balance between the public interest at
stake and the individual's right to personal liberty free from governmental intrusion. 8 Although the Terry court disclaimed ruling
on the constitutionality of a stop based on less than probable
cause and instead focused upon the propriety of the subsequent
frisk,7 the concurring opinion of Justice Harlan made the sensible observation that the right to frisk a suspect is dependent upon
the reasonableness of the forcible stop, 8 and that in this connection there was little difference for practical purposes between the
holding and dictum. s
of two men loitering on a street comer and peering into a store window at frequent
intervals; eventually the pair were joined by a third man. Thinking that the suspects were
planning a stickup and probably armed, the detective confronted the trio, identified
himself and asked for their names. When the men only mumbled something the officer
spun Terry around and patted his breast pocket. He felt a pistol, which he removed. A
frisk of the second man also uncovered a pistol; the third man was unarmed. Terry was
charged with carrying a concealed weapon, and he moved to suppress the gun as evidence.
The trial judge denied the motion, and all the higher courts, including the United States
Supreme Court, affirmed.
'4. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
I, 16-19 (1968). Note that fourth amendment protection extends only to seizures executed
pursuant to government authority. See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 903-04 (9th
'
Cir. 1973).
5. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause . . . . " U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Subject to certain exceptions, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
357 (1967). Accord, Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970); Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967). The California Supreme Court has stated that the issue in
evaluating possible fourth amendment violations "is not simply whether the conduct of
[the police] might have been 'reasonable' under all the circumstances, but whether [the
intrusion] fal1s within one of the 'few specifically established and well delineated exceptions' to the warrant requirement." People v. Smith, 7 Cal. 3d 282, 286, 496 P.2d 1261,
1263, 101 Cal. Rptr. 893, 895 (1972).
6. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) (per curiam); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. I, 20-21 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
7. 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
8. 1d. at 32-33.
9. Note, Reasonable Suspicion for Border Patrol Stops: United States v. Brignoni-
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Terry firmly rejects the monolithic model of the fourth
amendment which recognizes two polarities: either the officer
effectively restrains the liberty of a citizen, in which case a fourth
amendment seizure has taken place and its validity depends
upon the existence of probable cause to arrest, or else no restraint
has taken place and therefore there is no seizure and the resultant
conversation between officer and citizen is strictly voluntary. 10
Instead Terry chooses a sliding-scale model of the fourth amendment, providing police with an "escalating set of flexible responses,"11 in which "increasing degrees of intrusiveness require increasing degrees of justification and increasingly stringent procedures for the establishment of that justification."12 To justify a
stop, the officer "must be able to point to specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts,"13 warrant the intrusion. The test is objective: could an
officer reasonably conclude, in light of experience, "that criminal
activity may be afoot"?U The initial stop must be justified, and
the resultant inquiry must be "reasonably related in scope"15 to
the justification for its initiation.
C.

THE "FOUNDED SUSPICION" DOCTRINE OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Prior to Terry, the Ninth Circuit addressed the propriety of
an investigative stop based on less than probable cause to arrest
in Wilson v. Porter. 1ft Although the defendant in Wilson had not
violated any traffic laws at the time of the forcible stop, the police
Ponce, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 277, 289 (1976). See also Weisgall, Stop, Search and
Seize: The Emerging Doctrine of Founded Suspicion, 9 U.S.F. L. REV. 219, 229 (1974).
10. J. Caracappa, Criminall~aw & Procedure: Some Current Issues, 16 DUQ. L. REV.
499, 502 (1978).
11. 392 U.S. at 10.
12. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 390
(1974). See also Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727-28 (1969).
13. 392 U.S. at 21. A close scrutiny of facts and probabilities is mandated by Terry
and its progeny: only conduct that "affirmatively suggests particular criminal activity,
completed, current, or intended" can validate an investigative seizure. Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S. 40, 73 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
14. 392 U.S. at 30. The nature of the suspected criminal activity is relevant in deter·
mining the propriety of an investigative stop. Thus in Terry the suspected crime was
robbery, and the detective reasonably believed the suspects were armed; the Court ap·
proved the stop and frisk even though the period of observation was only several minutes.
In contrast, the suspected crime in Sibron was possession of narcotics; the Court held the
stop and frisk impermissible though the period of observation was several hours. La Fave,
"Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67 MICH.
L. REV. 40, 65 (1968). See J. Caracappa, supra note 10, at 510.
15. 392 U.S. at 20, 29.
16. 361 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1966).
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officers executing the stop apparently felt that a motorist cruising
the streets at three a.m. presented suspicious circumstances requiring further investigation. While looking into the car, one of
the officers saw a gun barrel protruding from beneath the passenger front seat and subsequently arrested defendant. The court
upheld this intrusion, arguing that although probable cause to
arrest did not exist at the time of the stop, only a "founded
suspicion" was necessary to authorize a brief investigative stop;
all that was required was "some bases from which the court can
determine that the detention was not arbitrary or harassing."17
The test is subjective and grants the officer wide latitude to act
in light of experience; the court stated that it "need not look for
a reconstructed, after-the-fact explanation of what may have
been nothing more at the time . . . than the instinctive reaction
of one trained in the prevention of crime."18
Yet instinctive reactions (hunches) are exactly what the
Court in Terry warned should not be used to justify a seizure of
the person, absent other reliable indicia of criminal activity. This
conflict has led one commentator to conclude that Terry effectively overrules Wilson. 19 However, recent Ninth Circuit
"founded suspicion" cases have cited Wilson as controlling authority,20 while other factually similar cases have ignored the
subjective test of Wilson and have chosen to follow the principles
of Terry.21
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,22 the United States Supreme Court applied the criteria of Terry in affirming an en banc
Ninth Circuit decision, holding that·" [e]xcept at the border and
17. [d. at 415.
18. [d.

19. Weisgall, supra note 9, at 244.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Diaz, 528 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1976) (per
curiam); United States v. Rocha-Lopez, 527 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 977 (1976); United States v. Holland, 510 F.2d 453 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1010 (1975); United States v. Rodriguez-Alvarado, 510 F.2d 1063 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane);
United States v. Larios-Montes, 500 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1057
(1975); United States v. Bugarin-Casas, 484 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Davis, 459 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1972).
21. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), aff'g 499 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir.
1974); United States v. Carrizoza-Gaxiola, 523 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Torres-Urena, 513 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Ward, 488 F.2d 162 (9th Cir.
1973) (en bane); United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1973). See generally
Note, Criminal Law & Procedure, The Doctrine of Founded Suspicion, 6 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REV. 509 (1976).
22. 422 U.S. 873 (1975), aff'g 499 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1974).
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its functional equivalents, officers on roving patrol may stop vehicles only if they are aware of specific articulable facts, together
with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant
suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in
the country."23 Though the governmental interest in guarding
against the smuggling of illegal aliens is legitimate, the border
patrol should not be allowed to stop motorists at random on less
than reasonable suspicion, since such power tends to abrogate the
fourth amendment rights of citizens mistaken for illegal aliens. 24
The Brignoni-Ponce decision should clarify Ninth Circuit case
law regarding the proper standard of the doctrine of "founded
suspicion. "
Assuming that the objective test of Terry and BrignoniPonce is proper in assessing the existence of reasonable suspicion
justifying an investigative stop, a nagging question remains: what
are "specific, articulable facts," and which inferences derived
therefrom are rational? Must the activity of the suspect affirmatively point to particular criminal conduct, as suggested by the
concurring opinion of Justice Harlan in Sibron v. New York,25 or
is it sufficient that the behavioral characteristics of the suspect
in a particular environment tend to place that suspect in a class
which in the past has demonstrated a high probability of criminal
conduct? This is the problem posed by the use of criminal profiles, exacerbated by the fact that under Terry the officer is allowed to draw upon experience in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists. In this connection, is the officer limited to
personal experience, or is the utilization of the collective experiences of others similarly situated permissible?28 In any event one
23. 1d. at 884. C{. Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S.Ct. 1391 (1979) (police made random stop
of car to check licensing and registration without a reasonable suspicion that either vehicle
or driver were subject to seizure for violation of law; the stop was unreasonable under the
fourth amendment). Random stops should be distinguished from roadblock or checkpoint
stops, since in these situations all cars are halted; motorists can see others in similar
circumstances, and thus are "less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion."
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 643, 658 (1976), quoting United States v.
Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 894-96 (1975). These concerns are relevant because a seizure may not
be reasonable under the fourth amendment if the methods of police investigation used are
harassing or offensive. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 16-17; note 82 infra.
24. 422 U.S. at 884.
25. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
26. Clearly a policeman can rely upon an uncorroborated tip furnished by a reliable
informant to jUstify a stop and frisk. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-48 (1972). But
see United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 890 (1976) (Douglas, J., concurring)
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point is clear: as the public interest at stake in a particular situation diminishes, and as the behavioral characteristics of a suspect
fall away from the ideal profile model, the seizure of the suspect
approaches conduct that could be termed "arbitrary or harassing."27

D.

UTILIZATION OF PARTICULAR CRIMINAL PROFILES

Criminal profiles are specialized behavioral models based
upon empirical data gathered by law enforcement agencies and
applied to specific factual situations. The usefulness of a profile
is therefore limited by the nature of the data used in the initial
formuJation, and here the officers may be tempted to substitute
personal hunches for objective scientific data. Cortez is an excellent example of this process at work: the border patrol officers
knew from investigation that the smuggler usually operated on
weekends, yet they had no rational basis for believing he would
operate that night, and further, they admitted "that they had no
reason to know that the vehicle assisting [the smuggler] would
approach from, and return to, the east rather than the west."28
Moreover, the officers deliberately excluded commercial looking
trucks, station wagons and sedans from the profile class, though
they were aware such vehicles had in the past been used to transport illegal aliens. 29
The Court in Brignoni-Ponce listed several factors to be considered in assessing the existence of reasonable suspicion to stop
a vehicle in the border area; together these factors form the basis
of the alien smuggling profile. 3u The apparent Mexican ancestry
of the driver and occupants is relevant, but an investigatory stop
(arguing that in Adams the informant was not credible and that the information upon
which the officer acted was not shown to be based upon first-hand knowledge). This raises
the interesting question of whether a criminal profile and the uncorroborated tip of an
informant are equally reliable for purposes of justifying a stop and frisk.
27. Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d at 415.
28. 595 F.2d at 507.
29. [d. at 506. The dissent in Cortez emphasized the desolate terrain and the early
morning hour in finding reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. [d. at 510 (Chambers,
J., dissenting). See also United States v. Torres-Urena, 513 F.2d 540,545 (9th Cir. 1975)
(Wright, J., dissenting); United States v. Jaime-Barrios, 494 F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1974).
30. The profile elements are as follows: (1) travelling near the border; (2) on a lightly
travelled road; (3) in a notorious smuggling area; (4) in a car that appears to be heavily
loaded or has an extraordinary number of passengers, or has large compartments suitable
for storing aliens; (5) driven by someone of Mexican' ancestry; (6) who takes evasive action
or drives erratically; and (7) who is carrying passengers exhibiting characteristics of Mexican residents who appear to be trying to hide. 422 U.S. at 884-85.
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cannot be based solely upon this factor. 31 Proximity of the vehicle
to the border, the typical traffic pattern of the road, and the
reputation of the locale as a "high crime" area are all relevant
factors,32 although such circumstantial evidence standing alone
cannot justify a stop.33 The critical profile characteristic in these
cases is usually a suspicious aspect of the vehicle itself or its
movements,34 as well as aberrant behavior of the driver. 35
These latter profile ingredients are critical because they more
closely resemble the "specific, articulable facts" required for a
valid stop in Terry; the ethnic and circumstantial factors take on
significance only in conjunction with the more reliable indicia of
criminal activity. This is in keeping with the statement in Terry
that the officer must observe "unusual conduct" which "in light
of his experience" reasonably leads him to conclude that criminal
activity may be afoot.38 Thus a group of Mexicans driving in a
3l. Id. at 885-86; United States v. Rocha-Lopez, 527 F.2d 476, 478 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 977 (1976). But see United States v. Bugarin-Casas, 484 F.2d 853,
856 (9th Cir. 1973) (ethnic background of the driver a8 a "neutral fact").
32. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884-85; United States v. AvalosOchoa, 557 F.2d 1299 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Rocha-Lopez, 527 F.2d 476 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 977 (1976); United States v. Jaime-Barrios, 494 F.2d 455
(9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Bugarin-Casas, 484 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1973). Ct. United
States v. Magda, 547 F.2d 756, 758·59 (2d Cir. 1976) (suspect stopped and frisked in
narcotics-prone location in New York City). But see United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d
859, 861 n.3 (9th Cir. 1973). Giving the "high crime area" factor too much weight could
easily lead to harassment of poor inner city residents. See Note, Inuestigatiue Stops in
Urban Centers: Upholding the Constable's Whim, 44 BROOKLYN L. REV. 963, 973 (1978).
33. See United States v. Martinez-Tapia, 499 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1974) (car proceeding slowly on road one mile from border in sparsely populated area not sufficient basis
for stop). However, the presence of a vehicle in a notorious smuggling area combined with
suspicious movements or appearance of vehicle can be enough to support a finding of
founded suspicion. See United States v. Rocha-Lopez, 527 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 977 (1976); United States v. Nunez-Villalobos, 500 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir.
1974); United States v. Roberts, 470 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920
(1973).
34. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885; United States v. MaduenoAstorga, 503 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (car equipped with large trunk and
heavy duty suspension system on the rear axle appeared to "drift" on a curve in the road);
United States v. Larios-Montes, 500 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1057
(1975) (two cars travelling in tandem, rear car appeared overloaded and riding low to the
ground, observed as it skidded around a comer); United States v. Bugarin·Casas, 484 F.2d
853 (9th Cir. 1973) (station wagon with large rear compartment riding low in the rear).
35. United States v. Rocha-Lopez, 527 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
977 (1976) (car braking unnecessarily at intersection, as if uncertain of the area); United
States v. Larios-Montes, 500 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1057 (1975)
(car skidding around comer). But see United States v. Ogilvie, 527 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1975)
(fact that driver turned off highway and reversed direction before reaching checkpoint
does not justify stop).
36. 392 U.S. at 29-30.
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notorious smuggling area should not be labeled "suspicious" and
stopped for investigation absent some affirmative behavior suggesting the possibility of criminal conduct. The officer, of course,
has the option of maintaining surveillance and making appropriate inquiries at a later time, after the occupants of the car have
given objective reasons to believe illegal aliens are being transported.
Though the experience of the officer in similar situations is
not strictly speaking part of the profile, both Terry and BrignoniPonce clearly indicate that this factor is relevant in determining
the existence of reasonable suspicion. 37 Certainly the record of
past arrests on similar' charges has a bearing on the officer's utilization of the profile vis-a-vis available facts. 38 Thus the "batting
average" of the officer is relevant in assessing the strength of prior
experience, but it may not be enough that a considerable number
of prior arrests were made. Clearly in close cases the proven expertise of the officer in executing judicially valid stops will be
crucial in determining the existence of reasonable suspicion.
Closely related to the alien smuggling profile is the stolen car
profile utilized by a team of federal and Arizona law enforcement
officers in United States u. Carrizoza-Gaxiola. 38 There, officers
stopped southbound cars matching a profile of vehicles commonly stolen in Phoenix and Tucson and driven into Mexico. The
government claimed reasonable suspicion existed to stop
defendant-driver because (1) he was Mexican; (2) he was driving
toward Mexico in a car with Mexican license plates; and (3) he
was driving a late model Ford Lro, a vehicle included in the
profile. The defendant was violating no traffic laws, and there was
nothing otherwise suspicious about his behavior; the forcible stop
was grounded solely upon the profile match.
The court disagreed with the government's position, finding
37. [d. at 27-28; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885.
38. Note, however, where an officer testified that he had made twenty to thirty arrests
of illegal aliens in the Oceanside area during the two years preceding the stop in dispute,
the court gave no weight to such testimony because of the officer's failure to testify as to
the number of people he had detained who subsequently proved not to be illegal aliens.
United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859, 861-62 (9th Cir. 1973); Accord, United States v.
Magda, 547 F.2d 756, 759-60 (2d Cir. 1976) (Motley, J., dissenting). See also Weisgall,
supra note 9, at 250-51; Bogomolny, Street Patrol: The Decision to Stop a Citizen, 12
CRIM. L. BULL. 544, 573 (1976).
39. 523 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1975).
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that "[f]ounded suspicion requires some reasonable ground for
singling out the person stopped as one who was involved or is
about to be involved in criminal activity."40 Although a profile is
constructed from specific, articulable facts, the "founded suspicion" test requires "some additional fact or facts which focus
suspicion on the individual or vehicle stopped."41 This view decisively rejects the lenient, subjective approach of Wilson and, consistent with Terry, stands for the principle that a profile match
alone does not permit an investigatory stop.
Because the public interest at stake in detecting stolen cars
does not approach the widespread economic concern generated by
the presence of hundreds of thousands of illegal aliens on American soil,42 the results of the Terry balancing test 43 will reflect this
difference when identical degrees of intrusiveness are considered.
Both profiles, however, are vulnerable to use by over-zealous officers as scientific· excuses for "fishing expeditions" conducted
mainly against members of the Mexican-American community
who are unfortunate enough to be in the wrong place at the wrong
time.
The development of the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) hijacker profile was predicated upon the strong governmental interest in protecting airline passengers from hijackings. 44
This profile was developed in October, 1968, through the combined efforts of the FAA, the Department of Justice and the Department of Commerce.4s Based on a statistical study of previous
hijackers who, as a group, tended to exhibit behavior different
from the ordinary airline passenger,4ft the profile consisted of
40. [d. at 24l. See United States v. Soto-Soto, 598 F.2d 545,547 (9th Cir. 1979) (stolen
truck profile).
4l. United States v. Cortez, 595 F.2d 505, 508 (9th Cir. 1979). But see State v. Ochos,
112 Ariz. 582, 544 P.2d 1097 (1976) (use of stolen truck profile adequate for lawful stop).
42. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 900-14 (appendix to opinion of Burger, C.J.,
concurring) .
43. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
44. One jurist has suggested that the danger to life and property posed by hijackings
alone justifies searching all prospective passengers. United States v. Bell, 464 F .2d 667,
675 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, C.J., concurring). In the same case, however, another member of the court rightly pointed out the "serious abuse of individual rights" that could flow
from such a sweeping rationale. [d. at 675-76 (Mansfield, J., concurring). See also United
States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1097-98 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
45. See Ingram, Are Airport Searches Still Reasonable?, 44 J. OF AIR L. & COM. 131,
133 (1978); McGinley and Downs, Airport Searches and Seizures-a Reasonable
Approach, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 293, 302 (1972).
46. See United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1082 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Ingram,
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twenty-five to thirty behavioral characteristics, only a small
number of which were used at anyone time to screen passengers
going through the boarding process}? Studies asserted that application of the profile would clear 99.5% of air travellers, but would
clear no potential hijackers,4s As of February 6, 1972, all passengers on all reservation flights in the United States were subjected
to the profile screening system. 49
At the outset it should be recognized that, unlike the alien
smuggling profile, the hijacker profile was meant to be used as
part of a larger detection system. As originally conceived, a suspect matching the hijacker profile (a "selectee") was required to
submit to examination by a magnetometer and asked to present
proper identification. If the selectee did not activate the magnetometer and produced adequate identification boarding was allowed, otherwise a United States marshal was summoned and
further investigation ensued. If necessary, a frisk or pat-down of
the selectee's outer clothing was conducted,50 but this action was
to be taken only as a last resort. According to statistics cited by
one court only about one-tenth of 1% of passengers screened were
actually frisked, but within this group there was a 6% probability
that someone had a weapon. 51 This probability was deemed high
supra note 45, at 133; J. Dailey, Development of a Behavioral Profile for Air Pirates, 18
VILL. L. REV. 1004, 1008 (1973).
47. See United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1182 (3d Cir. 1972); United States
V. Bell, 335 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d 667,670 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972). The profile characteristics are kept confidential to protect
the effectiveness of the system. But see Note, Searching for Hijackers, Constitutionality,
Costs, and Alternatives, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 383, 396 n.106 (1973).
48. United States V. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1084 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). But see Note,
The Antiskyjack System: A Matter of Search-or Seizure, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1261, 1265
n.35 (1973).
49. Ingram, supra note 45, at 136.
50. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); McGinley and
Downs, supra note 45, at 304. Note that by January, 1973, Federal Aviation Administration regulations required that all carry-on baggage must be searched and that all passengers must be screened by the magnetometer. See 37 Fed. Reg. 25, 934 (1972); United
States V. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 900 (9th Cir. 1973); Gora, The Fourth Amendment at the
Airport: Arriving, Departing or Cancelled?, 18 VILL. L. REV. 1036, 1046 (1973). Thus the
profile "should be relegated to a supplementary role," in part because this procedure does
not effectively deter the hijacking of shuttle flights. United States V. Edwards, 498 F .2d
496,497-98 (9th Cir. 1974). In fact, under modern screening procedure, it is doubtful that
the profile is used at all. See note 72 infra and accompanying text.
5!. United States V. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). Lopez was the first
case to consider the constitutionality of airport screening procedures. The court found that
"[t)he profile is a highly effective procedure for isolating potential hijackers." Id. at 1086.
The case was dismissed, however, because the airline had modified the profile by inserting
an ethnic characteristic and other criteria calling for the personal judgment of an airline
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enough to justify a Terry-type frisk of that small percentage of
persons remaining after the vast majority of the passengers had
been winnowed out by the screening process and permitted to
board the aircraft. 52
Courts following the approach of United States v. Lopez 53
agree that the airport search is analogous to the Terry-type stop
and frisk, but differ as to the weight the hijacker profile should
be accorded in determining the existence of reasonable suspicion. 54 As a threshold consideration, the profile is reievant in determining which passengers should be subjected to further scrutiny, but the profile without more should not be used to justify a
stop and frisk. As one commentator stated,
[m]ere statistical information that a person
demonstrates certain normal and innocuous characteristics, which may have been coincidentally
exhibited by [other criminals], can scarcely be
considered sufficiently suspicious to justify an intrusion into the right of privacy. Otherwise, it is
employee. [d. at 1101. Though the decision makes use ofstatistical probabilities, the court
refuses to use figures alone to justify a Terry.type frisk. [d. at 1097.
52. [d. In one sample of 500,000 passengers only 20 were denied boarding for any
reason. Note, Skyjacking: Constitutional Problems Raised by Anti·Hijacking Systems, 63
J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 356, 356 n.2 (1972). See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 26·30 (1968)
(permitting warrantless search without probable cause or consent when the officer has a
reasonable belief that the suspect is armed and dangerous). But ct. United States v.
Meulener, 351 F. Supp. 1284, 1292 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (defendant fit the profile and activated
the magnetometer, marshal erred in searching suitcase before making initial pat·down of
defendant's outer clothing). But see People v. Hyde, 12 Cal. 3d 158, 164,524 P.2d 830,
833, 115 Cal. Rptr. 358, 361 (1974) (questioning the validity of using the statistics quoted
in Lopez to justify a Terry·type search).
53. 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz.Estrella, 481 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1973) (defendant
met the profile and had marginally confusing identification but did not activate the
magnetometer and did not otherwise act suspiciously; no reasonable suspicion existed to
justify detention and search of shopping bag); United States v. Riggs, 474 F.2d 699 (2d
Cir. 1973) (defendant met profile and aroused suspicion by purchasing one·way ticket to
New York with cash produced from a paper bag; reasonable suspicion existed to investi·
gate defendant further and ultimately detain her when she attempted to board return
flight for Detroit); United States v. Allen, 349 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (defendant
met profile, had ticket made out to another name, and had another person's identification;
warrantless search of defendant's person and luggage not justified); United States v. Bell,
335 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aft'd, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991
(1972) (defendant met profile, activated the magnetometer and could produce no identifi·
cation; reasonable suspicion existed to stop and frisk defendant). Contra, United States
v. Fern, 484 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1973) (defendant met profile and displayed contradictory
forms of identification; warrantless search of defendant's flight bag justified). But see
United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272,1274·75 (5th Cir. 1973) (dictum) (profile alone
may be enough to justify stop and frisk).
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only a short step to suggest that a profile . . . of
the typical mugger or narcotics addict be prepared for distribution to the police for use in high
crime areas. 55

This accords with the result reached in connection with the alien
smuggling profile. 56
Courts, recognizing the marginal value of the profile concept,
have tended to uphold airport seizures on other grounds. In one
Third Circuit decision, the court acknowledged that the marshal
and possibly the ticket agent had utilized the behavior pattern
profile, and stated that "[s]ubstantial issues concerning such
usage are posed," but that "we need not reach them because the
justifiable bases for the search were largely independent of the
Profile."57 In a Second Circuit case, a search was deemed lawful
even though the defendant was erroneously designated a selectee,
because the magnetometer had been activated and the defendant
was using a ticket issued in another name and otherwise acting
suspiciously.58 These decisions seem correct under Terry because
of the presence of specific, articulable facts suggesting the possibility of criminal activity, and, by implication, the profile becomes irrelevant.
If the valid utilization of the hijacker profile is not required
for a lawful stop and frisk, the inquiry narrows to a determination
of exactly what affirmative conduct does provide reasonable suspicion in the context of an airport search. In one Fourth Circuit
case, the defendant did not match the profile but did activate the
magnetometer, and this provided the sole basis for the resultant
search which turned up a loaded pistol on the defendant's per55. McGinley and Downs, supra note 45, at 314 (footnotes omitted).
56. See notes 30 to 38 supra and accompanying text.
57. United States v. Lindsey, 451 F.2d 701, 704 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
995 (1972). In Lindsey the prospective boarder exhibited extremely anxious behavior, and
airline personnel indicated he should be watched. When approached by a U.S. marshal
and asked to identify himself, the defendant produced contradictory forms of identifica·
tion. The marshal then noticed two large bulges in defendant's coat pocket. Fearing the
bulges were weapons, defendant was asked to come outside the boarding area and submit
to a pat·down search. The bulges felt "very solid," so the marshal extracted aluminum
wrapped packages containing heroin. [d. at 703. See also United States v. Moreno, 475
F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973).
58. United States v. Mitchell, 352 F. Supp. 38 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 486 F.2d 1397
(2d Cir. 1973). This result was obtained on the theory that airports are special areas, like
borders, where people have a lesser expectation of privacy. See also United States v.
Legato, 480 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1973).
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son.59 The court held that the use of the magnetometer constituted a search, but that the search was reasonable under the
fourth amendment because of the strong governmental interest
involved and the minimal nature of the intrusion. 60 Relying on
Terry, the court reasoned that since the activation of the device
gave the marshal reason to fear for the safety of the other passengers, the personal frisk of the defendant was justified. 61 This conclusion is questionable in light of the fact that because the magnetometer reacts to coins, keys and other innocent objects, 50%
of all those who pass through the device register a positive reading. 82 Thus the search of the defendant was based solely upon the
marshal's inarticulable hunch that the defendant posed a danger
to other passengers, other indicia of criminal activity being absent. In this case, the Terry doctrine was stretched to its outer
limits.
Recognizing the problems associated with applying Terry to
airport screening procedures, the Fifth Circuit has applied less
protective fourth amendment standards by analogizing airport
searches to border searches,83 while the Seventh Circuit reached
a similar result by asserting that airports were "critical zones"
where special fourth amendment standards applied.54 In this latter case, the defendant fit the profile and produced conflicting
identification; though the magnetometer had not been activated
the court accepted the government's argument that sufficient
specific and articulable facts existed to justify the warrantless
search of defendant's flight bag which was found to contain heroin. 85 Through the juxtaposition of the traditional Terry analysis
59. United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 947 (1972).
60. [d. at 771.
61. [d. at 772. See also Unied States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180,1181-83 (3d Cir. 1972).
62. United States v. Bell, 335 F. Supp. at 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); United States v.
Lopez, 328 F. Supp. at 1086 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). See also Gora, supra note 50, at 1040;
McGinley and Downs, supra note 45, at 303, 314. The latter commentator has criticized
.the profile on grounds of inexactness, since the profile is merely a means of classifying a
person, upon presentation for boarding, as "somebody who should be looked at further,"
and does not purport to identify potential hijackers. [d. at 305, 314. By extension, the
combination of profile match and magnetometer activation is only a sum of hunches not
rising to the level of specific, articulable facts needed for a Terry frisk.
63. United States v. Cyzewski, 484 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Skipwith, 482 F .2d 1272, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Moreno, 475 F .2d 44 (5th Cir.
1973). See also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
64. United States v. Fern, 484 F.2d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 1973). See also note 58 supra.
65. 484 F.2d at 668-69.
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with the "critical zone" argument, the Seventh Circuit severely
reduced the level of probability needed for a lawful stop and frisk,
while extending the concept of frisk to include a full search of
carry-on luggage regardless of whether the entire screening procedure had been utilized. dd Thus the scales are tipped in favor of the
government as fourth amendment rights at the airport are overshadowed by the interest in preventing air piracy.
In United States v. Davis, d7 the Ninth Circuit concluded that
the Terry analysis is inapposite to airport searches because the
search is directed "not against appellant or any other person as
such, but rather against the general introduction of weapons or
explosives into a restricted area."dS Thus the appropriate analogy
is to the administrative search cases, where the search is conducted "as part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of
an administrative purpose, rather than as part of a criminal investigation to secure evidence of crime . . . ."89 This approach
comports with the deterrence rationale of the airport screening
system only ifthe search is reasonable. To meet the test ofreasonableness the administrative screening search "must be as limited
in its intrusiveness as is consistent with satisfaction of the administrative need that justifies it. "70 Since the administrative purpose of the search is to prevent air piracy, the need for such a
search disappears if the prospective passenger elects not to board
the aircraft; hence, airport searches are valid only if the right to
avoid search by declining to board is recognized. 71
The right to decline boarding and avoid search attains increased significance when the nature of modern airport screening
66.Id.
67. 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973).
68. Id. at 907. See United States v. Mitchell, 352 F. Supp. 38, 43 (E.D.N.Y. 1972),
aff'd, 486 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir. 1973). Several commentators have agreed with the Davis court
that the Terry doctrine could not be used to uphold the new screening process. See, e.g.,
Gora, supra note 50, at 1047-48; Wright, Hijacking Risks and Airport Frisks: Reconciling
Airline Security with the Fourth Amendment, 9 CRIM. L. BULL. 491, 502-06 (1973).
69. 482 F.2d at 908. See also United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); United States v. Schafer, 461 F.2d 856 (9th Cir.
1972). But see Comment, Constitutionality of the 1973 Airport Searches: A Factual
Analysis, 8 U.S.F. L. REV. 172, 188,193-94 (1973); Note, The Constitutionality of Airport
Searches, 72 MICH. L. REV. 128, 144 (1973).
70. 482 F.2d at 910. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-64 (1969); Sibron v.
New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 19 (1968).
71. 482 F.2d at 910-11; United States v. Meulener, 351 F. Supp. 1284, 1288-91 (C.D.
Cal. 1972); United States v. Allen, 349 F. Supp. 749, 752 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Contra, United
States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1276-81 (5th Cir. 1973).
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procedure is examined. The three~prong profile-magnetometeridentification process has been abandoned in favor of a new system in which electronic screening of all passengers and inspection
of all carry-on luggage is mandatory.72 The potential for abuse is
apparent when one considers that even before the advent of the
new system over 33% of arrests stemming from the screening
system have been for possession of illegal drugs. 73 Contrary to the
optimism expressed by the Davis court, it is clear that airport
searches are being used as a subterfuge to conduct general
searches of persons and property;74 such abuse can only worsen
under the new wholesale screening system. Application of the
exclusionary rule to non-weapon evidence seized during an airport search is a proper remedy if the dangers of official abuse are
to be avoided. 75
The airport is also the locus of the drug courier profile. Developed and used by Detroit Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) agents,7e this profile purports to list a number of deviant
characteristics that persons not transporting narcotics would not
be expected to exhibit. 77 Although the number or combination of
72. See note 50 supra.
73. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 909 n.43 (9th Cir. 1973). See, e.g., United
States v. Fern, 484 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180 (3d
Cir. 1972); United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972);
United States v. Lindsey, 451 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 995 (1972).
Cf. La Fave, supra note 14, at 65 n.126 (discussing temptation for officer to look for
contraband rather than dangerous weapons).
74. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d at 909.
75. Gora, supra note 50, at 1050·55. Contrary to the fear expressed by the Lopez court,
the marshal need not return the narcotics to the defendant; he could simply confiscate
the contraband. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. at 1098-99. The point is that official
overreaching will be curtailed if the contraband cannot serve as the basis for a subsequent
prosecution. For a progressive approach to this problem, see United States v. Kroll, 351
F. Supp. 148 (W.D. Mo. 1972).
76. Although the drug courier profile has mainly been utilized in connection with
Detroit International Airport, DEA agents in New Orleans and New York have also used
the profile. See United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Westerbann·Martinez, 435 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
77. Among the elements of the profile are the following: (1) nervousness in the ter·
minal; (2) travel to and from drug "source" cities, usually for short periods of time; (3)
little or no luggage, or the use of empty suitcases; (4) use of small denomination currency
for ticket purchases; (5) use of an alias; (6) making of phone call immediately upon arrival;
(7) use of one-way tickets; (8) furnishing false identification to airline personnel; (9)
attempt to conceal presence of travelling companion; (10) an unusual or circuitous itinerary. See United States v. Ballard, 673 F.2d 913 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Floyd,
418 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Mich. 1976); United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535 (E.D.
Mich. 1976), reu'd Bub nom., United States v. McCaleb, 662 F.2d 717 (6th Cir. 1977). This
list is not exhaustive since new elements of the profile appear as the factual situation
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characteristics needed for a profile match is uncertain, the government usually contends that the presence of these characteristics in the behavior of a suspect furnishes the DEA agent probable
cause to arrest, or at least a reasonable suspicion justifying a
Terry stop.78 The DEA and some jurists79 view the drug courier
profile as a valuable weapon in the fight against narcotics trafficking; one federal district court cited statistics in support of the
effectiveness of the profile. so
The drug courier and air piracy situations are distinguishable
in one important respect: in the drug cases there is no
"fundamental public interest at stake in routine enforcement of
the drug laws. "81 Hence, a seizure considered reasonable in the
context of either a border stop or a hijacker screening stop may
well be unreasonable where the object of the stop is to detect the
transportation of illegal drugs. An average citizen stopped at the
Mexican border or as part of the hijacker detection system will
most likely tolerate the brief detention because of the strong public policies involved, but the same traveller may become quite
indignant when told that the purpose of the stop is to intercept
narcotics. This subjective reaction stems from the nature of the
stop: unlike the former situations, the traveller stopped by a DEA
agent knows that the detention is "part of a criminal investigation to secure evidence of crime."82 The comfort in seeing others
in similar circumstances likewise stopped is missing. 83 The adchanges. United States v. Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F. Supp. 609, 698 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
78. United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717,720 (6th Cir. 1977). See also Kadish and
Brofman, Drug Courier Characteristics-A Defense Profile, 15 TRIAL 47-50 (May 1979).
79. See United States v. Mendenhall, 596 F.2d 706, 708 n.1 (6th Cir. 1979), cert.
granted, No. 78-1821 (September, 1979) (en banc) (per curiam) (Weick, J., dissenting).
80. Since the profile went into effect, agents have searched 141 persons in 96 airport
encounters. Agents found contraband in 77/96 encounters (80%), and arrested 122 persons
for narcotics violations. 26 of the 77 "positive" searches were consent searches; illegal
drugs were seized in all cases where consent was not given and a search was made. In 1525 consent searches no drugs were found. United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535,
539 (E.D. Mich. 1976), rev'd sub nom., United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717 (6th Cir.
1977).
81. 409 F. Supp. at 542. See also Amsterdam, supra note 12, at 390-92.
82. 482 F.2d at 908. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
83. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v.
Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 894-95 (1975); United States v. Montgomery, 561 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir.
1977); note 23 supra. See also Note, Criminal Procedure-Search and Seizure-Fourth
Amendment Precludes Drivers' License Inspection Vehicle Stops Not Based on Reasonable Suspicion or Made Pursuant to Random Selection Scheme, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1123,
1134 (1978). Note that an investigatory stop based on reasonable suspicion may turn into
an illegal arrest without probable cause if the manner and degree of force used in the stop
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ministrative search rationale, therefore, is inapposite, and the
propriety of the stop must be measured against the standards of
Terry, keeping in mind that because the public interest at stake
is relatively diminished, the fourth amendment rights of the individual loom correspondingly larger.
Courts have unanimously agreed that the use of the drug
courier profile by itself is insufficient to establish probable cause
to arrest a suspect. 84 The question then becomes whether the
profile alone furnishes the DEA agent with "specific and articulable facts," pointing to the conclusion that in light of past experience "criminal activity may be afoot."M Because the profile is
only as strong, for Terry purposes, as its component characteristics, the elements of the profile must be examined in light of the
objective standard of Terry. 88
Arrival from a major drug source city is a crucial part of the
profile, yet how a particular place becomes classified as a source
city remains a mystery. 87 Assuming arguendo the viability of this
profile component, its usefulness is reduced when the flight in
question stops over in a non-source city prior to arrival at its
ultimate destination, because the DEA agent cannot tell where
the suspect boarded the plane without executing a stop.88
Nervousness is also part of the profile, but it is difficult to
understand how an agent can distinguish between a passenger
would lead a reasonable, innocent person to conclude an arrest had been executed. United
States v. Beck, 598 F.2d 497,502 (9th Cir. 1979). See also United States v. Scheiblauer,
472 F.2d 297, 301 (9th Cir. 1973).
84. United States v. Mendenhall, 596 F.2d 706, 707 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, No.
78-1821 (September, 1979) (en bane) (per curiam); United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d
717,720 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Floyd, 418 F. Supp. 724, 729 (E.n. Mich. 1976);
United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535, 543 (E.n. Mich. 1976). See also Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
85. See notes 13 and 14 supra and accompanying text.
86. Note that this examination was not possible where the hijacker profile was concerned, because the characteristics of this profile were kept confidential. See note 47
supra. This is another indication of the lesser governmental interest involved in the case
of the drug courier profile.
87. Chicago is a source city, but according to one case "no evidence was introduced
in support of that classification," and notwithstanding this claim "lilt appears safe to
assume that the overwhelming percentage of travelers from Chicago are not in any way
connected with the heroin trade." United States v. Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F. Supp.
690, 698 (E.n.N.Y. 1977). C{. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 882 (1975)
(most drivers near the border have nothing to do with illegal alien smuggling).
88. 435 F. Supp. at 6'99. See also Kadish and Brofman, supra note 78, at 50.
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glancing about nervously to escape detection, and one who is
merely disoriented from air travel, the strangeness of the airport,
fatigue and so forth.89 The use of this element of the profile in
assessing a person's psychological attitude involves great potential for abuse and the concomitant erosion of the objective underpinnings of Terry.
Nor is the failure to claim baggage necessarily indicative of
criminal conduct. The fact that a suspect arrived on a morning
flight carrying only an overnight bag suggests nothing more than
a short stay in the arrival city.eo Similarly, even assuming that an
agent reasonably believes that a pair of disembarking passengers
are travelling together, there is nothing particularly suspicious
about the fact that the pair decline to speak to one another while
walking through the terminal. el Subjective hunches of the DEA
agent do not amount to reasonable suspicion.
Other elements of the profile such as the use of small denomination currency to buy tickets, the making of a phone call immediately upon arrival, an unusual itinerary, and the use of one-way
tickets are consistent with innocent conduct, and the airline passenger behaving in such a manner should not be subjected to
official interrogation absent reliable indicia of possible criminal
conduct. 82 Even when the more suspicious aspects of the profile
are considered, such as the use of an alias and the furnishing of
false identification to airline personnel, these acts cannot be said
to affirmatively point to the actor as a drug courier. In short, as
one court aptly put it, "nothing plus nothing equals nothing."·3
89. United States v. Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F. Supp. 690, 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1977);
United States v. Mico Rachelle Rogers, 436 F. Supp. I, 7 (E.D. Mich. 1976); United States
v. Floyd, 418 F. Supp. 724, 728 (E.D. Mich. 1976). Where, however, the agent is aware of
other facts pointing to criminal activity, nervousness can be used in connection with these
more reliable indicia. See, e.g., United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45,59-62 (2d Cir. 1977)
(agent recognized defendant as major narcotics dealer, other profile characteristics present); United States v. Allen, 421 F. Supp. 1372, 1375 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (defendant
carrying suitcase embossed with name of known large scale heroin dealer, other profile
characteristics present).
90. United States v. Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F. Supp. at 700.
91. 1d.
92. See, e.g., United States v. Dewberry, 425 F. Supp. 1336 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (defendant arrived direct from Los Angeles, met by persons agents believed to be known drug
traffickers, agents observed and overheard the.group arranging for the pickUp of a suitcase
in a suspicious and covert manner. Held reasonable suspicion to detain the group existed).
93. United States v. Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F. Supp. at 700-01.
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Although the drug courier profile may well be a "perfectly
valid law enforcement device,"u the proper approach seems to be
that its existence is not "a talisman that obviates the need for
traditional analysis."95 This is sound advice in view of the fact
that here the talisman is mutable: in one case an agent admitted
that "the profile in a particular case consists of anything that
arouses . . . suspiciops."D6 This approach echoes the lenient subjectivity of Wilson 97 and is to be avoided if personal liberty is to
retain any meaning, for if one DEA agent can testify that being
Hispanic is part of the drug courier profile,Ds there is no reason to
believe that the fourth amendment rights of any person will be
adequately safeguarded in the pursuit of crime.

E.

CONCLUSION

This survey of criminal profiles demonstrates that the line
between objective fact and subjective hunch can be extremely
thin; yet, the existence of the line is necessary ifrights guaranteed
under the fourth amendment are to be preserved against arbitrary governmental intrusions. The use of criminal profiles tends
to blur this line by replacing specific facts about particular suspects with generalities about classes of people that are susceptible
to abuse by law enforcement officers. The danger lies in the fact
that profiles are generated from empirical data that relies on
limited human experience; however, the variety of street encounters an average officer may face is endless, and when confronted
94. United States v. Mendenhall, 596 F.2d 706, 707 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, No.
78-1821 (September, 1979).
95. United States v. Chamblis, 425 F. Supp. 1330, 1333 (E.D. Mich. 1977). Accord,
United States v. Floyd, 418 F. Supp. 724, 728 (E.D. Mich. 1976). But see United States
v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717,720 (6th Cir. 1977) (dictum) (in which the court states that "a
set of facts may arise in which the existence of certain profile characteristics constitutes
reasonable suspicion . . . .").
96. United States v. Chamblis, 425 F. Supp. at 1333. The court in WesterbannMartinez concluded that "either the 'Drug Courier Profile' is too amorphous and unreliable to be of any help, or. . . there is a tremendous lack of communication within the Drug
Enforcement Administration as to the factors in the profile." 435 F. Supp. at 698.
As of this writing, DEA agents stationed in San Francisco International Airport have
been using the drug courier profile for the past four to five months. Although the profile
is usually not used alone to make an investigative stop, one agent working the airport
conceded that the elements of the profile varied with the situation at hand. Interestingly
enough, two of the prime behavioral factors relied upon are in apparent conflict: calmness
displayed in the baggage area and nervousness exhibited while walking through the terminal. Telephone interview with Bill Gellerman, special agent with the DEA airport
patrol, San Francisco International Airport (Nov. 26, 1979).
97. See notes 16 to 21 supra and accompanying text.
98. United States v. Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F. Supp. at 698.
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by a borderline situation in which reasonable suspicion to execute
a. Terry stop is uncertain, this average officer may well rely upon
the talisman of the profile instead of looking to objective facts in
light of personal experience. And in relying on the profile the
officer will most likely "fill in the gaps" through dependence upon
subjective hunches, justifying the resultant seizure as a product
of "good police work." This scattershot approach to crime detection circumvents the clear mandate of Terry and is repugnant to
American concepts of fairness and liberty.
Lee R. Roper

IV.

A.

PRIVATE AIR FREIGHT SEARCHES AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
INTRODUCTION

In United States v. Gumerlock, I the Ninth Circuit, en banc,
upheld convictions for heroin possession over the defendants'
fourth amendment challenge to the search of air freight by United
Airlines employees. In so doing, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
opinion of one of its panels2 which had set aside the convictions
on the ground that the search was unlawful. The Gumerlock
court, after examining a federal statutory scheme designed to
enlist the aid of private airlines to inspect packages to prevent
skyjacking, found that there was insufficient government involvement to require applying fourth amendment standards to air
freight searches by private airlines. 3
1. 590 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. Feb., 1979) (en bane) (per Browning, J.; Ely and Hufstedler,
JJ. filed separate dissenting opinions).
2. United States v. Fannon, 556 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1977) (per Koelsch, J.; the other
panel members were Chambers and Hufstedler, JJ.).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
For background material on searches and seizures in the airport context, see generally
Brodsky, Terry and the Pirates: Constitutionality of Airport Searches and Seizures, 62 Kv.
L.J. 623 (1974); McGinley & Downs, Airport Searches and Seizures-A Reasonable
Approach, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 293 (1972); Comment, Are Airport Searches Still
Reasonable?, 44 J. AIR L. & COM. 131 (1978); Comment, The Airport Search and the
Fourth Amendment: Reconciling the Theories and Practices, 7 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV.
307 (1978).
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In Gumerlock, the defendants delivered packages to United
Airlines for shipment.. As a result of the defendants' nervous
behavior and other circumstances, the United Airlines freight
agents suspected that the packages contained something other
than what the defendants had declared. 5 The agents sought permission from their supervisor to open the package and inspect its
contents pursuant to a tariff provision which they understood to
authorize inspection under the circumstances. 8 The agents found
heroin in the packages and defendants Gumerlock and Fannon
were subsequently convicted of possession of and conspiracy to
possess heroin. 7 No law enforcement personnel were involved at
any time during the search of the packages.
A Ninth Circuit panel in United States u. Fannon 8 reversed
the convictions and held that an air freight search by an airline
employee was sufficient state action in light ofrecent federal antiskyjacking legislation to warrant application of fourth amendment standards.' However, in Gumerlock, the Ninth Circuit
reached the opposite result and held that the fourth amendment
does not apply since there was no government involvement. 'o The
court construed the identical legislation that the panel had considered in Fannon but concluded: (1) the provisions of the Air
Transportation Safety Act of 1974 (ATSA)" and subsequent Fed4. 590 F.2d at 795.
5. The court did not specify what these "circumstances" were, nor what the defendants declared. [d. at 799.
6. [d. Air freight searches conducted pursuant to tariff regulations have been consistently held "non-governmental" for purposes of the fourth amendment. [d. at 799 n.17
citing United States v. Ford, 525 F.2d 1308,1311 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Issod,
508 F.2d 990, 994 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d 391, 399-401 & n.S1
(D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448, 450 (2d Cir. 1973); United States
v. Ogden, 485 F.2d 536, 538-39 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Cangiano, 464 F.2d 320,
324-25 (2d Cir. 1972); Gold v. United States, 378 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1967).
7. 590 F.2d at 795. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1979).
8. 556 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1977).
9. [d. at 964. The Fannon court found that 49 U.S.C. § 1511(b) authorizes air carriers
to condition transportation on the consent of the passenger or shipper to a search and
confers on the carrier a governmental function sufficient to subject its conduct to constitutional limitations. For the text of § 1511(b), see note 11 infra. The Fannon court set forth
the facts of the case far more fully than the Gumerlock court and reveals that the purpose
of the United Airlines search was to look for narcotics. 556 F.2d at 962.
10. 590 F.2d at 795.
11. The defendants relied on § 204 of the Air Transportation Safety Act of 1974
(ATSA) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1511 (Supp. v 1975» which provides:
(a) The Administrator shall, by regulation, require any air
carrier, intrastate air carrier, or foreign air carrier to refuse to
transport

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/8

58

Roper et al.: Criminal Law

1980]

CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE

133

era I Aeronautics Administration (FAA) regulations 12 do not mandate the search of air freight; (2) the defendants failed to carry
their burden of proof that the agents acted pursuant to ATSA or
FAA regulations; and (3) a search in which the government is not
involved directly as a participant or indirectly as an encourager
is not protected by the fourth amendment. 13
B.

ISSUES PRESENTED

The issues presented in Gumerlock, although not expressly
stated, were: (1) whether the provisions of the ATSA or subsequent FAA regulations mandating air freight searches constitute
state action warranting the application of fourth amendment
standards; (2) if the ATSA and FAA provisions are not mandatory, does an airline's voluntary compliance with these provisions
imply state action and therefore bring the search within the protections of the fourth amendment; and (3) whether an airline
employee search of air freight must meet fourth amendment standards when performed without government involvement but
solely to aid law enforcement.
(1) any person who does not consent to a search of his
person, as prescribed in section 1356(a) of this title, to determine whether he is unlawfully carrying a dangerous weapon,
explosive, or other destructive substance, or
(2) any property of any person who does not consent to a
search or inspection of such property to determine whether it
unlawfully contains a dangerous weapon, explosive, or other
destructive substance.
Subject to reasonable rules and regulations prescribed by the
Administrator, any such carrier may also refuse transportation
of a passenger or property when, in the opinion of the carrier,
such transportation would or might be inimical to safety of
flight.
(b) Any agreement for the carriage of persons or property
in air transportation or intrastate air transportation by an air
carrier, intrastate air carrier, or foreign air carrier for compensation or hire shall be deemed to include an agreement that
such carriage shall be refused when consent to search such
persons or inspect such property for the purposes enumerated
in subsection (a) of this section is not given.
12. 14 C.F.R. § 121.538(c) (1976). For the text of § 121.538, see note 19 infra.
13. 590 F.2d at 800.
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THE NINTH CIRCUIT OPINION

Does the Anti-Skyjacking Legislation Mandate Air Freight
Searches?

In 1974, Congress passed the ATSA with the intent to
"provide security against acts of criminal violence against air
transportation through the imposition at airports in the United
States of such measures as the screening of passengers."u In
Gumerlock, the defendants relied on a prior Ninth Circuit case,
United States v. Davis, IG which stated that any search conducted
pursuant to the ATSA scheme to strengthen the security of air
transportation is subject to the fourth amendment. Ie Davis involved a search of carry-on baggage rather than air freight and,
although the court examined many anti-skyjacking provisions, its
inquiry was directed to whether the defendant had waived fourth
amendment protections by consenting to the search. In
Gumerlock, however, the court found Davis to support their holding that the regulations were concerned only with airline passengers and their carry-on baggage, and not air freight. n The defendants submitted the ATSA legislation and FAA regulation in
their attempt to show that air freight searches by airline employees are required by law. The ATSA section l8 provides that any
carriage of persons or property for compensation shall be refused
by the carrier, if the shipper refuses to consent to the search of
such person or property. The court concluded that "[s]ection 204
does not in terms authorize or require searches by air carriers"
but rather provides the remedy of exclusion from the aircraft if
the passenger refuses the search of his person or carry-on baggage
in compliance with FAA regulations}e
14. Both the Senate and House bills require "all passengers and property in air
tran8portation ... be screened by weapon detecting devices." See S. REp. No. 13, 93d
Cong., 1st Se8s. 1·2, 8, 10 (1973) and H.R. REP. No. 885, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1974),
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS, 3996, 4003·04.
15. 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973). In Dauis, the appellant had been convicted of
attempting to board an aircraft while carrying a concealed weapon. The Dauis court
examined the anti·hijacking provisions under federal law, as well as their legislative
history, at great length and found that "the government's participation in the develop·
ment and implementation of the aircraft search program [had] been of such significance
as to bring any search conducted pursuant to that program within the reach of the Fourth
Amendment." [d. at 904. The court ruled that the defendant should have been afforded
an opportunity not to board the plane and thereby eliminate the need for an inspection
of his belongings. [d. at 911.
16. Id. at 904.
17. 590 F.2d at 796·97.
18. For the text of § 204 of the ATSA, see note 19 infra.
19. 590 F.2d at 797·98. The FAA regulations state in part:
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.The court found that there was no need for Congress to grant
air carriers the right to refuse to transport freight without consent
because that right had long been established through carrier tariffs and by common law. 20 The Gumerlock court reasoned that
this section of the ATSA, for purposes of applying the fourth
amendment, did not supplant a carrier's common law or tariff
right to search shipped goods. It concluded that Congress would
not have worked such a fundamental change in the law without
expressly saying SO.21
The FAA regulation 22 submitted by the defendants requires
airlines to submit a written program for a security system for
screening cargo to the FAA Administrator for approval. Defendants argued that this section amounted to a federal mandate for
air freight searches. The Gumerlock court found that this section
does not require "carriers to adopt any particular security procedures with respect to cargo, [and] specifically it does not require
inspection of cargo."23 In so finding that Congress did not intend
to include air freight shipment within the administrative scheme,
the court further decided that the search involved in this case was
(b) Each certificate holder shall . . . adopt and put into
use a screening system, acceptable to the ~dministrator, that
is designed to prevent or deter the carriage aboard its aircraft
of any explosive or incendiary device or weapon in carryon bag·
gage or on or about the person of passengers . . . .
(c) Each certificate holder shall prepare in writing and
submit for approval by the Administrator its security program
including the screening system prescribed in paragraph (b) of
this section, and showing the procedures, facilities, or a combi·
nation thereof, that it uses to support that program and that
are designed to (3) Prevent cargo and checked baggage from being loaded
aboard its aircraft unless handled in accordance with the certif·
icate holder's security procedures . . ..
14 C.F.R. § 121.538 (1976). The court acknowledged the mention of cargo in §
121.538(c)(3) but noted that the inclusion of checked baggage within the section which
did not require screening implied that cargo also need not be mandatorily screened. 590
F.2d at 799 n.15, citing 41 Fed. Reg. 10911 (1976). Legislation subsequent to Fannon had,
however, extended screening procedures to checked baggage. 1d. at 798.
20. See 590 F .2d 799 n.17. Tariffs refer to the carrier's responsibility to charge a
particular fee in transporting goods depending on what they were, and the carrier's need
to know what is being shipped. The common law rights arise from the carrier's duty not
to transport dangerous cargo. See United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d 391, 398·99 (4th Cir.
1974).
21. 590 F.2d at 798 n.9.
22. 14 C.F.R. § 121.538(c) (1976). For the text of this section, see note 19 supra.
23. 590 F.2d at 799.
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without government involvement. 24 The search of these packages
by the airline was private and not subject to fourth amendment
requirements. 25
State Action Through Voluntary Compliance With Legislation

After finding that the legislative provisions submitted by the
defendants did not require carriers to search air freight, the
Gumerlock court merely touched upon the issue of whether fourth
amendment protections would apply if carriers voluntarily complied with the FAA regulation on air freight. After noting that
defendants had failed at trial to carry their burden by proving
that United Airlines had submitted the mandatory screening program for air freight to the FAA, the court assumed that the airline
had not adopted such a system. u Had United Airlines adopted a
security screening program under the FAA regulations and conducted the Gumerlock search pursuant to that screening program, the implication is that the court might have found that
fourth amendment protection would apply. Judge Ely, in his dissent, makes this issue explicit: "[I]f the challenged inspection
in this case were conducted pursuant to such a security program,
then I believe that the inspection fell within 'the government's
administrative scheme to strengthen the security of air transportation.' As such, it would be subject to the Fourth Amendment."27 °
The inference from the majority opinion is that the fourth amendment would apply to a search conducted under the voluntary
provisions of the FAA regulation.
24.1d.
25. 1d. The Gumerlock court noted that "the two packages involved in this case were

not examined as part of a government mandated security program. On the contrary, the
search of these packages was a private one, conducted by the air carrier's employers
without government intervention, and is therefore not subject to the fourth amendment."
1d. at 796.
26. 1d. at 799. The court stated:
There is nothing in the record to indicate whether United Airlines in fact adopted any security procedures with respect to
cargo, or, if it did, whether the procedures include inspection
approved by the administrator. Since the burden of establishing government involvement in the search rests upon appellants, we must assume that United Airlines has not adopted
such a system in response to section 121.538(c)(3) which subjects air freight to security searches.
1d. (footnote omitted).
27. 1d. at 801.
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Search To Aid Law Enforcement

Finally, the defendants contended that fourth amendment
protection should apply to the United Airlines search because the
agents searched the packages for contraband in aid of law enforcement 28 rather than to vindicate any private interest of the
airline. 29 The court found that United Airlines employees acted
"officiously and not at the behest of the government, "30 and that
the search was not subject to the fourth amendment "because the
[agents were motivated] ... by a unilateral desire to aid in the
enforcement of the law. "31

D.

CRITIQUE

As Judge, later Justice, Cardozo once remarked about the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule, "the criminal is to go free
because the constable has blundered. "32 The threshold question
in Gumerlock is whether the United Airlines agents acted as constables or private persons. Searches by private persons without
government involvement are not protected by the fourth amendment. 33 However, where the government is even remotely involved, the court will hold the fruits of such a search inadmissible
on fourth amendment grounds. 34
The Ninth Circuit articulated this position in United States
v. Davis,35 stating that the fourth amendment should not be undercut by the government actively encouraging conduct by private persons which is prohibited to the goverpment. Thus, the
28. Id. at 800.
29.Id.
30.Id.
31. Id.
32. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21; 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926). See generally, Kamisar, Is The Exclusionary Rule an 'Illogical' or 'Unnatural' Interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment, 62 JUDICATURE 66 (1978); Sunderland, The Exclusionary Rule: A Requirement of Constitutional Principle, 69 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 141 (1978); Comment, Fourth
Am.endment in the Balance-the Exclusionary Rule After Stone v. Powell, 28 BAYLOR L.
REV. 611 (1976).
33. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465
(1921).
34. See, e.g., Corn gold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1976) (private search
conducted because of a police request found in violation of the fourth amendment); United
States v. Canada, 527 F.2d 1374, 1378 (9th Cir. 1975) (private search conducted in the
presence of police officers found in violation of fourth amendment); United States v.
Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973) (private search conducted solely in the aid of enforcing
a federal statute found in violation of the fourth amendment).
35. 482 F.2d at 904.
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Ninth Circuit in Davis has joined other courts who have implicitly stated that the fourth amendment applies when the government encourages a search or is a participant in a search. 30 While
the Davis court had little trouble finding that a search of carryon baggage was made in aid of the enforcement of a federal statute, the Gumerlock court simply found that air freight did not
come under the same federal ambit.
The fault of the Gumerlock opinion is that while the court
undertakes a scholarly discussion of the history of anti-skyjacking
legislation, the conclusion that the legislation does not encourage
the security search of air freight is questionable. The wording of
the FAA regulation 37 requires airlines to submit cargo screening
programs to the FAA for approval and requires that such a
screening program be designed to prevent an explosive or incendiary device from being brought aboard the plane. The majority,
however, does not read the regulation as requiring inspection of
air freight.3s As Judge Hufstedler notes in her dissent, the federal
legislation is designed to prevent explosive devices or firearms
from being loaded on aircraft, regardless of the manner by which
the prohibited devices are boarded. 3u
Gumerlock, in overruling Fannon found that air freight ship-

ments were "not within the reach of an administrative scheme to
enhance the security of air transportation from acts of criminal
violence," and that the scheme certainly "did not involve
searches of air freight."40 The inference is that air freight does not
pose a sufficient threat in skyjack attempts to warrant legislation
mandating its search. The court interprets the legislation as not
considering the use of air freight in skyjacking, even though air
freight is mentioned, because carriers have a common law right
to search air freight packages}·
36. E.g., the Ninth Circuit has stated: "[l]n light of all the circumstances of the
case, [the "private party"] must be regarded as having acted as 'instrument' or agent of
the state." United States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1, 6 (9th Cir. 1976), quoting Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971). While the Sherwin court was looking at a more
direct governmental participation than the "encouragement" referred to in Davis, the
Gumerlock court found neither direct or indirect participation by government. 590 F.2d
at 800.
37. 14 C.F.R. § 121.538(c)(3) (1976). For text of the FAA regulation, see note 19 supra.
38. 590 F.2d at 799.
39. [d. at 802 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
40. [d. at 799.
41. ld. at 798 n.9.
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Narrowing the Fourth Amendment
Judge Chambers' concurrence in the vacated Fannon opinion
expresses a fear of judicial expansion of the fourth amendment
and advocates restraint.42 The Gumerlock opinion, by initially
limiting situations when the fourth amendment applies at all,
accomplishes this goal in two ways. First, the court finds no government involvement through legislation even though the statutory language strongly suggests that air freight should be screened
and searched. Second, it affirms that an airline employee may act
unilaterially to aid law enforcement without complying with constitutional safeguards.
Airlines, through FAA and legislative licensing and restrictions are inextricably linked with the government. 43 The United
Airlines employees in Gumerlock, if acting solely to find narcotics, were performing a government function. 44 Since Gumerlock
affirms this conduct, it appears that the government may
"undercut" the fourth amendment through encouraging airline
employees to search.
Future Implications
The Gumerlock court left the door open for future attempts
by defendants to assert that the FAA regulation constitutes government involvement for fourth amendment purposes. The court
stated that the defendants failed to meet their burden of establishing government involvement and that there was nothing in
the record to show that United Airlines had voluntarily complied
with the FAA regulation. 45 The implication is that if a defendant
can prove that an air carrier voluntarily complies with the FAA
regulation, such a search would be protected by the fourth
amendment. We will have to wait for such a case. 48
42. 556 F.2d at 964·65. See also a brief opinion by Judge Chambers in which he states
his reasons for changing his concurrence to a dissent and for opposing an en banc review.
United States v. Fannon, 569 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1978).
43. 14 C.F.R. §§ 1·399 (1979).
44. See United States v. Krell, 338 F. Supp. 1372, 1375 (D. Alaska 1977), where the
court, on facts similar to those reported in Fannon stated: "Since the only purpose of the
search was to turn drugs over to the police it is within the fourth amendment." C{. United
States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d 391, 399·401 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding contra); Gold v. United
States, 378 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1967) (holding contra); United States v. Corngold. 367 F.2d
1, 7 (9th Cir. 1966) (holding contra).
45. 590 F.2d at 799.
46. Two cases support the Gumerlock decision: United States v. Edwards, 443 F.
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The extent to which courts will allow private parties to aid
law enforcement without fourth amendment standards needs to
be clarified by the Supreme Court. In his memorandum to the
vacated Fannon opinion, Judge Chambers reached this conclusion as well, stating that cases with facts such as those found in
Gumerlock are of extraordinary importance and must inevitably
be resolved by the High Court.47 The outcome will be of critical
importance in determining how far the government may go in
relying on private persons to effect law enforcement.

E.

CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit in Gumerlock held that the ATSA and
subsequent FAA regulations do not require carriers to search air
freight and consequently that state involvement is not present to
invoke the fourth amendment in a search of air freight. With the
constitutional stakes so high, one would hope that more insight
and explanation had been given in the court's opinion.
John Douglas Moore

V.

A.

TUCKER MOTIONS: THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PROCEDURE
INTRODUCTION

Farrow v. United States

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, I delineSupp. 192, 199 (D. Mass. 1977) (disagreeing with Fannon); State v. Pohle, 166 N.J. Super.
504; 400 A.2d 111, 113-14 (1979) ("Gumerlock is directly apposite and it constitutes persuasive authority for the fourth amendment immunity of the inspection and search procedures undertaken in the instant case.").
47. 569 F.2d at 1108, citing Judge Kaufman in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jaquelin, 479 F.2d
1005, 1020 (2d Cir. 1973):
I vote against en banc; not because I believe this case is unimportant, but because this case is of such extraordinary conseQuence that I am confident the Supreme Court will take this
matter under its certiorari jurisdiction . . . [e Jn bane consideration by this court hqwever would merely serve as an instrument of delay . . . .
1. The en bane procedure may be obtained at the initial hearing or on petition for
rehearing. The determination to hear the case en bane is made if a majority of the judges
feel that the case presents important Questions or that full-court consideration is necessary
to establish uniformity of that circuit's decisions. Note, Practitioner's Guide for Appeals
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Ninth Circuit Survey, 7
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 465-466 (1976).
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ated the proper procedures to be followed when a prisoner files a
section 2255 motion 2 challenging a sentence on the ground that
the sentence was based on invalid prior convictions. 3 In Farrow
v. United States,4 the defendant moved to vacate his sentence."
He argued that the district court had improperly considered four
prior convictions 6 at his sentencing which he alleged were ob2. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides that a prisoner in custody may move the court to vacate,
set aside, or correct a sentence that is in violation of the Constitution or otherwise subject
to collateral attack. The section further provides that the prisoner is entitled to a hearing
to determine the issues in dispute unless the motion and case records "conclusively show
the prisoner is entitled to no relief." Section 2255 provides, in pertinent part:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by
Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the
ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was
without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is
otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court
which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the
sentence.
A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
Unless the motion and the files and records of the case
conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the
court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the United
States attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the
issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with
respect thereto. If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was
not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or
that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the
judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence
him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear
appropriate . . . .
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
3. The invalid prior convictions addressed in this opinion are those rendered invalid
because they were obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Gideon established the right of an indigent defendant to have the benefit of courtappointed counsel at his trial. Gideon was made retroactive in Pickelsimer v. Wainwright,
375 U.S. 2 (1963). Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967) established that such invalid
convictions could not be used "against a person either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense."
4. 580 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. Aug., 1978) (per Choy, J.) (en banc).
5. Farrow was sentenced to five years for failing to pay a special tax on marijuana in
violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 4755(a)(1), 7202, and three years for jumping bail in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 3150. Id.
6. The four prior convictions claimed to be improperly considered were a 1949 Washington state conviction for first degree forgery; a 1950 California conviction for forgery,
grand theft auto, and escape; a 1952 California conviction for two counts of burglary and
forgery; and a 1956 California conviction for burglary. It is not indicated how many years
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tained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright. 7 The district court
denied his motion without an evidentiary hearing.s The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling in an opinion that
establishes the proper procedure to be followed by this circuit in
all future cases.
United States v. Tucker
In 1972, the Supreme Court applied the statute in the seminal case of United States v. Tucker. 9 The Court established that
a petitioner is entitled to relief when he shows that his sentence
was based on invalid prior convictions. Of Tucker's three previous
convictions,lo two were constitutionally invalid. The invalidity
was established in collateral proceedings II prior to the section
2255 motion. The record of the sentencing proceeding showed
that the judge had given explicit consideration to defendant's
previous convictions. 12
in prison Farrow served for these convictions. The sentences ranged from 30 days to 15
years in prison. Farrow did not contest the validity of two additional convictions, one in
California in 1959 for burglary and one in 1964, also in California, for second degree
robbery. Sentences for these convictions ranged from six months to life. All six prior
convictions were included in the Probation Department presentence report. [d. at 1357 n.
31. That the sentencing judge was aware of the challenged convictions at sentencing was
not disputed.
7. 372 U.S. 335. In his brief, Farrow asserted that these convictions had been found
unconstitutional in a California superior court. This assertion was never dealt with by the
court and throughout the opinion Farrow was treated as though he were merely alleging
invalidity.
8. In a three-judge panel decision, Farrow v. United States, No. 74-2429 (9th Cir.
Sept. 24, 1976), Judge Koelsch, writing for the majority, reversed the district court's ruling
and remanded the case for application of procedures laid out in its lengthy decision. See
note 74 infra. Judge Choy dissented from the panel opinion. Upon petition by the government, the court granted a rehearing en bane. The panel decision was withdrawn and
explicitly overruled in the later opinion by Judge Choy, now writing for the majority. 580
F.2d at 1344 n. 1.
9. 404 U.S. 443 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Section 2255 motions filed when
the prisoner is challenging his sentence on the basis of proven or allegedly invalid convictions have since become known as "Tucker motions" and will be referred to as such in
this note.
10. Tucker was convicted for a felony in 1938 in Florida, while he was a juvenile, and
served seven and a half years. In 1946, he was convicted in Louisiana on a felony charge
and was sentenced to four years. He was convicted for burglary in Florida in 1951 and
served one year before escaping. In the challenged sentencing proceeding, Tucker received
the maximum sentence of 25 years for bank robbery.
11. Some years after the challenged sentence was imposed the constitutional invalidity of the 1938 and 1946 convictions was established in the California Superior Court of
Alameda County. 404 U.S. at 444.
12. The record showed that the sentencing proceeding began by an FBI agent, present
at the hearing, enumerating Tucker's prior convictions in response to the judge's request.
[d.
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But the Court's ambiguous ruling in Tucker has led to much
confusion in the lower courts. 13 Many questions remain unanswered regarding the applicability and extent of Tucker's holding. Exactly what relief does Tucker afford? That is, must the
defendant's sentence be vacated or simply reconsidered? Does
Tucker apply when invalidity is only alleged? The Fifth Circuit
addressed this last question in 1972 in Lipscomb v. Clark.14
Lipscomb v. Clark

The defendant in Lipscomb was given the maximum sentence for his conviction. IS He alleged that three of his four previous
convictions were invalid. The court held that the fact that the
defendant merely alleged the invalidity of his previous convictions did not place the case beyond the scope of Tucker. 16
The court remanded the case to the district court for further
proceedings w.hich it assumed were in compliance with Tucker.
First, the district court should determine if the allegedly invalid
priors actually enhanced the sentence. Enhancement is to be determined by removing the challenged convictions from defendant's conviction record and deciding if the sentence is still
"appropriate"17 in light of remaining prior convictions. If the
court finds that the sentence is still appropriate this finding ends
the process. If the court finds that the sentence is not appropriate,
it must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the
challenged priors are in fact invalid. If the court finds that the
prior convictions are invalid, the petitioner must be resentenced. ls
B.

THE

Farrow

PROCEDURE

According to the Farrow court, a movant in a Tucker challenge must show three elements to establish a prima facie case:
(1) a prior conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v.
Wainwright; (2) the sentencing judge's mistaken belief that the
13. 580 F.2d at 1345. See also Wilson v. United States, 534 F.2d 130, 135 (9th Cir.
1976) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
14. 468 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1972).
15. Lipscomb was sentenced to five years for violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 10, 2311·2313
(1970).
16. 468 F.2d at 1323.
17. See notes 62 to 71 infra and accompanying text.
18. 468 F.2d at 1323.
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prior conviction was valid; and (3) enhancement of the challenged sentence based on the invalid prior convictions. 1u If all of
these elements are shown, the remedy is a resentencing without
consideration of the invalid prior convictions. 2u
In Tucker, the first element had been established in collateral proceedings. 21 The second element was clear from the record,
as is ordinarily the case, and thus not in issue. The only element
to be determined was whether Tucker's sentence had been improperly enhanced by the prior invalid convictions. 22
In Farrow, the court was faced with a different situation.
Unlike Tucker, Farrow had not determined the invalidity of the.
challenged convictions prior to the Tucker motion. Farrow's position was thus identical to that of the movant in Lipscomb v.
Clark. The court in Farrow held that in situations like this, where
the movant is 'only alleging invalid prior convictions, the procedure outlined in Lipscomb is to be followed. 23 This means that
instead of determining enhancement last, as in Tucker, enhancement is determined first. And unless the movant can show improper enhancement, he will never have an opportunity to show
that the prior convictions were in fact invalid.
Judge Recollection

The court in Farrow endorses Lipscomb's procedure for determining enhancement. In this procedure, the sentencing judge
reviews the movant's conviction record, after excising the chal19. 580 F.2d at 1345, 1354.
20. [d. at 1348, 1353.
21. See note 11 supra.
22. The defendant's prior convictions are normally brought to the judge's attention
in the presentence report.In federal proceedings, FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2) mandates the
presence of prior convictions in the presentence report.
23. 580 F.2d at 1354. It is not entirely clear whether the court intends to limit the
use of Lipscomb procedures to cases where the invalidity of the prior convictions is only
alleged. The movants in both Farrow and Lipscomb had not previously established invalidity. The court begins its analysis by identifying the issue to be addressed as the proper
"procedure to be followed in disposing of the motion . . . where the invalidity of the
defendant's prior convictions is only alleged," id. at 1345, and focuses on that problem
throughout the opinion. Yet the court at the same time states that "[w]e have taken this
case en banc to delineate the procedure for district courts to follow when a convict files a
§ 2255 motion claiming a Tucker violation," id. at 1344, without specifying that the
procedure only applies when the movant is alleging invalidity. There seems nothing in the
court's opinion to prevent applying these procedures to a movant who has established
invalidity.
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lenged convictions, to determine if the sentence is still appropriate. But Farrow adds an alternate procedure. The judge may
make a finding of no enhancement simply by recollecting that he
did not rely on the challenged convictions at sentencing. This
finding is sufficient to dismiss the Tucker motion without a hearing.24
The court's authority for this procedure is not Lipscomb,
since Lipscomb never mentions the judge's informal disclaimer of
reliance as a way to determine enhancement. The court relies
primarily on its own previous decisions 25 in United States v.
Eidum,28 Dukes v. United States,27 and Wilson v. United States. 2M
In Eidum the trial judge based his denial of the Tucker motion
on his own disclaimer of reliance. On appeal, the court held that
it would "not refute the judge's own estimation of the deleterious
impact of the prior convictions' on his determination of sentence"29 and therefore affirmed. Dukes presented an identical
situation. Relying on Eidum, the court affirmed the lower court's
dismissal of the motion. In Wilson the court approved both
Eidum and Dukes but added a caveat:
In affirming [the lower court's denial of the motion] we do not hereby adopt a rule that the trial
court's statement that it did not rely on the invalid prior conviction always constitutes sufficient reconsideration to satisfy Tucker . . . .
Rather, we hold that where, as here, there is a
substantial basis in the record on its face to support the court's statement of non-reliance, then
the reconsideration mandated by Tucker has been
performed. 30

The court in Farrow adopts and extends the Wilson rule,3'
holding that a dismissal of the motion based on the judge's disclaimer of reliance will not be overturned on appeal unless the
disclaimer is contradicted by the record. 32 There are three major
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

580 F.2d at 1353.
Id. at 1346-1348.
474 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1973).
492 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1974).
534 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1976).
United States v. Eidum, 474 F.2d at 582.
Wilson v. United States, 534 F.2d at 133. (emphasis in original).
See notes 50 and 53 infra and accompanying text.
580 F.2d at 1348.
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problems with this procedure: (1) the chain of authority on which
it is based is weak; (2) it gives the appearance of injustice; and
(3) it is difficult to review effectively.
1.

Inadequate Authority. The court is correct in suggest-

ing that the official adoption of the judge-disclaimer procedure in
Farrow simply affirms earlier Ninth Circuit cases. This procedure
was approved in Eidum, Dukes and Wilson. But, as Judge Hufstedler notes in her dissent to Wilson,33 neither Eidum nor Dukes
give any real authority for the procedure. "The decisions of our
circuit in Eidum . . . and Dukes . . . are opaque, very brief
opinions. The language of Eidum, repeated in Dukes and quoted
by the majority in this case, is conclusory, unsupported by any
authority, or any reasoning. No effort whatever is made to square
the conclusion with Tucker. "34
The court in Farrow attempts to meet Hufstedler's criticism;
it is only partially successful. The Farrow court quotes the Supreme Court in Blackledge v. Allison35 for the proposition that a
judge's own recollection may suffice to summarily dismiss a section 2255 motion "even though he could not similarly dispose of
a habeas corpus petition challenging a state conviction."36 However, the authority the court relied upon is dicta. The petitioner
in Blackledge was a state prisoner and was not attacking his
sentence under 2255. Moreover, the dispositive issue in
Blackledge was not improper enhancement of sentence but the
voluntariness of the petitioner's guilty plea. 37
The Farrow court continues by reasoning that the rationale
33. 534 F.2d at 134-39 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). Wilson was a panel decision in
which the majority affirmed the lower court's denial of the motion without a hearing. A
petition for rehearing en banc was denied. Judge Hufstedler dissented from both decisions
and was joined by Circuit Judges Koelsch, Browning, Duniway, and Ely from the denial
of the rehearing en bane.
34. [d. at 137.
35. 431 U.S. 63 (1977).
36. 580 F.2d at 1352.
37. The defendant in Blackledge was a prisoner in a North Carolina state penitentiary who petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. He was attacking his sentence of 17-21
years for attempted safe robbery. He alleged that his plea of guilty to this offense was not
voluntary because it was based on a promise by his attorney, presumably after consultation with the judge, that he would receive a sentence of only 10 years. At the sentencing
proceeding, the petitioner stated on the record that his plea was voluntary. The Court held
that the record of the proceeding for taking the petitioner's guilty plea did not on its face
defeat his allegations. 431 U.S. at 78.
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supporting the rules 38 governing section 2255 compels the conclusion that a judge may dismiss the motion based on his own recollection. Rule 4 provides that whenever feasible the motion should
be presented to the same judge who imposed the sentence. 3U The
court reasons that the rule encourages the judge to use his own
familiarity with the case and with the sentencing proceeding to
decide the motion. 40
This reasoning is persuasive-but inadequate. It does not
explain how the procedure complies with Tucker. 41 In her dissent
to Wilson, Judge Hufstedler noted that the Court in Tucker remanded the case even though the judge in the lower court had
disclaimed reliance. 42 In her dissent to Farrow, Hufstedler denies
outright43 the validity of the judge's disclaimer of reliance because
it does not comply with section 2255. The judge simply makes a
finding, rather than testifying about his state of mind at sentencing. Thus the disclaimer is not a part of the record. Section 2255
mandates that a hearing must be had "[u]nless the motion and
the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief. "44
38. Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts (1977),
reprinted in BB MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, at § 14.30 app. (2d rev. ed. 1979).
39. Id. Rule 4 (a) provides:
(a) Reference to Judge; Dismissal or Order To Answer.
The original motion shall be presented promptly to the judge
of the district court who presided at the movant's trial and
sentenced him, or, if the judge who imposed sentence was not
the trial judge, then it shall go to the judge who was in charge
of that part of the proceedings being attacked by the movant.
If the appropriate judge is unavailable to consider the motion,
it shall be presented to another judge of the district in accordance with the procedure of the court for the assignment of its
business.
40. 580 F.2d at 1352.
41. See, e.g., Note, Sentencing. Due Process, and Invalid Prior Convictions: The
Aftermath of United States v. Tucker, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1099, 1108 (1977), arguing
against reading the rules' in such a way as to sanction denying hearings:
[T]he rules are plainly intended to implement section 2255,
not thwart it. The statutory language is the ultimate source of
authority and must guide the interpretation of the new rules.
The statute states that the "court shall . . . grant a prompt
hearing" unless the papers "conclusively show that the prisoner
is entitled to no relief." This language argues against a reading
of the rules as encouraging summary dismissal.
(footnote omitted)(emphasis in original).
42. 534 F.2d at 134 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
43. 580 F.2d at 1364. Judge Ely joined Judge Hufstedler in the dissent.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976) (emphasis added). See Halliday v. United States, 380
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The majority in Farrow answer this criticism by declaring
that "such an interpretation is both too literal and misapprehensive of the Lipscomb procedure."4o The majority may be correct,
but they nonetheless do not show how the judge's finding is based
on "the motion and the files and records of the case" as required
by the language of section 2255.

2. Appearance of Injustice. A second problem with this
procedure is that it simply looks unfair. The judge merely makes
a finding of no reliance based on his own recollection; there is no
formal hearing; the movant has no opportunity to argue his case
or to question the accuracy of the judge's recollection. Moreover,
as Judge Hufstedler points out in her Wilson dissent, the judge
is called upon to recollect his state of mind at a sentencing proceeding that in many cases took place years before the current
Tucker motion. 48 "Even if we could assume that judges, unlike
other mortals, are capable of such feats of total recall and edited
ex post facto judgment, the process is unfair and will be perceived
as unfair. "47
The Farrow disclaimer procedure gives the appearance of
injustice because it gives the judge wide discretion and denies the
movant a hearing on this issue. The Farrow dissent recognizes
that this procedure reflects the court's desire to avoid hearings on
any issue. 48

It is not difficult to imagine that a judge will be influenced
by a desire to avoid the "time and expense that a hearing would
entail"4' when he recollects his previous state of mind. Suppose,
for example, that a movant challenges three of six prior convicF.2d 270, 273 (1st Cir. 1967) ("In spite of some remarks in certain cases about the judge's
personal recollections we cannot believe that, unless acquiesced in, they are part of the
record in a § 2255 proceeding.").
45. 580 F.2d at 1352.
46. 534 F.2d at 138. In Wilson, for example, the judge was recollecting a sentencing
proceeding that occuned eight years earlier. 1d. at 132-33, 138.
47. 1d. at 138.
48. 580 F.2d at 1364 (Hufstedler and Ely, JJ., dissenting). The fact that the issue of
enhancement is decided before that of the invalidity of the challenged convictions increases the likelihood that no hearing on invalidity will be necessary. Furthermore, by
holding that the question of enhancement will be determined through the judge's own
recollection or review of the records, the court attempts to avoid a hearing on this element
as well.
49. 1d. at 1353.
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tions. Under the Farrow disclaimer procedure, it is relatively easy
for a judge to dismiss the motion simply by finding that it was
not the three challenged convictions that he relied upon. The
majority feel that apprehension of such "psychological barriers to
[the judge] deciding objectively"50 is mistaken. They feel confident that "judges will rise above such influences-just as . . .
they do in cases of racial or personal bias, or public or private
pressure-subject, of course, to review by this court under appropriate standards."51 Quite aside from one's doubts about the
ability of judges to rise above such biases, the review process
advocated by the court is wholly inadequate to the task.
3. Inadequate Standards of Review. The Farrow court
subtly alters the rule in Wilson. The effect is to deny relief on
review in all but the most extreme cases. Wilson held that a
judge's disclaimer would be upheld when there was a "substantial
basis in the record to support"52 it. In a display of tortuous logic,
the Farrow court asserts that this "substantial basis" need not be
independent of the disclaimer nor "clear on the face of the record,
since . . . the judge's finding based on his own recollection may
itself provide this 'substantial basis."'53 In circular fashion, the
disclaimer supports itself. Having in effect destroyed Wilson's
substantial basis test, the court also destroys the possibility of
adequate review on this issue, for there remains nothing against
which to measure the judge's disclaimer of reliance. 54

The court holds that the judge's dismissal of the motion
based on his own recollection will be reversed on appeal only
when his disclaimer is clearly contradicted by the record. 55 This
situation is exemplified for the court by a recent Ninth Circuit
case, Leano v. United States. 58 The defendant in Leano was given
50. [d. at 1350.
51. [d.

52. 534 F.2d at 133. See notes 29 to 31 supra and accompanying text.
53. 580 F.2d at 1355-56 n.27.
54. The only other possible way to review the judge's disclaimer is to hold a hearing
on this determination. The judge would be the chief witness at such a hearing. As Judge
Hufstedler notes in the dissent, it is understandable that courts have sought to avoid
hearings in which the mental processes of judges are the subject of factual inquiry. [d. at
1364 (Hufstedler and Ely, JJ., dissenting). But the answer to this dilemma is not to
declare such a disclaimer non-reviewable but to avoid a procedure whereby a judge's
disclaimer of reliance is sufficient in and of itself to dismiss a Tucker motion.
55. 580 F.2d at 1355.
56. 494 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1974) (Leana I) (reversing district cQurt's dismissal of
Tucker motion on the basis of disclaimer); 592 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)
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the minimum sentence for a second offender on the mistaken
assumption that a prior conviction for a related offense was
validY When Leano brought a Tucker motion attacking the sentence and alleging that the prior conviction was invalid, the judge
disclaimed reliance on the prior and dismissed the motion without a hearing. The Ninth Circuit reversed because the record
clearly contradicted the disclaimer: the record showed that the
judge considered the minimum sentence to be that of a second
offender, which could not have been the case unless the judge had
relied on the prior conviction. On remand the judge reiterated his
disclaimer and again dismissed the motion. Leano appealed, and
the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case to a different
judge for resentencing.
Thus, it is clear that a judge's disclaimer of reliance on challenged prior convictions will be overturned on appeal only in the
rare case where the record shows that he must have relied on
those convictions to impose the sentence he did. 58 Such cases will
normally occur only where the judge imposes a sentence based on
the mistaken notion that the defendant is a second offender, as
in Leano, or where the judge states his reliance on the challenged
conviction at the sentencing proceeding and later disclaims reliance on that conviction. But where the judge bases the sentence
in part on the challenged conviction, does not so state at the
sentencing proceeding, and later disclaims reliance-either because his memory is faulty or because he considers the sentence
still appropriate for other reasons-no review is possible. Yet
this non-reviewable disclaimer is sufficient to dismiss a Tucker
motion without a hearing. Given the importance of this procedure, and the fact that what is at issue is "misinformation of
constitutional magnitude,"5u it is difficult to share the court's
confidence that "judges will rise above bias ... subject, of
course, to review by this court."80
(Leana II) (reversing judge's second dismissal and remanding to a different judge for

resentencing).
57. Leano pleaded guilty to two counts of concealing and transporting imported
marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 176a (since repealed). He was sentenced to 10 years
for each count, to be served consecutively. Ten years was the mandatory minimum sen·
tence for a second drug offender. 592 F.2d at 558.
58. According to the Farrow court, a case will be assigned to a different judge on
remand only where the judge reiterates his disclaimer after the contradiction between his
disclaimer and the record are brought to the judge's attention. 580 F.2d at 1351·52 n.
20.
59. [d. at 1345, quoting from United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443.
SO. [d. at 1350.
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The Endorsement of Lipscomb's Appropriateness Standard

According to the Farrow court, enhancement may be deter-.
mined using two procedures. The first and easiest to apply is the
judge's recollection of reliance. 81 The second procedure is taken
from Lipscomb. 82 In the Lipscomb procedure the judge reconsiders the movant's sentence in light of the allegations of invalidity.
The judge then excises the challenged convictions from the movant's conviction record to determine whether the sentence is still
appropriate. If it is, the challenged convictions are deemed not
to have enhanced the movant's sentence, and the motion may be
dismissed without a hearing. 83
All of the circuits that have addressed the issue have endorsed some form of the Lipscomb procedure. 84 But the unanimity dissipates over the issue of what is the proper standard to be
employed. 85 The biggest problem with the Lipscomb procedure is
61. See text accompanying notes 24 to 32 supra. The court appears to make the
enhancement determination a two-step process. If the judge does not affirmatively rec()llect that he relied on the challenged convictions at sentencing, he moves on to the
Lipscomb procedure: "Where the judge does not have an affirmative recollection of his
previous mental state, he must reconsider the appropriateness of the original sentence
from reconstruction of the record, assuming the invalidity of the challenged priors." [d.
at 1354.
62. 468 F.2d at 1323.
63. See notes 17 and 18 supra and accompanying text.
64. See Reynolds v. United States, 528 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1976) (explicitly approving
Lipscomb); Crovedi v. United States, 517 F.2d 541 (7th Cir. 1975) (explicitly approving
Lipscomb); Wilsey v. United States, 496 F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1974) (using similar procedure
without citing Lipscomb); United States v. Radowitz, 507 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1974) (explicitly endorsing Lipscomb); United States v. Sawaya, 486 F.2d 890 (1st Cir. 1973) (explicitly
endorsing Lipscomb); Brown v. United States, 483 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1973) (explicitly
approving Lipscomb); United States v. Green, 483 F.2d 469 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1071 (1973) (using similar procedure without citing Lipscomb); McAnulty v. United
States, 469 F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1972) (using similar procedure without citing Lipscomb).
For Ninth Circuit cases, see notes 25 to 28 supra. But see Mitchell v. United States, 482
F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1973) (rejecting Lipscomb procedure without citing Lipscomb).
65. Not every circuit adopting Lipscomb or Lipscomb-like procedures has had occasion to enunciate whether it also adopts the Lipscomb "appropriateness" standard. The
First Circuit in United States v. Sawaya, 486 F.2d 890 (1st Cir. 1973), the Third Circuit
in Del Piano v. United States, 575 F.2d 1066 (3d Cir. 1978), the Fifth Circuit in Smith v.
United States, 565 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1978), the Sixth Circuit in Reynolds v. United States,
528 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1976), the Seventh Circuit in Crovedi v. United States, 517 F.2d
541 (7th Cir. 1975), and the Eighth Circuit in McAnulty v. United States, 469 F.2d 254
(8th Cir. 1972), have all adopted the "appropriateness standard. The Second Circuit in
Wilsey v. United States, 496 F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1974) uses the "same sentence" standard
employed in Tucker. The Fourth Circuit used the "appropriateness" standard in Brown
v. United States, 483 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1973), but rejected it in Stepheney v. United
States, 516 F.2d 7 (1975) (en banc) (remanding to the district court to determine if the
sentence would have been the same) and in Strader v. Troy, 571 F.2d 1263 (1978) (following Stepheney).
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that it appears to depart from Tucker in the standard to be employed in reconsidering the sentence. The enhancement test in
Tucker" is whether the judge, in reconsidering the sentence, can
assert that he would have given the same sentence if he had
known that the prior convictions were invalidY The Lipscomb·
test, which the court in Farrow endorses, is whether the judge,
after removing the challenged convictions from the record (and
his consideration), now considers the sentence to be appropriate. 6K
The Tucker "same sentence" standard is very precise, narrow, and difficult to meet: the movant must be resentenced unless the judge finds that he would have given precisely the same
sentence had he based the sentence on correct information. The
"appropriate sentence" standard is broader and, accordingly,
easier to meet. A judge's finding that the sentence is still appropriate may mean simply that the original sentence is not unreasonable or that it falls within the wide range of permissible punishments. The Fourth Circuit interpreted the "appropriate sentence" standard in Stepheny v. United States 69 and correctly
found that it did not comply with Tucker. The court held that a
judge's finding that the sentence was appropriate
does not clearly say that the District Court found
that the length of sentence was unaffected by the
invalid prior convictions, that the sentence would
have been the same with or without them . . . .
[Under Tucker] [t]he fact of seeming general
66. It is not universally agreed that Tucker requires a finding of enhancement to
make a prima facie case. See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 482 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1973),
decided a year after Lipscomb, in which the Fifth Circuit found no enhancement requirement in Tucker: "To prevail below (the movant) was not required to secure an affirmative finding that reliance on prior invalid convictions enhanced his sentence. He needed
only to show that the sentencing judge considered constitutionally invalid convictions."
ld. at 291.
67. Although the Farrow court does not follow the Tucker test, it states the test
accurately: "[t]he 'real question' in Tucker cases [is] whether the original sentence
might have been different if [the judge] had known that the prior convictions were
invalid under Gideon." 580 F.2d at 1353.
68. 580 F.2d at 1354. The Tucker procedure does not ask the judge to perform the
difficult (perhaps impossible) task of reconsidering the movant's sentence as if the judge
had never looked at the challenged priors. Instead, the Court in Tucker asked the judge
specifically to consider the unconstitutionality of the prior convictions, and found the
earlier unconstitutional imprisonment of the movant a compelling reason to resentence.
404 U.S. at 447 n. 8. See also, Note, supra note 41, at 1101 n. 16 (1977). Under the Farrow
procedure the judge need never consider the fact of previous unconstitutional imprisonment at all and certainly need not balance it against the unchallenged priors in reconsidering the sentence.
69. 516 F.2d 7 (4th Cir. 1975).
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appropriateness now is not enough if the sentencing judge cannot say he would not have imposed
a lesser sentence had he been unaware of the prior
conviction or had assumed its invalidity at the
time of sentencing. 70

The dissent in Farrow makes a similar objection to the use of the
Lipscomb "appropriateness" standard. The dissent correctly asserts that this procedure does not comply with Tucker or with
section 2255 because "[t]he question is not whether the sentence
would have been 'appropriate' . . . . [but] whether, at the time
of the sentencing, the judge would have given the same sentence."71
Since under the Farrow formula a finding of enhancement is
a prerequisite to resentencing, the effect of the court's endorsement of the broader Lipscomb standard is to make it more difficult for a movant to prevail in a Tucker proceeding. This effect
can be seen by reiterating an earlier example: if a movant challenges three of six prior convictions, it is easier for a judge to find
that the sentence, originally based on six convictions, is still appropriate in light of three valid convictions than to find that he
could have given the same sentence if he had known of the invalidity of the three challenged convictions.
The Hearing on Invalidity
If the sentencing judge finds that the sentence was enhanced
by the allegedly invalid prior convictions, the movant will be
granted a hearing on the validity of those convictions. Three elements must be established to successfully demonstrate the
Gideon violation: (1) that the movant was indigent at the time
of the challenged proceeding; (2) that he was not represented by
counsel in that proceeding; and (3) that there was no effective
waiver of the right to counsel in that proceeding. 72 If the movant

70. [d. at 9.
71. 580 F.2d at 1363. Regarding the requirements of Tucker, the dissent notes that
"[ilf a Tucker error could be cured simply by the district judge's reviewing the initial
sentencing record, deleting the invalid priors, and deciding whether the sentence was still
'appropriate,' the Supreme Court's rejection of the Government's argument would be
incomprehensible." Id. See also Comment, Due Process at Sentencing: Implementing the
Rule of United States v. Tucker, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1111, 1126 (1977).
72. 580 F.2d at 1354. The movant has the burden to show indigency; it is met where
he alleges indigency and the government does not deny it, or if the government does deny
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establishes all three elements at the hearing, he will be resentenced without consideration of the invalid prior convictions.
C.

THE DISSENT:

AN

ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURE

It is ironic that in attempting to preserve judicial efficiency
the court creates procedures that in many cases will prove more
time-consuming than if the issue of invalidity were determined
in the first instance. The need for a full-scale hearing to determine invalidity may not arise as often as the court seems to fear
nor will the hearings themselves necessarily consume as much
time as the court seems to think. In her dissent, Judge Hufstedler
explains that the issue of invalidity can be resolved easily and
efficiently:
Ordinarily, the face of the record of the prior conviction will reveal either the presence or the absence of counsel. If the record clearly shows that
counsel was present, an evidentiary hearing will
not be required unless the petitioner claims that
the record does not truly reflect the proceedings.
If the record is silent concerning the presence of
counsel, or if the record is equivocal, the absence
of counsel is presumed . . . . In absence of proof
from the record that the petitioner knowingly and
intelligently waived his right to counsel, the prior
conviction is constitutionally infirm. Waiver of
counsel cannot be presumed from a silent record
. . . . In almost all cases, the Gideon issue will be
resolved by the combination of the record of the
prior proceedings together with the allocations of
the respective burdens of proof. Because the burdens are very difficult to overcome, there will be
few occasions in which any kind of evidentiary
hearing will be necessary. 73

To avoid the somewhat labyrinthic procedures advocated by
the majority, Hufstedler suggests a simpler procedure. She would
it, where the movant so testifies and the government offers no evidence to rebut. The
burden is on the government to show representation where the record is silent or shows
that the movant was not represented; the burden is on the movant to impeach the record
where it shows he was represented. The burden is on the government to prove waiver when
lack of representation is determined and the record is silent or shows no waiver; the burden
is on the movant to show waiver not knowingly and intelligently made where the record
shows he was offered counsel and declined. Proof of each factor must meet the
preponderance·of·the·evidence standard. Id. at 1355.
73. Id. at 1364·1365 (Hufstedler and Ely, JJ., dissenting).
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require a Tucker movant to make a prima facie case by showing
four elements: (1) that the movant neither had counsel nor made
an effective waiver in the challenged proceedings, shown from the
records of those proceedings; (2) that the judge considered the
challenged convictions at sentencing; (3) that the judge did not
place a disclaimer of reliance on the challenged priors on the
record at the time of sentencing, and (4) that the challenged
sentence exceeded the minimum for the offense for which the
movant was convicted. If the movant makes this showing, he
must be resentenced.
This procedure has the advantages of saving the court's time,
weeding out frivolous motions by requiring a substantial showing
of invalidity at the time of the motion, and giving the appearance
of justice by weighting the procedure in favor of the movant,
rather than against him.

D.

CONCLUSION

By rejecting Judge Hufstedler's proposal, and a similar proposal made by the majority in the withdrawn panel opinion,74 the
Ninth Circuit joins the other circuits in a near-unanimous endorsement of the Lipscomb procedure. In so doing, and in establishing the validity of its own judge disclaimer procedure, the
74. The panel opinion sets out a six-point procedure: (1) where practical, the Tucker
motion should be assigned to a judge other than the sentencing judge; (2) if it is clear from
the motions, files, and records of the case that the sentencing judge did not consider the
challenged convictions, the original sentence stands; (3) if non-consideration of the challenged convictions does not appear from the motions, files, and records, the sentencing
judge's consideration of these convictions is presumed; (4) where improper consideration
is presumed, a hearing must be conducted to determine the validity of the challenged
convictions, unless this issue can be determined from the motions, files, and records of
the challenged proceedings; (5) if the challenged convictions are found to be valid, the
original sentence stands; (6) if the challenged convictions are found to be' invalid, the
sentence is vacated and the movant is resentenced by the Tucker proceeding judge without consideration of the invalid prior convictions. Farrow v. United States, No. 74-2429,
slip op. at 18 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 1976). The panel majority considered the third step in
the procedure to be a "prophylactic rule." This rule was designed both to avoid a hearing
"in which the sentencing judge, pitted against the petitioner, is placed on the witness
stand" and to ensure the appearance of fairness. [d. The panel majority also suggested
the possibility that the judge in resentencing might consider the prior unconstitutional
imprisonment of the movant as a mitigating factor. [d., n. 11. The panel's suggestion that
a different judge should hear the Tucker motion has since been overruled by the Rules
Governing § 2255 Proceedings, note 38 and 39 supra; see Rule 4 (a). For an extensive
criticism of the panel opinion before it was withdrawn, see Elliot v. United States, 434 F.
Supp. 774 (N.D. Cal. 1977). For a discussion and endorsement of the panel opinion
approach, see Note, supra note 41, at 1106-11 (1977).
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Ninth Circuit may have closed the door on movants who seek a
fair hearing on challenges of constitutional magnitude.
Paige L. Wickland
VI. YOU CAN TELL A CRIMINAL BY HIS LIBRARY

A.

INTRODUCTION

In an age of relative enlightenment with respect to the procedural rights of criminal defendants, it is somewhat surprising that
an accused can be subjected to criminal liability based, at least
in part, on his admission of having read a particular book. Yet,
in United States v. Giese' the Government was not only allowed
to require the defendant to read aloud inflammatory passages
from a revolutionary anthology, in the guise of character and
veracity impeachment, but was allowed to argue to the jury in
closing argument that the defendant acted in conformity with the
radical ideas expressed therein. The defendant asserted six
grounds for reversal of his conspiracy conviction, 2 and while the
majority of the Ninth Circuit expressly recognized the first
amendment implications, they found an implied waiver of the
rights involved. Thus the constitutional issues were shrouded in
mundane evidentiary concerns as the first amendment faded in
importance.
B.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Frank Stearns Giese, a professor of French at Portland State
University, became associated with his co-conspirators through
the Radical Education Project (REP) bookstore which he founded
in 1971. As an adjunct to the enterprise, he sent books to inmates
1. 597 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir. May, 1979) (per Trask, J.; Sweigert, D.J., sitting by designation concurred in a separate opinion, Hufstedler, J., dissented in a separate opinion),
cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 480 (1979).
2. The grounds asserted were as follows:
(1) Count X of the indictment was legally insufficient.
(2) The district court erred in denying Giese's motions for
bills of particulars.
(3) The voir dire examination was inadequate.
(4) The district court erred in admitting certain evidence.
(5) The court's instructions to the jury were erroneous.
(6) The Government committed reversible acts of prosecutorial misconduct.
1d. at 1177. This casenote will primarily address the fourth contention due to its constitutional significance.
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at the Oregon State Correctional Institution and led group discussion sessions at the prison. According to two of the co-conspirators
who became witnesses for the prosecution, several participants
eventually coalesced into a group for the purpose of discussing
their vehement opposition to the Vietnam War. Eventually, the
group succumbed to the futility of their passive efforts to end the
war, and vowed to take direct action in order to stop, or at least
disru pt the war.
Two acts of violence, attributed to this coalition and allegedly including Giese, formed the basis for the Government's prosecution: the January 2, 1973 bombing of a Portland Navy recruiting center; and the January 4, 1973 bombing of a Portland Army
recruiting center. Giese allegedly agreed to take part in the latter
bombing, helped plan the details of the operation, and drove the
getaway car during its commission.
A federal grand jury for the District of Oregon returned a
joint ten-count indictment charging Giese and four other persons
with a variety of offenses. Giese was named in six of the counts
charged, 3 including a general conspiracy count. The jury acquitted Giese of all of the substantive crimes, but found him guilty
of criminal conspiracy.
At trial, the prosecution introduced in its case-in-chief numerous revolutionary books and pamphlets seized pursuant to a
search of an apartment belonging to one of the co-conspirators"
3. Giese was charged in Count "IV with misprison of a felony (the January 2, 1973
Navy recruiting center bombing), in Counts V through vm with committing various
offenses in connection with the January 4, 1973 Army recruiting center bombing, and in
Count X with criminal conspiracy to commit the substantive offenses charged.ld. at 1176.
4. A total of 27 seized literary items were introduced into evidence, including: " 'The
Underground Bombing Manual,' 'Firearms and Self-Defense,' 'Department of Army Manual, Electronic Blasting Equipment,' 'Technical Training and Tips: Mine Warfare,'
'[From the Movement Toward] Revolution,' 'Communist Guerilla Warfare in the
U.S.A.,' 'The Paper Trip,' 'The Anarchist's Cookbook,' and 'Protect Yourselffrom Investigation.''' ld. at 1204 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
In his opening statement, the prosecutor described "The Blaster's Handbook" as "one
of the 'more significant pieces of evidence in this case. It is the ABC's of bombing, the
how-to-do-it, how to use explosive devices, .. .''' ld. at 1202 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
According to Judge Hufstedler, while several of the pamphlets were identified only
by name, the Government's lead-off witness, co-conspirator McSherry, was asked to identify several pamphlets and to describe their subject matter. For example, "McSherry
identified 'Special Forces Handbook,' which he said dealt with 'explosive devices, mines,
and different kinds of explosives and how to detonate them.''' ld. at 1203 (Hufstedler, J.,
dissenting.)
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Meyer, another co-conspirator, testified for the prosecution that
during discussions with prisoners, Giese offered to send them free
"Communist or Socialist literature." Meyer further testified that
Giese engaged in discourse on such varied topics as "revolution,
radicalism, black liberation, Hitler, and the war in Vietnam,"
and that Giese at one point advocated George Jackson's Blood In
My Eye-a book dealing with "urban warfare in American cities."5 The Government's theory was that certain materials contained fingerprints of the co-defendants which tended to corroborate witness' testimony that the conspirators associated with
one another.
Giese's fingerprints were found on only one of the books,
From the Movement Toward Revolution (Revolution}.6 His lawyer objected to the introduction of the fingerprints into evidence
on, at least, the grounds that the Government had laid an inadequate foundation. 7 Nonetheless, Revolution was admitted into
evidence as a physical object containing the fingerprints of Giese
and several of his alleged co-conspirators.
Giese took the stand in his defense and was questioned by his
counsel regarding each and every Government exhibit. He testified that he did not sell, nor did he carry, in his bookstore any of
the books and pamphlets in evidence. s Thereafter, Giese's lawyer
had him produce eighteen books which he termed a "representa5. rd. at 1194.

6. Three of Giese's fingerprints were found on page 146, three were found on page 166,
one was found on page 167, and two were found on page 168. The testimony of the
Government's expert witness did not definitely establish when the fingerprints were
placed upon the book. He stated that, in general, fingerprints can remain identifiable for
a period of up to seven years. Consequently, it appeared that the fingerprints on
REvOLUTION were made sometime between the book's publication in mid-1971 and its
seizure by Government officials in mid-1973. rd. at 1186 n.17.
7. The precise nature of the objection made by defense counsel is controverted. The
book apparently came into evidence as a part of a stipulation concerning all 27 items, and
the majority claimed that Giese's lawyer made only one objection during the Government's case-in-chief which "did not challenge the book's probative value as circumstantial
evidence of association, but merely alleged that the government had laid an inadequate
foundation." rd., n.18. Judge Hufstedler contended, on the other hand, that upon his
discovery regarding the age of the fingerprints, defense counsel promptly interposed an
objection "on the ground that no proper foundation had been laid and on the further
ground that the evidence was irrelevant to any issue in the case . .. [d. at 1203 (Hufstedler,
J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The factual schism is not insignificant in that the
majority rested its application of only the plain error standard of review on counsel's
alleged failure to object on relevance grounds.
8. [d. at 1188.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/8

84

1980]

Roper et al.: Criminal Law
CRIMINAL
LAW & PROCEDURE

159

tive sample" of the type of books Giese did sell in his REP bookstore, and he proceeded to identify, and briefly describe some of
them for the jury.s According to the majority, Giese had "prefaced" his testimony regarding the sample with an account of his
involvement in various social and political causes, apd described
how he participated in sit-ins and marches to manifest his concern until 1969, when he received a "sizeable inheritance," and
decided that "the best way to propagate his political views was
to establish" the REP bookstore. to
On cross-examination, Giese testified that he had read portions of Revolution and that he owned his own copy of the book,
but he denied ever having sold it or having otherwise provided it
to his co-conspirators. The prosecutor then requested that Giese
read aloud certain pre-selected and inflammatory passages of
Revolution. 11 Giese was required by the court to comply with the
9. The majority portrayed Giese's production of the representative sample as follows:
(H]e offered a rather detailed exegesis of Frederick Engel's
Dialectics of Nature; he discussed Camus's background; and he
explained the theses of Pierre Jalle's Pillage of the Third World
and Andre Gorz's Strategy for Labor. A Radical Proposal. He
gave brief descriptions of the contents of Soul On Ice by Eldridge Cleaver, Away With All Pests: An English Surgeon in
People's China. 1954-1969 by Joshua Hom. Capitalism and
Underdevelopment in Latin America by Andre Gunder Frank.
and Soledad Brother by George Jackson. Black Elk Speaks by
John G. Niehardt. Viet Nom in Photographs and Text by Felix
Greene. Limits to Growth (a report for the Club of Rome). and
American Radicals: Some Problems and Personalities. Giese
also mentioned Sisterhood Is Powerful. An Anthology of Writings From the Women's Liberation Movement by Robin Morgan. Readings in U.S. Imperialism by K.T. Fann and Donald
C. Hodges. and Monopoly Capital. An Essay On the American
Economic and Social Order by Paul A. Baran and Paul M.
Sweezy. The three works Giese had written were Artus Desire.
Priest and Pamphleteer of the Sixteenth Century. French Lyric
Poetry. and an article on Camus and Algeria which was published in the Colorado Quarterly.
Id. at 1188-89.
10. Id. at 1189.
11. Id. at 1192-93 n.26. The following exchange between the prosecutor and Mr. Giese
occurred:
Q. Mr. Giese. would you look at Page 166. the last paragraph
on the lower right-hand side. I have got a little check mark
there?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you see that. sir?
A. Yes. I do.
Q. Could you read that particular paragraph for us and con-
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request over the objection of defense counsel on grounds of relevance and first amendment concerns.'2 In his closing argument,
the prosecutor himself read out loud to the jury some additional
violent passages from Revolution, and argued that "throughout
the book are references to the very thing that these people did."13
tinue on?
A. 'We are sorry to'Mr. Paulson: May I have an objection?
The Court: You may have a continuing objection. Please proceed.
A. You want to read it aloud? 'We are sorry to hear that the
townhouse forever destroyed your belief that army [sic] struggle is the only real struggle. That places us in a unique position
because, as Che stated, "armed struggle is the only solution for
people who fight to free themselves" and we have lost dearlyloved comtades.' Do you want me to go on?
Q. Yes sir.
A. 'Also probably every experienced revolutionary has, but we
realize that risks must be taken, some will die, others will replace them or us.'
Q. Will you continue to the end of the paragraph.
A. I am trying to make sense out of the sentence. All right.
'Others will replace them or us like people rapping about ending racism, colonialism, sexism and all of the other pigisms,
exploitation and all that but these things can only be ended by
revolution and revolution is in the final analysis armed struggle, revolution is violence, revolution is war, revolution is bloodshed. How long have different successful national liberation
fronts fought before they have won large popular support.'
The passage came from pages 166 and 167 which bore Giese's fingerprints. [d.
12. The objection interposed was as follows:
Mr. Paulson [Giese's lawyer]: Objection. It's hearsay and to
my knowledge, he has not been charged with having read books
but with acts in this case ofThe Court: Overruled.
Thereafter, the court gave Giese's counsel a "continuing objection," see note 11, supra.
597 F.2d at 1192 n.26.
13. The closing argument was, in pertinent part, as follows:
In California as regards to Mr. Giese, we have From the Mouement Toward Reuolution, Mr. Giese has fingerprints on this
particular book. He told you that he had one of these books
himself, possibly, at home. He could not recall how or if at all
his fingerprints got on this particular book which came out of
the Debra Sue Apartments in California. This is an architectural manual, basically, of urban warfare. Between this book
and this book, you have the makings for any sort of urban
warfare that you would like to participate in.
This is basically a conspiracy action, and I would like to just
very briefly take excerpts from pages which contain Mr. Giese's
fingerprints. 'A revolutionist sees death as a national phenomenon, must be ready to kill to change conditions. Revolution is
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On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Giese claimed that the trial
court violated a number of the rules of evidence with respect to
Revolution: (1) it was error to admit Revolution in the Government's case-in-chief as its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value as evidence of association; (2) it was error to admit the
book's contents on cross-examination because they were hearsay
and irrelevant to the offense charged; and (3) in any case, it was
improper for the trial court to permit the prosecutor to make
Giese read the inflammatory passage in front of the jury .14 Giese
also claimed that admission of Revolution infringed upon his first
amendment liberties, specifically, freedom of expression and the
right to receive information. 15
In rejecting Giese's arguments, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that they were not establishing a "general rule" that the
Government may use a person's reading habits or literary tastes
against him in a criminal prosecution. Their decision rested
firmly upon the "peculiar circumstances" of the case; "reflecting
[their] concern for the sensitive nature of first amendment values, it rest[ed] on very narrow grounds."II The court held that
the admission of Revolution in the Government's case-in-chief
armed struggle, violence, war, bloodshed and the duty of a
revolutionary is to make revolution.
Let's all try to pick targets with more care and planning. The
object is to destroy the economy like bombing sites which will
affect the economy the most, rip off weapons and money, sniping attacks. Remember, in a revolution, one wins or dies. The
stakes are very high.
Do you recall the old words, "Ask what you can do for your
country," destroy it, mentally, morally, psychologically and
physically destroy it. And whatever you do do it good.
Now those are just two pages from this book but these are two
pages which contain the fingerprints of Frank Giese. If you have
an opportunity, you may want to-leaf through the rest of the
book, because, as I indicated, this tells you-this is another
how to do it for urban warfare.

[d. at 1206
14. [d.
15. [d.
16. [d.

Did we make up Frank Giese's fingerprints on the book From
the Movement Toward Revolution? ... You read those pages
where Frank Giese's fingerprints were. You read those pages. It
talks about bombing, sniper attacks. You read that book. You
read other pages throughout there. Look at Page 51, for instance, look at the preface. Throughout that book are references
to the very thing that these people did.
(Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
at 1184.
at 1184-85.
at 1185.
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was proper because the book, as a physical object, bore Giese's
fingerprints and those of other co-conspirators and therefore
tended to corroborate the witness' testimony that they were associated with one another. 17 Further, the court held that it was
proper for the prosecutor to request Giese to read out loud extracts from the book on cross-examination because Giese had
"opened the door to that line of inquiry" by introducing the eighteen books sold in his bookstore as evidence of his peaceable character.18 In more simple terms, the majority held that Revolution
was admissible to prove association, to rebut character evidence,
and to impeach the defendant's credibility as a witness. IS
C.

THE COURT'S REASONING

The majority reasoned that Giese's counsel failed to object
to Revolution as fingerprint evidence on grounds of relevance and
therefore the trial judge would only be reversed for plain error. 20
The court recognized that book titles alone can "sometimes have
a tendency to prejudice a defendant," relying on United States
v. McCrea;21 however, in the instant case, the court concluded,
the exhibit's probative value "clearly outweighed" the title's
"slightly prejudicial effect."22 The majority "readily" distinguished McCrea on the basis that the books introduced by the
prosecution in that case totally lacked probative value, either as
works of literature or as physical embodiments of evidence linking co-conspirators.23
17.Id.
18.Id.
19. Id., n.15.
20. Id. at 1186-87.
21. 583 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1978). McCrea was convicted of possession of an unregistered firearm (destructive device) in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). The prosecution
introduced two books seized from McCrea's possession into evidence: "Improvised Munitions Handbook" and "OSS Sabotage & Demolition Manual." The Ninth Circuit held
that admission of the books was error, but held the error to be harmless in light of the
otherwise overwhelming evidence of McCrea's guilt, coupled with the fact that the Government made no mention of the books during its opening statement, nor attempted to
capitalize on them during trial.
Judge Trask, writing for the majority in Giese, distinguished McCrea on the basis that
knowing possession was all the government had to prove and thus the defendant's intent
was immaterial. Since one cannot logically infer possession of firearms from mere possession of books concerning them, the books contributed "nothing to the truth finding process." Judge Trask further noted that although the McCrea opinion gave no indication as
to whether the books bore the fingerprints of the defendant, or anyone else, even if they
had, the books still would have been immaterial since McCrea was not charged with
criminal conspiracy. 597 F.2d at 1187.
22.Id.
23. Id. at 1188. See note 21 supra.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/8
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Next, the majority concluded, the prosecution gained the
right to cross-examine Giese on Revolution's contents when he
took the stand and produced the eighteen samples, testifying to
the contents of many of them, and "suggesting" that they were
indicative of his peaceable character.24 "Giese implied," claimed
the majority, "that the 18 books exemplified the kind ofliterature
he sold, owned, or read,25 and that the literature, in turn, reflected
his left-wing but nonrevolutionary political views. "26 By
"juxtaposing" an account of his political activities with an explanation of his motivation for founding REP bookstore, and a
description of the kinds of books he "sold, owned or read,"27
Giese, the majority concluded, sought to portray himself as a
"scholarly, humane, peace-loving political activist who possessed
a decidedly non-violent character."28
The Supreme Court set forth the basic principles governing
use of character evidence by a defendant-witness in Michelson v.
United States,29 concluding that "the price a defendant must pay
for attempting to prove his good name is to throw open the entire
subject which the law has kept closed for his benefit and to make
himself vulnerable where the law otherwise shields him." The
majority applied this principle and concluded that "Giese threw
open the subject of his literary tastes and reading habits when he
testified about the specific acts of selling, reading, and owning the
eighteen books."30 At that point, the trial judge was vested with
" 'broad discretion to admit extrinsic evidence tending to contradict the specific statement, even if such statement concern[ed1
a collateral matter in the case.' "31 The majority noted that a trial
judge had broad discretion in determining what lines of questioning are reasonably related to the subject matter of direct exami24. 597 F.2d at 1188.
25. [d. at 1188-89 (emphasis added). See note 9 supra. The majority noted that the
books Giese had personally authored were his personal property and kept at home rather
than in the bookstore. Hence, Giese "owned" some of them. The majority also noted that
while Giese claimed that he had not necessarily read the 18 books he was introducing into
evidence, "he left no doubt that he had read many of them," by virtue of his discussion.
Hence, Giese "read" some of them. [d.
26. [d. at 1189 (emphasis added).
27. [d.
28. [d.
29. 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948).
30. 597 F.2d at 1190.
31. [d., quoting United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246, 1250 (2d Cir. 1978).
32. See United States v. Higginbotham, 539 F.2d 17, 24 (9th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Palmer, 536 F.2d 1278, 1282 (9th Cir. 1976); MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 191, at 59 (2d ed. Supp. Cleary et al., eds. 1978).
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nation,32 and, in the case of character evidence in particular, its
admissibility "'depend[s] on numerous and subtle considerations difficult to detect or appraise from a cold record, and therefore, rarely and only on a clear showing of prejudicial abuse of
discretion will Courts of Appeals disturb rulings of trial courts
.... '''33 In light of the foregoing principles, and given Giese's
"fairly extensive contacts with the book" the court could not
conclude that the trial judge had abused his discretion. The majority explained:
Justice would not have been served had the jurors
been left with ... the one-sided impressions
created by Giese's 18 innocuous books. To show
the opposite side of the coin, as it were, it was fair
for the government to cross-examine Giese on
other books had had sold, owned, or read. From
the Movement Toward Revolution was such a
book. It is true that Giese did not keep From the
Movement Toward Revolution in stock at the
book-store, but he did not sell all of the 18 books
there either. However, there is no doubt that
Giese read and owed From the Movement Toward
Revolution. 34

The court reasoned that the trial judge correctly overruled
defense counsel's objections on grounds of hearsay and irrelevance because Revolution was relevant for the "dual rebuttal"
purposes of impeaching Giese's character and his veracity as a
witness. The contents were not hearsay because they were not
introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein. 3li
The court likewise rejected Giese's claim that he was
"forced" by the prosecutor to read out loud from Revolution in
front of the jury, noting that Giese himself did not wage a protest,
33. 597 F.2d at 1191, citing Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 480 (1948).
34. 597 F.2d at 1191. The majority added that because defendants are traditionally
afforded "considerable latitude" when they testify regarding their personal histories, they
"[sjometimes commit tactical blunders." The court explained:
We are cognizant of the limitations inherent in the use of literature as proof of character, and we do not applaud the strategy
employed by Giese and his attorney. Nor do we bestow our
imprimatur on the concept of trial by books. Nevertheless, the
question before this court is not whether we think books are a
persuasive form of character evidence; the issue is whether the
government had a right to respond once the defendant had, of
his own volition, chosen that method of proving he was a peaceable, law-abiding individual.
[d. at 1190-91.
35. [d. at 1191-92.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/8
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nor did his lawyer object to "the act of reading as such."38 "Giese
was no more 'forced' to read from the book than is a witness who
is asked to read a prior inconsistent statement to the jury," the
court notedY Again, the trial judge is accorded considerable discretion, the majority reasoned, in deciding "how" evidence is to
be presented because of his "superior position" to evaluate the
proceedings, and his exercise of discretion will be upheld unless
he has acted "arbitrarily or irrationally."38
The majority adopted a "useful te~t" from the Sixth Circuit
for determining whether a defendant is unjustly prejudiced by
having to perform a particular act on the witness stand,39 and
determined that Giese suffered no degradation such as to warrant
reversal of his conviction.4° Whatever damage did occur, the majority determined, could easily have been mitigated by defense
counsel "simply asking his client on redirect whether he agreed
with what the book said. "41 Besides, the court concluded, even if
Giese was slightly injured by his performance, "the probative
value of enabling the jury to observe his demeanor while he was
being impeached outweighed the prejudicial effect."42 In light of
36. [d. at 1192. See note 12 supra.
37. 597 F.2d at 1192.
38. [d. at 1192-93. The majority relied on a recent Second Circuit opinion, United
States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507, 515 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905
(1978) which held that" 'the preferable rule' in reviewing a district court's decision on
the question of unfair prejudice 'is to uphold the trial judge's exercise of discretion unless
he acts arbitrarily or irrationally.' " [d.
39. United States v. Doremus, 414 F.2d 252, 254 (6th Cir. 1969). In Doremus, the
Sixth Circuit held that impermissible prejudice results when "the requested performance
or demonstration would unjustly humiliate or degrade the defendant" or "such perform'
ance would be damaging to the defendant's image and irrelevant to the issue on trial."
40. 597 F.2d at 1193.
41. [d. While no such rehabilitative effort was in fact made, it could have been made.
Therefore, the situation differed from, for example, the "forced reenactment of an especially shocking crime" which is capable of degrading a defendant "beyond repair," according to the majority. [d.
42. [d. The court elaborated as follows:
It is axiomatic that jurors are entitleg to see how the witness
reacts when the cross-examiner catches him in a contradiction
or exposes one of his falsehoods. "The demeanor of the witness
on the stand may always be considered by the jury in their
estimation of his credibility." lilA Wigmore on Evidence § 946,
at 783 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) (emphasis in original). Evidence
is normally taken by means of viva voce testimony of witnesses
rather than by written depositions because it is considered crucial for the judge and jury "to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence of a witness' deportment while testifying."
[d. quoting J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1395, at 153 (emphasis in original).
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these factors, the court reasoned, the trial judge did not act irrationally or arbitrarily in failing to rule sua sponte that the act of
reading unfairly prejudiced Giese}3
The majority concluded its analysis regarding the prosecution's use of Revolution by stating that Giese's first amendment
argument "is without merit. "44 The majority noted that Giese did
not assert his constitutional argument "by way of a timely objection or request for instructions at trial;" moreover, he impliedly
waived it, according to the majority, by opening up the subject
of his literary tastes. 45 At that point, "Giese was not entitled to
be selective in describing the contents of his books any more than
the defendant in United States v. Hearst u . . . was entitled to be
selective in describing what she did between the time she was
kidnapped and her arrest."4? The court concluded that "one who
raises the issue of the kind of books he sells, reads, or owns should
not be able to invoke the First Amendment as a bar to crossexamination [on matters reasonably related to the subject matter of direct examinationl."48
43. [d.
44. [d.
45. [d. at 1193-94.

46. 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978).
47. 597 F.2d at 1194.
48. [d. at 1194. The court analogized Giese's waiver of his first amendment rights to
a waiver of fifth amendment rights, quoting McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 216
(1971). See also Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 166 (1958); United States v. Lustig,
666 F.2d 737, 760 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 926 (1977). Giese's first amendment
argument regarding Meyer's testimony in the Government's case-in-chief about his participation in political discussions at the prison and recommendation of certain books to the
inmates met a similar fate. The majority reasoned that:
Evidence relating to Giese's statements about books and politics was relevant because it provided the jury with information
about his relationship with many of the people who subsequently became his co-conspirators. Like the fingerprints on
From the Movement Toward Revolution, Meyer's testimony
shed light on the conspirators' association with each other. It
also tended to show that Giese exercised a leadership role visa-vis the other conspirators. By conducting discussions on a
topic of mutual interest-radical politics-and by furnishing or
recommending books on that Bubject, Giese attracted Meyer
(and perhaps his fellow prisoners Severin and Wallace) to the
group at the bookstore which eventually formed the conspiracy.
Meyer's testimony was not unfairly prejudicial. In fact, the
government took steps to ensure that the jury did not draw
improper inferences from evidence relating to books and political beliefs. In his summation, the assistant United States attorney reminded the jurors that Giese and his co-defendants were
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In reviewing the several instances of prosecutorial misconduct, the court admitted that the prosecution had used "some
slightly overblown rhetoric in describing From the Movement
Toward Revolution" in its summation to the jury. 49 Due to the
lack of an appropriate objection, and request for a corrective instruction, the majority again applied only the plain error standard of review. 50 The court concluded that there was no plain
not on trial for reading or possessing certain types of literature
or for subscribing to a particular political philosophy. Our scrutiny of the record convinces us that the government used
Meyer's testimony solely for permissible purposes and not to
prove that Giese had a violent character or to induce the jury
to punish him for reading and recommending radical literature.
Accordingly, we hold that Giese's First Amendment rights were
not violated.
597 F.2d at 1194-95.
49. 1d. at 1199. See note 13 supra. The majority stated that although they
"wish[ed)" the prosecutors had exercised greater restraint in their characterization of
REvOLUTION in closing argument, in light of the circumstances, their remarks did not
compel reversal of the conviction:
Since the book was in evidence, the government attorneys were
entitled to comment on it to a certain extent. However, they
should have confined their remarks to stressing the sharp contrast between the kinds of books Giese said he read and the
kinds he actually read, thereby reminding the jurors that From
the Movement Toward Revolution had been used to contradict
Giese's character evidence and to impeach his credibility as a
witness. Having considered all of the circumstances, we conclude that the prosecutors' failure to so limit their remarks was
not so improper and damaging as to compel reversal. We note
that although Giese's attorney had registered his "continuing
objection" to the admissibility of the book's contents ... he
• did not voice an objection or request a curative instruction in
response to the government's comments in closing argument.
We further note that the defense attorneys made extensive use
of the book in their own summations. Co-defendant Cronin's
counsel sarcastically characterized From the Movement Toward Revolution as a "song book" .... Co-defendant Wallace's lawyer told the jury that the book was one ofthe weakest
links in the government's case. . .. The defense attorneys repeatedly urged the jurors to peruse various parts of the book
. . ., and the lawyers for Giese and Cronin even went so far as
to read extracts from pages of From the Movement Toward
Revolution on which no conspirator's fingerprints were found
.... The defense attorneys' behavior at trial belies Giese's
appellate argument that the prosecutors' references to From
the Movement Toward Revolution in summation so inflamed
the jury as to deprive him of a fair adjudication of guilt or
innocence. (emphasis added).
597 F.2d at 1200 n.30.
50. 1d. at 1199. See note 49 supra; United States v. Perez, 491 F.2d 167, 173 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 858 (1974).
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error committed because the case against Giese was "strong" and
therefore, absent the Government's improper remarks the jury
still would have found him guilty of criminal conspiracy.51 Further, the court noted, the defense attorneys' "extensive use" of
Revolution in their own summations and urgings that the jurors
peruse portions of the book belied Giese's argument that the prosecutors' conduct in summation so inflamed the jury as to deprive
him of a fair tria1. 52

D.

CRITICISM

There is little one can add to the criticisms set forth convincingly by Judge Hufstedler in her dissenting opinion. However,
since the Supreme Court has recently denied petition for certiorari in this case, this Note will briefly review some of the major
pitfalls in the majority's analysis, and then summarize the major
implications of this very important case.
The prosecution clearly utilized the contents of Revolution to
convince the jury that the revolutionary ideas expressed therein
were held by Giese himself, and that, moreover, Giese acted upon
those concepts to form a conspiracy to bomb military recruiting
centers in order to halt the Vietnam War. 53 Based upon her reading of the record, Judge Hufstedler concluded that "Giese was
. . . convicted of conspiracy by book association in egregious violation of the guarantees of the First Amendment."54 She further
concluded that the "record flatly contradict[ed] the majority's
waiver and invited error theories."55
From a purely evidentiary standpoint, Revolution probably
should have been excluded by the trial judge on a number of
distinct .grounds. Under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evi51. 597 F.2d at 1199-1200. See United States v. Greenbank, 491 F.2d 184, 188-89 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 931 (1974); Corley v. United States, 365 F.2d 884,885 (D.C.
Cir. 1966).
52. 597 F.2d at 1200 n.30. See note 49 supra.
As Judge Hufstedler noted in her dissent, the critical inquiry is whether the remarks
were so prejudicial in light of the circumstances as a whole as to make it likely that they
adversely influenced the jury so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. See, e.g., Lawn
v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 359-60 n.15 (1957); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150,237-43 (1940); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 84-89 (1935);
United States v. Greenback, 491 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1974). 597 F.2d at 1210 n.7 (Hufstedler,
J., dissenting).
53. [d. at 1201 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).

54. [d.
55. [d. at 1202 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/8

94

1980]

Roper et al.: Criminal Law
CRIMINAL
LAW & PROCEDURE

169

dence, the book was particularly excludable as evidence of association in view of its highly cumulative nature. 56 While the erroneous admission of the book as a tangible embodiment of other
evidence was most likely harmless error given the abundant evidence of the co-conspirators' association with one another, the
difficulty is that proper exclusion at that point might have obviated the subsequent sequence of rather odd events which provided for its further misuse.
Judge Hufstedler determined that Judge Trask's "novel"
impeachment theory of admissibility was not only forbidden by
the first amendment, it was contradicted by the record. She lamented the majority's "escape" from the reality of the book's use
by the prosecution to convince the jury that it should attribute
the ideas expressed therein to Giese, who thereafter acted upon
them to form the conspiracy to commit the underlying substantive offenses. 57 Moreover, she surmised, the contents were not
properly admissible to impeach Giese, "even if the Government
had made that attempt."58 For one thing, the contents of books
one reads are not probative as to the reader's peaceable or nonpeaceable character because "[n]o inference of any kind can be
drawn about a person's character from the kinds of books that he
reads. "59
56. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by, inter alia,
the "needless presentation of cumulative evidence." As the Advisory Committee Notes
explain, certain circumstances "call for the exclusion of evidence which is of unquestioned
relevance" when unfairly prejudicial, i.e., having "an undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one . . . . "
Moreover, as is noted by Judge Hufstedler, whether the fingerprints were probative
at all is subject to question-all they really proved was that "the persons who handled
the book had been associated with the book." As she reasoned: "[n)o inference a[rose)
that the persons who handled the book were even casually acquainted in absence of proof
that the fingerprints were made at or about the same time." The Government expert could
not pinpoint the temporal proximity of the prints on REVOLUTION, so that it was imminently possible that they were made in succession, as the book changed hands between
1971 and 1973. 597 F.2d at 1206-07. (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). See note 6 supra.
57. 597 F.2d at 1209 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
58. [d. at 1207 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
59. [d. Even if Giese had misguidedly attempted to imply that the 18 pieces of
literature somehow reflected his left-wing but non-revolutionary political views, the Government should have been precluded from responding with the contents of a book which
Giese had read, in part, for as Judge Hufstedler noted: "We have no basis in human
experience to assume that persons of 'good' character confine their reading matter to
'good' books, or that persons who read peaceful books are peaceful people, or that persons
who read books involving violence are violent people." [d. at 1207.
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Secondly, as Judge Hufstedler perceived, since Giese did not
purport to put forth a representative sample of the kinds of books
that he read, but merely had incidentally read some of the books
he sold, "there was no evidence on this score to contradict. "60 In
addition, there was no "sharp contrast" between the eighteen
books introduced by Giese and Revolution, as a number of Giese's
exhibits ranged from liberal to far left to radical as did the spectrum of the writings inclusive in Revolution, a political anthology.61 Giese's veracity as a witness was in no manner impeached
by the contents of Revolution. 82
Moreover, as a practical matter, it is fairly clearthat Giese,
and not the Government, was placed in a rebuttal posture regarding the use of association or implication by literature. Giese's
lawyer had him introduce the "representative sample" of the
sorts of books he carried in his bookstore in an attempt, albeit illconceived, to rebut the prosecution's evidence that REP bookstore carried how-to-do-it books and pamphlets on explosives and
violent revolution. The majority's assertion that Giese "put" his'
character into issue through literary means, thus mandating in
"fairness" that the prosecution be allowed to rebut in kind, in
actuality turns the situation on its head. sa
60. [d. at 1208 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
61. [d., at 1208 n.4.

62. The use of a commercially published book as the prior inconsistent statement of
a witness is unprecedented. And, as Judge Hufstedler noted, "Professor Wigmore would
have been astonished to discover that he supported a view that any inferences whatever
could be drawn about a witness' veracity from the manner in which a witness read aloud
from a book." [d. at 1208. Besides, the majority's interpretation of Giese's act of reading
patently ignores the "prosecutor's transparent purpose" in making the request-i.e., "to
convey to the jury that the words of the author were the words of Giese." [d.
63. The Ninth Circuit recently disposed of a similar argument in United States v.
Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1339 (9th Cir. 1977). Hearst likewise claimed that her waiver of
her privilege against self-incrimination was involuntary because she was compelled to
testify by the admission of highly prejudicial evidence. Caught between the "rock and
the whirlpool," she argued that she had to testify in order to set the record straight. The
Ninth Circuit distinguished her case, however, from Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S.
219 (1968), in which testimony given to overcome the impact of an illegally obtained
confession was held to be involuntary, on the basis that the prosecution in Hearst did not
introduce any illegal or otherwise inadmissible evidence. The court held that a defendant's
"subjective impressions" of what he is "forced" to do during trial are insufficient to render
his testimony involuntary. [d. Since the majority in Giese specifically held that the prosecution's use of pamphlets in its case-in-chief was perfectly proper, Giese's "subjective
impressions" of what he was forced to do in order to put on a defense could not save him
from inadvertently putting his character into issue and impliedly waiving his first amendment rights.
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The significance of the case, however, clearly derives from
the majority's landmark finding of an implied waiver of first
amendment rights. Giese's alleged waiver of his constitutionally
protected right not to have ideas contained in books he has read
attributed to him is legally unprecedented. In view of the dearth
of authority on the subject, the court analogized his case to that
of the criminal defendant who takes the stand and then attempts
to invoke the fifth amendment to bar cross-examination on reasonably related matters. As a factual matter, Giese did not testify
regarding the kinds of books he read, although, admittedly, he
was not totally unfamiliar with the subject matter of several
books introduced in the "representative sample" he sold in the
REP bookstore. Even if the record "left no doubt" that Giese had
in fact read "many" of them, as the majority surmised, the Government's detailed examination regarding the contents of
Revolution-a book he had read but did not stock in his bookstore-would not appear to have been reasonably related to the
subject matter of his direct examination.

United States v. Hearst,84 relied upon by the majority, is
somewhat distinguishable. Hearst attempted to take the stand
and testify regarding her captive existence from the moment of
her kidnapping to the time of her arrest, and then invoke the fifth
amendment regarding an identical line of questioning by the
prosecutor directed, particularly to the "lost year" she failed to
cover on direct examination.
Even Giese "prefaced" his exhibits with a claim that he
founded the bookstore in order to "propagate" his political point
of view, as the majority claimed, it is still unreasonable to assume
that he automatically subscribed to the social, economic or political messages contained in each and every of the varied literary
works he saw fit to carry. Moreover, if such were a reasonable
assumption, the fact that Giese chose not to carry Revolution, a
book with which he was admittedly familiar, suggested that it did
not sufficiently mirror his political predelictions, contrary to the
Government's assertion.
Therefore, assuming for the moment that first amendment
rights are subject to waiver, and even if an implied waiver of some
degree was inferrable based on the facts-that Dr. Giese waived
64. 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1977).
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his constitutional right to have the Government refrain from introducing samples of the books he chose to sell in his bookstore-the cross-examination which ensued surely exceeded the
scope of the implied waiver. A properly circumscribed crossexamination, i. e., one to the effect that the books he produced
were not in fact representative of those he carried, would have
been reasonably related to the scope of his direct examination
and thus arguably permissible. 85
The court's unhesitating analogy, however, to waiver of the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is also suspect from the standpoint of the constitutional rights hierarchy.
It is generally accepted that the first amendment freedoms of
speech, press and association occupy a preferred position in the
hierarchy of constitutional freedoms due to the explicit protection
accorded them and to their importance to a democratic society.ss
A civilized society should not allow a waiver of the individual's
fundamental right to his "individual freedom of mind,"s7 for the
same reason that the society protects a criminal defendant
against waiving all fundamental due process rights. At the very
least, given the preeminence of first amendment protections,
more precise standards for waiver should have been elucidated by
the court.
Generally, in instances of waiver, the act which constitutes
the waiver must clearly indicate an intentional relinquishment of
65. As Judge Hufstedler noted: "The Government introduced no evidence to show
that, contrary to his testimony, the books that he introduced were not representative
samples of the books he carried in his bookstore, [nor did it offer any] evidence that the
book Revolution was .carried in his bookstore." 597 F .2d at 1208 (Hufstedler, J., dissent·
ing).
66. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). See also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130, 145 (1967) ("Free speech is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly
every other form of freedom, . . . "); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) ("This
right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth,. . . is fundamental
to our free society."); Baker, Scope of the First Amendment·Freedom of Speech, 25
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 964 (1974); Barnum, Constitutional Status of Public Protest Activity
in Britain and in the United States, 1977 PUB. L. 310; Be Vier, First Amendment and
Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV.
299 (1977·78); Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unravelling the Chilling
Effect, 58 B.U.L. REV. 685 (1978); Note, First Amendment Limitations in Punishing
Political Threats, 9 CONN. L. REv. 304 (1977); Note, Freedom of Speech: Evolution of the
Enlightenment Function, 29 MERCER L. REV. 811 (1977·78); AnBstaplo, Book Review, 9
Sw. U.L. REV. 273 (1977) (D. MURPHY, THE MEANING OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH: FIRST AMEND'
MENT FREEDOMS FROM WILSON TO FDR).
67. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. at 714.
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a known right or privilege in order to counteract the strong presumption against waiver of fundamental rights. os With respect to
simultaneous waiver by an accused of several constitutional
rights, for example, the trial judge must assume a protective
posture and carry a weighty responsibility in determining
whether the defendant has in fact made a voluntary, intelligent
and competent waiver. Given the dominant position of the first
amendment protections in the constitutional constellation, the
presumption against waiver should be particularly strong, and
any inadvertent or accidental waiver should be procedurally safeguarded. In Giese's case, not only were both he and his counsel
clearly ignorant of the implications of his testimony, but also
there is no indication that the trial court gave any consideration
to the existence of an implied waiver of constitutional rights. On
appeal the finding of an intentional and voluntary relinquishment by Giese of a known constitutional right seems inconsistent
with the objections of his counsel, which included a continuing
objection on first amendment grounds to the introduction of
Revolution's contents. 89
As Judge Hufstedler pointed out, the actual use made of the
book by the Government was completely aberrant to the Constitution,70 and the admission of Revolution was "no more constitutionally permissible" had it been utilized for impeachment purposes as was argued by the majority. "No inferences can constitutionally be drawn about the character of book readers on the basis
68. See, e.g., Brookhart v. Jains, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966); Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60, 70-71 (1942); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Mone v. Robinson, 430
F. Supp. 481, 484 (D. Conn. 1977). See also Dix, Waiver as an Independent Aspect of
Criminal Procedure: Some Comments on Professor Westen's Suggestion, ARIz. ST. L.J.
67 (1979); Dix. Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More Careful Analysis, 55
TEX. L. REV. 193 (1977); Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, Procedural Default. and the Burger
Court, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1978).
69. See note 12 supra.
70. 597 F.2d at 1209 (Hufstedler. J., dissenting). Judge Hufstedler explained:
The Government's theory, which it argued to the jury, was that
the ideas of an author of a book may properly be attributed to
the reader of the book and then used against him to prove
disposition to commit a crime, motive to undertake criminal
action, or proofthat he did the acts charged. None of these uses
is constitutionally permissible. Freedom of speech would be
totally destroyed if the shadow of the prosecutor fell across the
pages of the books we read. Even during the evil thralldom of
McCarthyism, we did not embrace the concept of guilt by book
association.
Id. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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of the books they read, [inasmuch as the] [a]bstract advocacy
of violence is constitutionally protected."71 She noted that since
the "corollary of the right to utter or to print advocacy of violence
is the right to listen or to read violent exhortations," the use of
"book reading, ... to impeach a person's character is utterly
incompatible with constitutional protections afforded free
speech. "72
The Supreme Court has recognized, on numerous occasions,
the existence of the constitutional right to receive information,
either as an indispensable corollary to the right to disseminate
information,73 or as elemental to the freedom of thought. 74 In
71. 597 F.2d at 1209.
72. [d. In 1971, Justice Harlan had occasion to speak eloquently regarding the fundamental ideals of democratic society which depend for their livelihood upon the first
amendment:
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine
in a society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and
intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of
public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shaH
be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that
use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable
citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other
approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity
and choice upon which our political system rests (citations
omitted).
To many, the immediate consequence of this freedom may
often appear to be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance. . . . That the air may at times seem filled with
verbal cacophony is, in this sense not a sign of weakness but of
strength . . . . That is why .. [w Iholly neutral futilities . . .
come under the protection of free speech as fully as do Keats'
poems or Donne's sermons ... ," and why "so long as the
means are peaceful, the communication need not meet standards of acceptability."
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971) (citations omitted).
73. See Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 65 n.6 (1963); Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507, 509-10 (1948); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
74. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965), the Supreme Court proclaimed that:
[T]he State may not, consistently with the spirit of the first
amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge.
The right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the
right to utter and print, but the right to distribute, the right to
receive, the right to read (Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141,
143) and freedom in inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom
to teach ....
Justice Stewart later expanded on this notion in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
649 (1968):
The first amendment guarantees liberty of human expression
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Stanley v. Georgia,75 for example, the Court declared unconstitutional a statute making it unlawful to possess obscene materials
in the home, because it offended the "right to receive ideas, regardless of their social worth," and violated the "right to be free,
except in very limited circumstances, from the unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy."76
The Court perceived that the "test" of the freedom's
in order to preserve in our Nation what Justice Holmes cal1ed
a "free trade in ideas." . . . To that end, the Constitution
protects more than just man's freedom to say or write or publish what he wants. It secures as wel1 the liberty of each man
to decide for himself what he will read and to what he will
listen. The Constitution guarantees, in short, a society of free
choice.
75. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
76. [d. at 564. Intel1ectual freedoms have been championed by philosophers since
ideas were first committed to paper. Early, Spinoza spoke out against
laws which decree what everyone must believe, and forbid utterance against this or that opinion, [which) have too often
been enacted to confirm or enlarge the power of those who
dared not suffer free inquiry to be made, and have by a perversion of authority turned the superstition of the mob into violence against opponents.
B. SPINOZA, TRACTUS THEOLOGICO-POLITICUS 349 (London 1862). Montesquieu pursued a
similar theme in his discourse on the law entitled L'Esprit des Lois, published in 1748.
As a reknowned thinker of the times, he proclaimed against punishing thoughts or words:
There was a law passed in England under Henry vm, by which
whoever predicted the king's death was declared guilty of high
treason. This law was extremely vague; the terror of despotic
power is so great that it recoils upon those who exercise it. In
the king's last illness, the physicians would not venture to say
he was in danger; and surely they acted very right . . . .
Marsyas dreamed that he had cut Dionysius' throat. Dionysius
put him to death, pretending that he would never have
dreamed of such a thing by night if he had not thought of it by
day. This was a most tyrannical action: for though it had been
the subject of his thoughts, yet he had made no attempt towards it. The laws do not take upon them to punish any other

than overt acts. . . . Words do not constitute an overt act; they
remain only an idea.
idea.
1 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 192-93 (1949) (emphasis added).
Thomas Irwin Emerson might have had United States v. Giese in mind when he
warned that "expression may be seriously inhibited when the speaker knows what he says
can be used against him at a later time if some unforeseen action ensues, and can be taken
into account by a jury in determining his state of mind in performing a subsequent act,
or perhaps be the decisive factor in a jury's general verdict against him. T. EMERSON,
THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 405 (1970) (emphasis added). Judge Ely apparently agreed and voted to grant the petition for a rehearing en banc in Giese, "believing
that the original majority [0 )pinion constituted an impediment to the intel1ectual growth
of our citizenry." 597 F.2d at 1213.
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"substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart
of the existing order."77 The Court noted that:
We can have intellectual individualism and the
rich cultural diversities that we owe to exceptional
minds only at the price of occasional eccentricity
and abnormal attitudes. When they are so harmless to others or to the state as those we deal with
here, the price is not too great. But freedom to
differ is not limited to things that do not matter
much. That would be the mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ
as to things that touch the heart of the existing
order.
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion
or force its citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein. If there are any circumstances which
permit an exception, they do not now occur to US. 78
Moreover, the attribution to the reader of thoughts expressed
by an author whom he has merely read plainly violates the first
amendment's proscription against "guilt by association." In
Schneiderman v. United States,78 for example, the Supreme
Court recognized, the Government having conceded, that it was
unsound to impute to the members of an organization the views
espoused in organizational documents. Indeed, in Aptheker v.
Secretary of State, 80 the Court rejected a rule imputing the beliefs
of an organized political party to its members, even though the
complainants in that case were in fact the party chairman and
its chief theoretician. Recently, the First Circuit, in United States
77. Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943). Americans also
struggled to rid the republic of the spectre of "thought crime" and to punish our citizens
only for overt acts against the state. 'See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Cramer
v. United States, 325 U.S. 1,28-30 (1944).
78. 319 U.S. at 641-42. Giese's conviction stands in sharp contrast to time-honored,
fundamental maxims regarding first amendment liberties. We are newly faced with the
dismal prospect that a lighthearted comment once made by Mark Twain has become,
ironically, a sad truism. Twain wrote: "It is by the goodness of God that in our country
we have those three unspeakably precious things: freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, and the prudence never to practice either of them." M. TWAIN, FOLLOWING THE
EQUATOR 198 (1903).
79. 320 U.S. 118, 147, 154 (1942). See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 186 (1972);
Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299-300
(1961); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945).
80. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
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v. Spock, 81 declined to hold that a drafter of a document necessarily adhered to, and intended to act upon, its illegal aspects. These
cases surely prohibit the imputation of the views of an author of
a commercial literary work to his readers.
Giese's conviction might have been reversed on the basis of
Stromberg v. California,82 in which the Supreme Court held that
a conviction, based upon a record and statute which did not
substantially exclude the possibility that it occurred in contravention of constitutional rights, must be reversed. In Street v. New
York,83 the Supreme Court applied the Stromberg rule and reversed Street's conviction by general verdict, since it left open the
possibility that he was convicted based on pure speech alone,
. even though the uncontroverted proof of Street's act of flag burning provided a fully sufficient and constitutionally permissible
basis for the conviction. Giese, on the other hand, was acquitted
of the substantive counts in connection with the bombings, which
tended to suggest that there was at least some question as to the
existence of a fully sufficient and constitutionally permissible
basis for his conspiracy conviction.
Notwithstanding the prosecutor's flagrant misuse of the contents of Revolution, the trial court's failure to give the jury special
instructions cautioning it not to convict on the basis of first
amendment activities, and the fact that the record did not indicate that the jury did not base its verdict on safeguarded conduct,
the Ninth Circuit held that the trial court's general conspiracy
instructions "sufficiently warned the jury."84 The court maintained that "[a]lthough these instructions did not explicitly prohibit the jury's consideration of First Amendment activities, they
did, by their very terms and logic, negate the relevance to the
verdict of Giese's protected speech, association, and assembly."85
81. 416 F.2d 165, 178 (1st Cir. 1969).
82. 283 U.S. 359 (1931). See also Bachel1ar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 571 (1970);
Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 113 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 6, 31·2
(1965).
83. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
84. 597 F.2d at 1198.
85. [d. The majority explained:
The jury could have convicted Giese only after finding that he
"willfully and knowingly" joined a conspiracy formed "to com·
mit and cause to be committed, certain offenses against the
United States and other persons and institutions by means of
or acts of violence, terrorism and destruction." Nothing could
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SIGNIFICANCE

The obvious significance of United States v. Giese is that, in
the Ninth Circuit, criminal defendants can waive at least one of
their first amendment protections. The Ninth Circuit has virtually invited Government ingenuity to devise new theories of
relevance upon which the introduction of first amendment material may be sustained.
Potentially far-reaching aspects of the case derive from what
transpired during the Government's case-in-chief. Apparently,
the prosecution may demonstrate the associational coalescence
and hierarchical structure of an allegedly conspiratorial group by
enlisting the aid of constitutionally protected activity. The activist defendant is especially vulnerable because his political activity may be used against him. His associates can turn state's evidence and testify as to his abstract advocacy of violence. In fact,
the Government may rest its conspiracy case almost entirely on
evidence concerning the activist's discussions, literary habits,
and advocacy to others.
The implications of the Government's misuse of Revolution
are equally frightening. Defendants and their counsel are strongly
influenced to refrain from attempting to rebut the prosecution's
literary evidence with other literature, lest an implied waiver of
constitutional rights be found. At the moment, however, this aspect of the case is strictly limited to the somewhat bizarre facts.
The majority recognized the first amendment implications inherent in the use of Revolution, and, absent some affirmative conduct by an accused which can be construed as "throwing open the
door" to his literary tastes, the Government should not be able
to compel him to read from the most unpopular treatise found in
his library.
Lastly, the books one reads, while not the most effective
method of proving or disproving a particular character trait, are
now at least probative and thus competent evidence on this issue
in the Ninth Circuit.
be clearer, or less threatening to First Amendment values. After
hearing these instructions, no reasonable juror could have
found that Giese joined the conspiracy solely by expressing
opposition to the Vietnam War. A more direct and purposeful
manifestation of intent was required to find that he joined the
conspiracy "willfully and knowingly."
[d.
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NON -TESTIFYING DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO
APPEAL: UNITED STATES V. COOK
INTRODUCTION

During the past Survey term, a panel of the Ninth Circuit in
United States v. Cook l decided issues relating to pre-trial identification, access to witnesses and the right to confrontation in a
criminal action. The court also considered "whether a defendant,
who elected not to testify during his trial, could preserve on appeal his challenge to the trial judge's [preliminary] ruling on a
motion for an order excluding evidence of his former robbery
convictions. "2
In this case, the trial court preliminarily ruled that if defendant testified, the prosecution could present evidence of defendant's past robbery convictions for impeachment purposes. The
defendant did not testify at trial, and based his appeal, inter
alia, on the argument that the lower court ruling effectively denied him a chance to testify. The court, in an en banc opinion
held that a defendant is not barred from appellate review of a
trial judge's ruling admitting evidence of prior convictions, even
if defendant does not testify as long as the defense: (1) establishes that he would testify if evidence of his priors is excluded,
and (2) "sufficiently outline[s] the nature of his testimony so
that the trial court, and the reviewing court, can do the necessary balancing contemplated in Rule 609 [of the Federal Rules of
Evidence].' '3
The focus of this Note will be to clarify the issues posed by
the Cook en bane opinion concerning Rule 609 and to examine
the problem posed by the requirement of the testimonial record.
1. 608 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir. June, 1979) (partially decided en bane per Goodwin, J.)

(partially decided in panel per Goodwin, J.; the other panel members were Trask, J. and
Kellaher, D.J. sitting by designation) (filing separate opinions to the en bane opinion
were Wallace, J., concurring; Kennedy, J.; dissenting in part and concurring in part,
joined by Wright, Choy and Hug, JJ.; Sneed, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part; Hufstedler, J., dissenting, joined by Ely, J.), cert denied, 100 S. Ct. 706 (1980).
2. 1d. at 1183. Traditionally, the admissibility of prior convictions of the witness has
been entirely within the discretion of the trial court. However, in 1975, the Federal Rules
of Evidence codified the standard against which admissibility is to be measured. FED. R.
Evm. 609; see note 4 infra.
3. 608 F.2d at 1186.
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BACKGROUND

The Admissibility of Evidence of Prior Convictions
Federal Rule of Evidence 6094 presently governs the admissibility of evidence of prior convictions in federal court. This rule
replaced the common law rule that anyone convicted of various
crimes was incompetent to testify.s Rule 609 was the subject of
extensive and heated legislative debate.' Although an in-depth
examination of this debate is beyond the scope of this Note, a
brief mention should be made of the four major phases through
which the law passed, which may be simply characterized7 as fol4. FED. R. EVJD. Rule 609 provides in pertinent part:
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility
of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime
shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public
record during cross· examination but only if the crime (1) was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year
under the law under which he was convicted, and the court
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) in·
volved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the
punishment.
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is
not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed
since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness
from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever
is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests
of justice that the probative value of the conviction supported
by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its
prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction more than
10 years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless the
proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written
notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such
evidence.
6. For a discussion of the common law rule that any person convicted of various
crimes was incompetent to testify, see generally, 1 S. GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAw
OF EVIDENCE § 372 (16th ed. 1899); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE §
43 (2d ed. 1972); 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIAL AT COMMON LAW § 980 (Chadbourne
rev. 1970); Boehm, Limiting the Use of Prior Felony Convictions to Impeach a Defen·
dant· Witness in California Criminal Proceedings, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 136 (1977). This
common law rule was abrogated by Rule 609.
6. In United States v. Smith, 661 F.2d 348, 369·63, 366·69 (D.C. Cir. 1976), Judge
McGowan set forth a detailed study of Rule 609, including its legislative history. See also
United States v. Jackson, 406 F. Supp. 938 (E.D. N.Y. 1976) for further comment on the
legislative history of Rule 609.
For a critique and commentary on the statute, a selection of the legislative debate
and an extensive bibliography, see 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
(1976).
7. These characterizations are simplified but not distorted. The word, "felony," for
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lows: (1) evidence of any felony or any offense involving dishonesty or false statement is automatically admitted;8 (2) evidence
of any felony is admitted unless the court determines that the
danger of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value of the
evidence of the conviction, and any offense involving dishonesty
or false statement is automatically admitted;' (3) only evidence
of a conviction for an offense involving dishonesty or false statement is automatically admitted;IO (4) evidence of a conviction of
a crime involving dishonesty or false statement is automatically
admitted; a felony is only admitted if the court determines that
the probative value of evidence outweighs the danger of unfair
prejudice. II
It should be noted that the legislature has tended to limit
rather than to expand the use of prior convictions to impeach
defendants. For example, under formulation number four, a
felony conviction was presumed inadmissible unless the government met the burden of showing that the probative value of
the conviction outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice; 12
under formulation number two, however, a conviction was preinstance, is used in place of "crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one
year." FEn. R. EVID. Rule 609 (a)(l).
8. This is basically the form of the rule as promulgated by the Supreme Court and
transmitted to Congress. This formulation met stiff oppostion. Proposed Rules of Eui·
dence: Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on the Judiciary, House of Representa·
tiues, 93rd Cong., 1st. Sess. Serial No.2. 29-30, 68-69, 105-14. 251-52120 CONGo REe. 2001
(1973). The full text of this draft of the rule was:
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility
of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime is
admissible but only if the crime, (1) was punishable by death
or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under
which he was convicted, or, (2) involved dishonesty or false
statement regardless of the punishment.
[d. (remarks of Congressman Hogan).
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime is admissible but
only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment
in excess of one year, unless the court determines that the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value of the
evidence of the conviction, or (2) involved dishonesty or false
statement.
H.R. REp. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1973).
10. This is, the version as further amended by the House Judiciary Committee. The
full text of the rule is: "(a) General rule.-For the purpose of attacking the credibility of
a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime is admissible only if the crime
involved dishonesty or false statement." Proposed Rules of Euidence, supra note 8.
11. This is the formulation that was ultimately accepted by Congress. For the text of
Rule 609, see note 4 supra.
12. United States V. Hawley, 554 F.2d 50,52 (2d Cir. 1977) (few crimes, other than
those involving dishonesty or false statement, are likely to be probative of a witness'
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sumed admissible unless the prejudice outweighed its probat!ve
value. More than a mere semantic shift, this change underscores the legislature's intent to limit the introduction of prior
convictions. One reason for this is the often severe and sometimes unjust consequences of introducing evidence of prior
convictions. 13
Problems Facing A Defendant With a Prior Criminal Record

The defendant with a criminal record faces several
problems: (1) if the record is introduced at trial, the jury may
well use the evidence of prior crimes for propensity purposes, 1.
rather than for the purpose of assessing the defendant's credibility; (2) if the defendant chooses not to take the stand, his silence
may be construed as an admission of guilt; and (3) the defendant must comply with certain procedures in order to maintain
his right to appeal an improper evidentiary ruling under which
evidence of the priors were admitted.
In Gordon v. United States, 15 Chief Justice Burger, then sitting as a district court judge, discussed the purposes of impeachment with prior convictions: Judge Burger commented:
[W]e must look to the legitimate purpose of impeachment which is, of course, not to show that
the accused who takes the stand is a "bad" person
but rather to show background facts which bear
directly on whether jurors ought to believe him
rather than other and conflicting witnesses. In
common human experience acts of deceit, fraud,
cheating, or stealing, for example, are universally
regarded as conduct which reflects adversely on a
man's honesty and integrity. Acts of violence on
the other hand, which may result from a short
temper, a combative nature, extreme provocation,
or other causes, generally have little or no direct
bearing on honesty and veracity. A "rule of
thumb" thus should be that convictions which
rest on dishonest conduct relate to credibility
veracity). See also United States ·v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 359 (D.C. Cir., 1976) (Rule 609
had effect of shifting the burden of persuasion to the government).
13. See generally Boehm, supra note 5.
14. That is the jury may infer that if the defendant committed such crimes in the
past, it is more likely that he also committed the crime with which he is presently
charged.
15. 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1967).
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whereas those of violent or assaultive crimes generally do not; . . . 16

The use of prior convictions to impeach a defenant-witness
is restricted in an attempt to avoid the possibility of a conviction
simply because the jury thinks the defendant is a "bad man."17
Prior convictions are supposed to be used by the jury for the sole
purpose of assessing the defendant's credibility and not for any
propensity purposes. While the defendant is entitled to a standard limiting instruction,18 when impeachment by prior conviction is allowed, as Justice Jackson stated, it would be "naive" to
assume that such an instruction can overcome the prejudicial effect of such evidence. IV Judge Learned Hand characterized limited instructions as requiring a "a mental gymnastic" of which a
jury is incapable of performing. 20
The idea that juries tend to attach undue weight to a defendant's prior record is substantiated by a study by Professors
Kalven and Zeisel which showed that the jury acquittal rate declined from forty-two to twenty-five percent in those trials where
the defendant had been shown to have a criminal record. 21 Sensitive to this problem, some jurisdictions have gone so far as to
limit the admissiblity of prior convictions to those situations in
16. Id. at 940.
17. United States v. Martinez, 555 F.2d 1273, 1276 (5th Cir. 1977); Boehm, supra
note 5, at 136.
18. A limiting instruction is a charge to the jury to "consider the evidence only for
the allowable purpose." C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, at § 59. For example, one such
limiting instruction reads as follows:
Certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose.
At the time this evidence was admitted you were admonished
that it could not be considered by you for any purpose other
than the limited purpose for which it was admitted.
You are again instructed that you must not consider such evidence for any purpose except the limited purpose for which it
was admitted.
CALJIC No. 2.09 (4th ed. 1979).
19. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949).
20. Nash. v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932).
21. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966); see also McGowan,
Impeachment of Criminal Defendants by Prior Convictions, [1970] Law & the Soc. Ord.
1, 2 (relating how Judge McGowan, after being questioned about the American rule by
English judges, was moved to remand a conviction of a defendant whose credibility had
been impeached by use of prior conviction in Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C.
Cir. 1965»; Note, Procedural Protections of the Criminal Defendant-A Reevaluation of
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Rule Excluding Evidence of Propensity
to Commit Crimes, 78 fuRV. L. REv. 426 (1964).
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which the accused attempts to establish his own good
character.22
The alternative of not taking the stand at all poses severe
problems to the defendant: most jurors view defendant's failure
to testify as an indication of guilt. 23 Thus, a defendant with admissible prior convictions is faced with a very difficult choice:
either to take the stand and risk being convicted because the
jury believes he is a "bad man," or not to take the stand and
risk being convicted because the jury construes defendant's silence as an admission of guilt.
A further problem area concerning the use of prior convictions is the preservation of defendant's right to appeal an improper evidentiary ruling admitting the priors. This was the
problem focused on by the Cook en banc decision. In United
States v. Murray,24 a pre-Rule 609 decision, the Ninth Circuit
held that the defendant was required to take the stand in order
to preserve his right to appeal an improper evidentiary ruling.
Under Murray, then, the defendant was in the very difficult position of either taking the stand, having the prior convictions (improperly) introduced against him, and suffering the harmful
prejudice caused by the priors; or not taking the stand and losing his right to appeal.
22. For example, HAWAII REv. STAT. §§ 621·622 (Supp. 1975) states in pertinent part:
[I]n a criminal case where the defendant takes the stand, the
defendant may not be questioned or evidence introduced as to
whether he has been convicted of any indictable or other offense unless the defendant has himself introduced testimony
for the sole purpose of establishing his credibility as a witness.
In State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 260, 492 P.2d 657, 661 (1971), the court held
that the use of prior convictions to impeach a testifying defendant was unconstitutional.
23. Statistics gathered by the American Institute of Public Opinion showed that 71%
of the persons questioned believed that the accused's refusal to take the stand in reliance
on the privilege was an indication of guilt. H. MEYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT? 29 (1959). As the Supreme Court suggested in Wilson v. United States, 149
U.S. 60 (1893), other factors may influence the defendant's choice to forego the opportunity to testify: "ExceBBive timidity, nervousness when facing others and attempting to
explain transactions of a suspicious character, and offenses charged against him will
often confuse and embarrass (the defendant·witness) to such a degree as to increase
rather than remove prejudices against him." [d. at 66. One author states that of 300
defendants prosecuted by him, 23 elected not to take the stand and only one was acquitted. A. TIwN, 1itUE STORIES 011 CRIME FROM THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 98 (1939);
see also Dunmore, Comment on Failure of Accused to Testify, 26 YALE L.J. 464 (1916).
24. 492 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 854 (1974).
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THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S REASONING

The Ninth Circuit identified two conflicting lines of cases
within the circuit that have ruled on the question of whether a
non-testifying defendant has the right to appellate review. In the
first line of cases, the court has held that if a defendant refuses
to testify at trial he thereby waives his right to appeal on the
ground that, had he testified, his testimony would have been impeached by improperly admitted evidence of his past convictions. 25 There exists another class of cases, however, in which the
court has considered the facts of a given case in order to decide
whether a lower court made an improper ruling on whether evidence of prior convictions should have been admitted. 26 The
court noted that those cases denying judicial review were based
on the common law rule that evidence of a felony conviction was
always admissible for the purpose of impeaching a witness, and
that Federal Rule of Evidence 609 abrogated that common law
rule. Since that line of cases was based on an overturned rule of
law, the Cook court specifically overruled those cases.
Having decided the narrow issue of whether a defendant has
the right to appeal an in limine ruling on the admissibility of
prior conviction evidence, the court went on to state, in dictum,
the requirements for the exclusion of evidence of post convictions
in future cases: (1) that a defendant establish that he will testify
at trial if the challenged evidence is excluded, and (2) that the
defense outline the nature of defendant's testimony so that the
balancing test required by Rule 609 can be carried out.27 In this
25. United States v. Murray, 492 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 854
(1974). See United States v. Fulton, 549 F.2d 1323, 1326 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Walters, 477 F.2d 386 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1007 (1973).
26. United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1111 (1977) (evidence of non-testifying defendant's past convictions held admissible);
United States v. Villegras, 487 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1973) (motion to exclude evidence of
past convictions held admissible because irrelevant to issue of defendant's veracity).
27. 608 F.2d at 1186-87. The Cook majority's testimonial record requirement may
pose serious problems. In essence, the requirement serves as a broad discovery device for
the prosecution. If the defendant fails to make such a record, he is penalized by waiving
his right to appeal.
The first serious problem is whether the defendant is acting under compulsion in
"choosing" to make a testimonial record. The cost of the privilege not to make the testimonial record is the loss of the right to appeal. A second problem of constitutional dimension is whether the testimonial record requirement encroaches upon the defendant's
fifth amendment right, "[not to be] ... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself . . . . " U.S. CONST. amend. V. See generally Westerfield, The Conundrum of Criminal Discovery: Constitutional Arguments, ABA Standards, Federal Rules,
and Kentucky Law, 64 Ky. L.J. 801, 810-19 (1976).
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way, the lower court can state the basis for its in limine ruling,
and a full record will be available for appellate review. Failure to
establish such a record would constitute abandonment of the
contention, and waiver of the right to appeal a ruling on the admissibility of the impeachment evidence.
On the facts, the court upheld the lower court's finding that
the probative value of the challenged evidence outweighed its
prejudicial effect. The court limited that finding to the present
case, adding that not all past convictions for violent crimes
would be admissible in every case. Approving a District of Columbia Circuit case,28 the court held that allowing in all past
convictions of violent crimes would be impermissible under Federal Rule 609(a). Indeed, the court stated that only in "rare"
cases would the facts justify an in limine ruling permitting the
introduction of such evidence. 2u

D.

CRITICISM: THE NINTH CIRCUIT MISAPPLIES THE BALANCING
TEST

In deciding Cook, the Ninth Circuit addressed two basic
questions regarding the lower court ruling: (1) whether the preliminary ruling to admit the priors was proper; and (2) if not,
whether the improper ruling was harmless or prejudicial error.
28. United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
29. 608 F.2d at 1187.
Rule 609 contains both mandatory and discretionary sections. Subsection (a)(2), the
mandatory portion of Rule 609, provides that all crimes of dishonesty or false statements
will be admitted. The rationale is that these crimes have a bearing on the defendant's
credibility. Robbery, and crimes of a similar nature are admissible under this subsection.
E.g., United States v. Fearwell, 595 F.2d 771, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (petit larceny); United
States V. Dorsey, 591 F.2d 922, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (shoplifting); United States V. Hastings, 577 F.2d 38, 41 (8th Cir. 1978) (narcotics); United States V. Ashley, 569 F.2d 975,
978 (5th Cir. 1978) (shoplifting); United States V. Seamster, 568 F.2d 188 (lOth Cir.
1978) (burglary); United States V. Ortega, 561 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1977) (shoplifting);
United States V. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1977) (importing cocaine); United States V.
Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (armed robbery and assault); Virgin Islands V. Testamark, 528 F.2d 742, 743 (3d Cir. 1976) (petit larceny).
If a prior conviction for robbery is to be admitted, it must be done so under subsection (8)(1), the discretionary portion of Rule 609. In order to admit a prior conviction
under 609 (a)(l), the court must balance the probative value of the conviction as it bears
on the defendant's credibility, against the possible prejudicial effect it will have on the
jury. Though the trial court did not do this, the Ninth Circuit rule that, "[tlhe ruling did
not constitute an abuse of discretion, as appropriate reasons could be given for it." 608
F.2d at 1187. The logic behind the court's ruling is that, although the lower court did not
properly perform the balancing test, had it done so, the prior convictions would have
been admissible.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/8

112

1980]

RoperLAW
et al.: Criminal
Law
CRIMINAL
& PROCEDURE

187

To determine the admissibility of defendant's criminal record,
the Ninth Circuit independently performed the balancing as required in Rule 609(a)(1). That is, the court weighed the probative value of the challenged evidence against the possible
prejudice to the defendant. In performing the 609 balancing test,
the court looked to (1) the type of crime involved;30 (2) the age of
the past conviction;31 and (3) the similarity between the prior
conviction and the crime with which the defendant is presently
charged. 32
It would appear upon an application of the above factors
that the probative value of the prior convictions would be outweighed by their prejudicial effect. Cook's prior conviction was
for robbery, a crime that does not bear much relevance to his
credibility.33 Furthermore, the prior conviction for robbery was in
1967, ten years prior to the instant case. This long time gap between the two crimes cast further doubt on the probative value
of the prior conviction. 34 Finally, since the prior conviction was
for robbery, the same crime with which defendant was currently
charged, there was a great danger of undue prejudice.

The Ninth Circuit, however, held that upon such a balance,
the decision to admit the prior convictions was within the trial
court's discretion. This is contrary to the legislative intent of
Rule 609. The Cook rule seems to stand for the proposition that
almost any prior felony conviction is admissible. Yet, this broad
reading of admissibility of prior convictions is precisely the practice Congress intended to abrogate. 35
An alternative basis for the Cook decision could have been a
finding that the ruling, though erroneous, constituted harmless
30. United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 828 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 867
(1977) (smuggling rates higher on the "scale of veracity-related crimes" than a conviction
of a violent crime).
31. Id.
32. United States v. Seamster, 565 F.2d 479, 481 (7th Cir. 1977) (the more similar
the past conviction, the greater the danger of prejudice).
33. United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d at 828; United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348,
362 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see also United States v. Hickey, 596 F.2d 1083, 1087 (let Cir.),
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 107 (1979); United States v. Langston, 576 F.2d 1138, 1139 (5th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied. 439 U.S. 932 (1979); United States v. Fearwell, 595 F.2d 771, 777
(D.C. Cir. 1978); United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 357 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United
States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 826 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 434 U.S. 867 (1977).
34. For the relevant statutory language of Rule 609(b), see note 10 supra.
35. See notes 5 to 13 supra and accompanying text.
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error. In her dissent, Judge Hufstedler accused the majority of
blurring the issues of the erroneous nature of the ruling and the
possible prejudicial effect of the ruling. 3s Thus, in Judge Hufstedler's view, at least, the basis for the Cook decision is unclear.
For this reason, an alternative basis for the ruling will be
examined.
If the Ninth Circuit had found the lower court's ruling im-

proper, they would have concluded that the improper lower court
ruling constituted "harmless error," even though the appellate
court did not have the benefit of a testimonial record. As mentioned above, the testimonial record is required by the Cook majority for the preservation of all future defendant's right to appeal an improper ruling to admit prior convictions. The majority
states that the purpose of the testimonial record is "so that the
trial court, and the reviewing court, can do the necessary balancing contemplated in Rule 609."37
The testimonial record, however, is relevant for two purposes: first, to do the necessary balancing contemplated in Rule
609, and second, to determine whether or not the lower court's
erroneous ruling constituted harless error. This second purpose
was explicitly stated in United States v. Fearwell. 38
In Fearwell, the appellate court found that the lower court
had improperly ruled defendant's prior attempted petit larceny
convictions admissible. The defendant did not make a testimonial record. The court held that "not knowing what Fearwell's
testimony would have been leaves us unable to apply [the] test
for harmless error." 3S The court went on to say that though a
testimonial record was not required to secure a ruling of harmless error from the court, it would be helpful. 40
Not having such a testimonial record, the Fearwell court's
solution was to "remand the record to the District Court for the
limited purpose of taking the defendant's testimony (subject to
36. 608 F.2d at 1192 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). "The majority does not directly
address the question of Rule 609 error because it blends the two distinct issues of the
existence of error with the existence of prejudice."
37. [d. at 1186.
38. 595 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
39. [d. at 779.
40. [d. at 779 n.2.
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the government's cross examination) so that the trial judge can
in the first instance decide whether the error was harmless."4.
Thus, Fearwell stands for the proposition that to determine
whether or not an improper ruling (which caused the defendant
not to testify) was harmless error, the defendant's testimony
must be elicited. The lower court may then determine if the defendant's testimony would more probably than not42 have
altered the verdict.

E.

CONCLUSION

Under ~he Cook rule, the result as reached in Fearwell could
never occur. Either the defendant will have made a testimonial
record, or he will have lost his right to appeal the ruling. The
procedure required by Cook seems ultimately to be less cumbersome than that of the District of Columbia Circuit.4s Because of
the harsh result that inures from the defendant's failure to make
a testimonial record, however, it seems less just. Under Cook,
even a blatant abuse of discretion by the lower court judge would
be unappealable unless the defendant had made a testimonial
record, either in the presence of the jury or not. Whether or not
to make a testimonial record, and preserve a non-testifying defendant's right to appeal will thus be one more factor to be
weighed in the defense strategy.
In holding that the lower court's ruling was not an abuse of
discretion, the Cook court has effectively lowered the standard
for the admissibility of prior convictions. Under Cook, it now appears that a prior felony conviction may be admitted, whether or
not the trial court goes through a charade of balancing the requisite 609 factors. This is a return to the earlier version of Rule 609
which allowed the admission of any felony conviction. Given the
legislative history of Rule 609, as well as the severe ramifications
of the admission of prior convictions, the Cook decision will ultimately have to be re-examined.

Charles Ferrera
41. 1d. at 779.
42. United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 1977).
43. United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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VITI. HEARSAY AND THE MARITAL PRIVILEGE

A.

INTRODUCTION

In United States v. Tsinnijinnie, I the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed the issue of whether or not the marital privilege may be invoked to prevent the introduction of a spouse's outof-court statement through the testimony of a third party.
Norman Tsinnijinnie was indicted for the second degree
murder of his mother-in-Iaw. 2 The Government alleged that defendant had driven his truck into his mother-in-Iaw's hogan with
the intention of running her down and struck and killed her with
his truck as she attempted to flee from him. His defense was that
she had fallen down while fleeing from him and that he had run
her over accidentally.
At trial, defendant invoked the "anti-marital facts privilege"3 to prevent his wife from testifying against him. Another
witness, however, testified that moments after the truck ran over
the victim, he heard the defendant's wife scream, "He
[defendant] ran over my mother."· The defendant claimed that
the admission of the witness's statement violated the marital
privilege. On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit allowed the introduction of this statement into evidence since it fell within the
excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, holding that the
"marital privilege should not be extended to bar a witness from
relating an excited utterance by a spouse."5
B.

BACKGROUND

In 1975, all privileges were subsumed under Rule 501 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.' Privileges, with respect to federal
issues "shall be governed by the principles of the common law.
. as interpreted . . . in the light of reason and experience
• • • "7 The Supreme Court has recognized two marital privi1. 601 F.2d 1035 (9th Cir. June, 1979) (per Nielsen, D.J., sitting by designation; the
other panel members were Trask and Goodwin, JJ.), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 706 (1980).
2. [d. at 1036.
3. [d. See text accompanying notes 18·24 infra.
4. 601 F.2d at 1037.
5. [d. at 1039.
6. FEn. R. EVID. 501. See generally 10 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 500.03·500.21
(2d ed. 1976 & Supp. 1979·80).
7. FED. R. EVID. 501 provides as follows:
.011
Except 8S otherwise required by the Constitution of the United
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leges: confidential communications 8 and the testimonial privilege.'
The confidential communications privilege relates to private
communications between a husband and wife which are presumed confidentiaPO and are, therefore, privileged. In Wolfe u.
United States, II the Supreme Court recognized the confidential
communication privilege. The Court qualified that privilege,
however, by noting that "[t]he privilege suppresses relevant testimony and should be allowed only when it is plain that marital
confidence cannot otherwise reasonably be preserved."12
In assessing the propriety of the invocation of the confidential marital communications privilege, several factors are considered. The marriage must be a valid one,13 a common law marriage
may suffice, if recognized by that state.14 The communication
must have been made during the marriage, J5 but the privilege
continues after death. IS Finally, despite some disagreement it
States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by
the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil
actions and proceedings with respect to an element of a claim
or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision,
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with
State law. (Emphasis added).
8. See Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951).
9. See Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
10. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S.
332 (1951). See generally 2 D. LoUlSELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 219 (1978);
Borden, In Defense of the Privilege for Confidential Marital Communications, 39 A.t.A.
LAw. 575 (1978).
11. 291 U.S. 7 (1934).
12. Id. at 17.
13. United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 747-48 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Apodaca, 522 F.2d 568, 571 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Neeley, 475 F.2d 1136, 1137
(4th Cir. 1973). See generally O'Brien, The Husband- Wife Evidentiary Privileges: Is Marriage Really Necessary? 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 411.
14. See United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d at 748; United States v. White, 545 F.2d
1129, 1130 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Boatwright, 446 F.2d 913,915 (5th Cir. 1971);
United States v. McElrath, 377 F.2d 508, 510 (6th Cir. 1967).
15. United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006, 1009 (2d Cir. 1943); Yoder v. United
States, 80 F.2d 665, 668 (10th Cir. 1935).
16. See generally 2 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 488 (rev. McNaughton
1961).
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seems that only communications and not acts are privileged. 17
The testimonial privilege, commonly referred to as the "antimarital facts" privilege, prevents one spouse from testifying
against the other, absent waiver.'8 In Hawkins v. United States, 19
the Supreme Court addressed the testimonial privilege. In
Hawkins, the Government asked that the court grant the privilege to witness who was not the accused. 20 The Government
argued that voluntary testimony was a strong indication that the
marriage was already gone, and thus, the policy offostering marital harmony would not be undermined. 21 The Court rejected the
Government's argument and stated that since "not all marital
flare-ups are permanent, "22 the justification for protecting martial harmony continues to exist. Therefore, "the testimony of one
spouse [is generally barred] against the other unless both consent."23
The issue before the Ninth Circuit in United States v.
Tsinnijinnie was whether the "anti-marital facts" privilege prevents a third party's statement relating an out-of-court statement
made by a spouse to be introduced as evidence. In reaching its
decision, the court balanced the considerations protecting marital harmony and confidential communications on the one hand
and the need for disclosure of facts on the other. 24
C.

THE COURT'S REASONING

The Tsinnijinnie court first considered whether to follow dictum from a prior Ninth Circuit case 25 which stated that the marital privilege precludes the introduction of a third person's testi17. United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d at 1009 (2d Cir. 1943); see generally 8 J.
supra note 16, §§ 657, 658, 2337.
18. 601 F.2d at 1037 citing Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
19. 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
20. [d. at 77.
21. [d.
22. [d.
23. [d. at 78. Recently, the Supreme Court in Trammel v. United States, No. 78-5705
(Sup. Ct. Feb. 27, 1980) re-examined the Hawkins rule to determine whether an accused
may invoke the privilege against adverse spousal testimony to prevent the introduction
of a spouse's voluntary testimony. The Court left in tact the confidential communications
privilege (see notes 10-12 supra) but modified Hawkins so that the privilege to testify vests
in the witness-spouse.
24. 601 F.2d at 1037-39.
25. Peek v. United States, 321 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 954
(1964). In Peek, the court stated that a third person could not relate a statement by one
WIGMORE,
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mony relating a statement made by a spouse. 28 Although this
dictum had previously been followed in the Ninth Circuit,27 and
was adopted by the Fifth Circuit,28 the Tsinnijinnie court did not
feel it was "bound by dicta from prior cases. "21
The court then examined the application of the privilege "in
the light of reason and experience, "30 focusing on "whether there
are sound reasons for applying the spousal [marital] privilege to
bar testimony of third persons. "31 On the one hand, the court
acknowledged that "privileges are inherently barriers to the fact
finding mission of trial courts. "32 The court noted that the marital
privilege has been the subject of harsh criticisms. 33 These criti·
cisms are directed towards the rule's failure to serve any purpose,
and the fact that it is increasingly being used as "mechanisms for
conceal[ing] the relevant facts."s.
The Tsinnijinnie court next turned to an examination of the
justifications for the marital privilege outlined in Hawkins v.
United States 3S : to preserve marital harmony, and to avoid pit·
ting one spouse against the other. The court noted that where,
however, the privilege is asserted because a third person relates
spouse against another where defendant spouse could have invoked the marital privilege
to preclude the admission of the original statement. However, this was dictum as the
privilege had been waived.
26. Id. at 943.
27. United States v. Price, 577 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1978) (spouse's statements admitted as admissions of a co-conspirator); Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795 (9th Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 982 (1957) (Peek-type language was dictum because the
privilege had been waived).
28. United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1971); Ivey v. United States,
344 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1965).
29. 601 F.2d at 1058 quoting Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
30. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
31. 601 F.2d at 1038.
32. Id. See generally C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 86 at 173 (2d ed. Cleary ed.
1972); Borden, supra note 10; Fawal, Questioning the Marital Privilege: A Medieval Philosophy In a Modern World, 7 CUM. L. REv. 307 (1976).
33. 601 F.2d at 1038. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 16 at § 2232; 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 405, at 87 (1969).
34. 601 F.2d at 1038 quoting C~ MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 79, at 165 (2d ed. Cleary
ed. 1972). The author continues:
The policy. . . of maintaining the (marital) privilege. . . is a
matter of emotion and sentiment. All of us have a feeling of
indelicacy and want of decorum in prying into the secrets of
husband and wife. We (should) realize . . . that this motive of
delicacy, while worthy and desirable, will not stand in the balance with the need for disclosure in court of the facts upon
which a man's life, liberty, or estate may depend.
Id. § 86, at 173.
35. 358 U.S. at 77. 78 (1958).
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a spouse's out-of-court statement, it is highly unlikely that either
goal is served. 3s The court reasoned that a third person offers a
"convenient buffer" which eliminates the chance of marital friction being engendered through the introduction of the spouse's
statement. 37 Furthermore, a spouse would not make damaging
statements about the other spouse unless the marriage had deteriorated to the point that a dissolution was inevitable. 3s

D.

CRITICISM: THE ILLUSION OF THE "BUFFER" AND "DETERIORATED
MARRIAGE" RATIONALE

The court's statement that a third person presents a convenient buffer which eliminates any possibility of marital friction is
illusory. When a third person testifies, that party simply conveys
the other spouse's statement. The fact that the words are spoken
in court by a third party does nothing to reduce marital friction.
The Fifth Circuit, in Ivey v. United States,39 disregarded any
"buffer" rationale. Ivey commented directly upon the type of
hearsay problem encountered by the Tsinnijinnie court, stating:
"She might as well be permitted to testify against her husband
in open court as to permit the introduction of a statement she had
made against him out of court."40
36. 601 F.2d at 1038.
37. Id., quoting United States v. Mackiewicz, 401 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1968). In
Mackiewicz, the Second Circuit admitted hearsay statements made by one spouse impli.
eating the other, reasoning that since the testimony was one step removed from actual
testimony. marital frictions would not be aggravated. Accord, United States v. Cleveland,
477 F.2d 310, 313 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Doughty, 460 F.2d 1360, 1364 n.3 (7th
Cir. 1972). Commentators have suggested that Mackiewicz is the better rule.
A person holds no privilege to prevent his or her spouse from
making adverse statements abroad in the world, and if this
occurs and is revealed in court, it is the {act of the out·of-court
conduct o{ the spouse, not the advent of the trial, which is the
source of any strain upon the marriage.
2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, § 218 at 624.
This reasoning seems puzzling. I{ it is "the {act of the out-of-court conduct and not
of the spouse and not the advent of the trial, which is the source of any strain," then the
third person would not insulate the marriage from friction. The friction is generated from
the out-of-court conduct and its ensuing legal ramifications. It appears that the only way
to avoid marital strain in this situation is to exclude the statements under the privilege.
What seems to pervade this issue is an attempt to reconcile the admission of the hearsay
statements with the policy of fostering marital harmony. The truth of the matter is that
admitting hearsay statements does cause marital friction; however, marital friction will
not "stand in the balance with the need for disclosure." See note 34 supra.
38. 601 F.2d at 1039.
39. 344 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1965).
40. Id. at 772.
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The Ninth Circuit asserted that a spouse would not make
damaging statements unless the marriage were in a severely deteriorated state. A spouse may make a damaging statement with
no malicious intent whatsoever. The statement could be made
inadvertently, or blurted out as an excited utterance, as it was in
the present case, or it could be made innocently, without any
knowledge whatsoever of its potentially damaging effect. At any
rate, Hawkins expressly rejects the argument that voluntary adverse testimony is a strong indication that a marriage is already
gone. 41

E.

CONCLUSION

Based on the facts in Tsinnijinnie, the result reached by the
Ninth Circuit is correct. It was apparent that the Tsinnijinnie's
marriage had deteriorated and therefore, the third party testimony could have little detrimental impact on their marriage.
However, this decision might be interpreted more broadly, as
holding that third party testimony relating extrajudicial spousal
statements, will always be admitted. This should not be the rule.
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence grants a federal
court wide discretion in interpreting the rules of privileges. In
determining whether or not a privilege applies, a court should
balance the conflicting interests. In favor of applying the privilege
is the interest of preserving harmonious marriages, while on the
other hand, admitting relevant and probative evidence from
which a trier of fact can reach a just decision, serves to counterbalance that interest. While the result in Tsinnijinnie may have
justified withholding the privilege, a lower court should not be
precluded from balancing the conflicting interests presented by
a different and compelling set of facts.

Charles Ferrera
IX. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN CRIMINAL LAW
& PROCEDURE
In United States v. But/alo, 591 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. Jan.,
1979), defendant sought a reversal of his conviction on the ground
that the evidence used to convict him was a result of a search
conducted on the basis of an affidavit containing material misstatement by the government affiant. The Ninth Circuit, relying
on the two-prong test enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) affirmed the judgment
41. 358 U.S. at 77.
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of conviction finding (1) the information in the affidavit did not
constitute intentional misstatements, and (2) even with the challenged material excised, the affidavit contained' other material
which would support a showing of probable cause.
In United States u. Smith, 595 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir. Dec.,
1978), the court examined whether a false statement by a government affiant will invalidate a search warrant. Once again relying on Franks u. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), the court, reluctant to extend the rule of exclusion to negligent omissions or
good faith mistakes held that erroneous assumptions made by a
federal agent on the basis of information he received, does not
amount to reckless inclusion of false statements.
In United States u. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. Sept.,
1978), federal agents investigating a mail fraud scheme entered
defendant's apartment without a warrant or probable cause to
believe that a person who had committed a felony was hiding in
defendant's apartment. Defendant was convicted of being an accessory after the fact. On appeal, the court noted that the issue
of whether, absent exigent circumstances, police officers who
have probable cause to arrest a person whom they reasonably
believe to be in a particular dwelling may enter without a warrant in order to carry out the arrest, has never been resolved by
either the Supreme Court or within the Ninth Circuit. Joining
the District of Columbia Circuit and the Second Circuit, the
Prescott court held that the police must obtain a warrant before
entry to carry out the arrest.
In United States u. Radlick, 581 F .2d 225 (9th Cir. Aug.,
1978), the court found it necessary to remand a case for determination of whether there was a reasonable explanation for federal
officers proceeding without obtaining a federal search warrant. In
Radlick, a state search warrant was issued, but the participation
of the federal officers in the case left no doubt that the investigation was so pervasive that it was sufficiently "federal" as to require compliance under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure or an explanation for non-compliance. The court
adopted the Second Circuit's test for suppression of evidence
which looks to whether there is evidence of intentional and deliberate disregard of a provision in the Rule, and remanded the
case for a determination on this issue.

In United States u. Romero, 585 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. Aug.,
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1978), the Ninth Circuit held a federal search warrant to be valid
based on information obtained independently and prior to the
illegal state warrant and seizure of incriminating evidence. The
state warrant was invalidated on the basis that the items to be
seized were described too broadly. The court found that the evidence· seized under the federal warrant was not the fruit of the
invalid state search and the evidence was not required to be suppressed on the ground that the federal warrant had been merely
an attempt to cure a prior illegal search. The court further held
that the government's failure to inform the United States magistrate in its search warrant that evidence sought under federal
warrant had been previously suppressed by state court was not a
basis for invalidating federal warrants.
Judge Merrill filed a dissenting opinion arguing that when a
state is under a suppression order, it has a duty to return the
seized evidence to the defendant. Until the state has returned
the evidence, the evidence is immune from federal seizure. Judge
Merrill found it improper on the part of state and federal officials to have refrained from returning the evidence until federal
seizure had been accomplished, and therefore would have
reversed.
In United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. Aug.,
1978), a lawful customs search of a package mailed from Thailand to an address in the United States revealed ten plastic bags
of heroin in the hollowed out walls of the package. Agents of the
Drug Enforcement Administration removed the bags and substituted bags of white powder and two bags of heroin. Additionally,
electronic devices were placed inside the parcel which emitted
beeping signals allowing the agents to follow the parcel. The
Ninth Circuit, applying a two step analysis required in situations
involving the use of electronic surveillance devices found (1) the
initial customs search of the package and insertion of the device
was lawful, and (2) the continued surveillance, i.e., transmitting
the location of the package by electronic signal is merely an aid
to what could be accomplished by other permissible techniques
of surveillance. Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that the placement
in a package of such a device did not constitute an unlawful
search in violation of the fourth amendment. The court reasoned
that since there was "reasonable cause to suspect" contraband,
the initial opening of the package was lawful and because the
transmitting of the package's location by electronic signal was

.
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seen to be merely an aid to what could be accomplished by visual surveillance, there was no fourth amendment violation.
In United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. May,
1979), the Ninth Circuit addressed the issues involving the scope
of corporate searches and the application of the felony provision
in the Bank Secrecy Act. In Beusch, the government seized certain items that were allegedly unrelated to the offending transaction and which served as the basis for misdemeanor convictions.
The court, however, held that where ledgers and files all contained incriminating evidence regarding transactions, failure to separate the ledgers and files and take only those portions dealing
specifically with the transactions did not constitute an impermissible general search. The court reasoned that a general rule
requiring ledgers and files to be separated would substantially
increase the amount of time required to conduct a search. In addition, this type of search would require the use of auditors,
bookkeepers and accountants, thereby aggravating the intrusiveness of the searc h.
Regarding the scope of the Bank Secrecy Act, the court held
that a series of currency transfers which, by themselves, constitute misdemeanors, may also constitue felonious activity if they
show a pattern of illegal activity and exceed $100,000 over a
twelve month period. Judge Bright, concurring and dissenting in
part, did not agree with the majority's expansive reading of the
felony provision under the Bank Secrecy Act, and would not
have elevated the several misdemeanor convictions to felonies
when the violations were unrelated to any other type of activity
that might be considered illegal.
The court in United States v. Glover, 596 F.2d 857 (9th Cir.
Mar., 1979), held that an FBI agent's conduct in interviewing a
defendant without permission of counsel could not be construed
as a violation of the right to counsel requiring dismissal of the
indictment on the theory that it interfered with the attorney-client relationship. The court based its holding on the fact that the
interview was terminated shortly after it had begun and that the
interview was not undertaken to obtain incriminating statements
but to offer a dismissal of charges in exchange for information.
Further, the court found that although the FBI agents should
not have spoken to the defendant, there was no indication that
defendant suffered any prejudice because of the agent's remark.
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In United States v. Newell, 578 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. July,
1978), the court held that although a serviceman had been appointed counsel in connection with changes of unauthorized absence, the failure of military investigators to determine whether
the serviceman was represented by counsel when interviewed as
an arson suspect did not violate any rights under military law of
effective assistance of counsel. The court also ruled that the right
to counsel of a serviceman prosecuted in federal court, and the
remedies for violation of that right, are controlled by federal civilian law rather than the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

In United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. Apr.,
1979) (per curiam), defendant argued that the denial of his Motion for Substitution of Appointed Counsel deprived him of effective assistance of counsel at trial. Defendant and his court-appointed counsel appeared before the judge about one month
before trial to make the motion on ground that defendant and
his counsel were totally incompatible. Defendant renewed his
motion three weeks later. The motion was denied although both
defendant and his attorney confirmed that the relationship between the two was bad. When faced with the choice of going to
trial with the original attorney or defending himself pro se, defendant went to trial with his court-appointed counsel. Relying
on Brown v. Cravens, 424 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1970), the court
held that in so denying the motion, the lower court had deprived
defendant of effective assistance of counsel.
In United States v. Rosales, 584 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. Aug.,
1978), the court ruled that in order for a party's co-conspirator's
statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy to be admissable, there must exist independent evidence, sufficient to
make it a prima facie case of conspiracy. The court ruled that
sufficient evidence existed in the present case to admit the testimony of an undercover agent. The evidence of the conspiracy
need not be sufficient to compel a conviction. All that is required
is that the evidence support a conviction.
In United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. Feb.,
1978) (per curiam), the court held that a juror who had two sons
who were imprisoned for murder and robbery in connection with
an attempt to acquire heroin was not impartial in a trial for conspiracy to possess heroin. The court also ruled that only statements of a co-conspirator made in furtherance of the conspiracy
were admissable as an exception to the hearsay rule. Thus, mere
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conversations between conspirators are not admissable as declarations in furtherance of the conspiracy.
In United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. Feb., 1979)
the court held that in the absence of any indication of a lack of
trustworthiness in the procedure of recording license plate numbers of cars passing through the Mexican border, that that date
could be admitted under the "public records" exception to the
hearsay rule in a narcotics case. The court also ruled that where
the lower court admitted data cards containing those lists of license numbers under the "business records" rather than the
"public
records" exception, no error was committed .
•
In Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. Nov., 1978)
the Ninth Circuit rejected a per se rule that any investigatory
questioning during prison confinement constitutes custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. The court recognized
the unique prison setting where the questioning took place, and
'applied both the reasonable person standard and free to leave
standard concluding that this situation amounted to no more
than on-the-scene questioning. Therefore, no Miranda warnings
were required. Judge Anderson filed a dissenting opinion contending that the majority's enunciated test is both unrealistic
and unworkable.
In United States v. Nick, 604 F .2d 1199 (9th Cir. Oct.,
1979), the Ninth Circuit considered whether statements made by
a victim and reported in the testimony of victim's mother and
physician violated the hearsay rule or the confrontation clause.
The court also considered whether the defendant's confession
was taken in violation of the Miranda ruling.
Defendant was arrested for sexually assaulting a three-yearold boy, picked up and driven to jail. At that time, the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, whereupon defendant
asked the policemen to look in defendant's bedroom for a paper
with defendant's lawyer's name and address on it. The policeman was unable to find the paper until after defendant had
signed a waiver form, confessed and had been appointed counsel.
Relying on United States v. Rodriguez-Gastelum, 569 F.2d 482
(9th Cir. 1978)(en bane), the court of appeal held that although
defendant had effectively asserted his right to counsel, he had
later waived those rights by signing the waiver form. The physician's retelling of the defendant's statements were admitted
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under the exception to the hearsay rule admitting statements
made to a physician for diagnostic purposes. FED. R. EVID. §
803(4). Testimony of the victim's mother retelling the victim's
out of court statements was admitted under the "excited utterances" exception to the hearsay rule. FED. R. EVID. § 803(2).
Finding that the victim-declarant had not been subjected to
cross-examination, the court of appeals considered whether the
victim's out of court statement should have been admitted over
an objection on the ground that defendant was not given the opportunity to confront his accuser. Ruling that the availability of
cross-examination was not the sole criterion for testing the admissibility of hearsay evidence, the court held that in view of the
fact that the evidence had high probative value, was highly reliable, was unquestionably material, and was the best evidence
available, the statement was properly admitted over the confrontation clause objection.

In United States v. Pantohan, 602 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. May,
1979), the court of appeal affirmed the conviction for the unlawful possession of a sawed-off shotgun (26 U.S.C. § 5861(d». Defendant claimed that: (1) because certain of his self-incriminating statements were made during plea-bargaining, that these
statements were improperly admitted; (2) because those statements were inadmissible but were heard by the grand jury,
the indictment should have been quashed; and (3) the lower
court improperly failed to give a specific intent instruction for
the crime charged.
Relying on United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356, 1366
(5th Cir. Nov., 1978) (en banc), the court held that in order to
determine whether plea bargaining has taken place, a court
should determine whether the accused subjectively believed plea
negotiation was taking place at the time, and whether that belief
was reasonable under the circumstances. The court ruled that
although defendant may have subjectively believed plea bargaining was taking place, his belief was unreasonable under the
circumstances. Therefore, the statements were properly admitted. Because the statements were admissible, they were properly before the grand jury, and the indictment was valid. Defendant's claim that the lower court improperly failed to give a
specific intent instruction was rejected on the ground that
§ 5861(d) is not a specific intent crime.
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In Jett v. Castaneda, 578 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. July, 1978), the
court held that although no charges had been brought against a
prison inmate who was the prime suspect in a prison stabbling,
the district court properly appointed counsel for him. The court
also ruled that because no charges had been brought against the
suspect, nor was there a grand jury investigation pending, the
lower court lacked jurisdiction to enter a discovery order.
In United States v. Guido, 597 F.2d 194 (9th Cir. May,
1979), defendants were convicted in both Arizona and California
district courts on charges of conspiracy to possess marijuana
with intent to distribute. Although the convictions covered different periods of time, defendants argued that they were identical and therefore should not be considered as separate conspiracies. The Ninth Circuit found that the conspiracies involved the
same objectives, the same key participants, the same source, the
same distribution and coverted one period of time and therefore
held the conspiracies to be one single continuing conspiracy.
In United States v. Peterson, 592 F.2d 1035 (9th Cir. Jan.,
1979), the court held that a criminal defendant who fails to report to the marshal's office after having been ordered by the
court that the sentence was to commence immediately, is "in custody" and guilty of escape under 18 U.S.C. § 751(a). Judge
Chambers filed a dissenting opinion arguing for acquittal on the
basis of the government's failure to sufficiently prove escape
from custody in its indictment.
In United States v. Anguloa, 598 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. June,
1979), the issue concerned problems which arose with regard to
translations of defendant's testimony by two interpreters appointed by the court. The first translator who misinterpreted
portions of the defendant's testimony was replaced by the court
clerk at the prosecutor's request alone. The replacement interpreter, also misinterpreted portions of the defendant's testimony
and, further, made disparaging remarks about the defendant.
As a result of the prosecutor's action and resulting further confusion in the translations, the defendant contended he had been
denied due process. The court held that the prosecutor's ex
parte actions in substituting interpreters was improper; however, defendant was not prejudiced. The prosecutor did not attempt to obtain any tactical advantage and was apparently
motivated by a desire to obtain a more accurate interpreter.
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Further, prompt and fqrceful instructions to the jury. by the
court to disregard any disparaging comments about the defendant made by the second interpreter cured any prejudice which
might have arisen.
In United States v. Hayes, 590 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. Jan.,
1979), the court dealt with the issue of whether under § 5032 of
the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, the district court has discretion to reject the tendered admission of the juvenile delinquency information before a transfer motion has been filed. The
court held that, based on analogy to the adult criminal prosecution process, the district court impliedly had the discretion to
accept or reject admission of juvenile delinquency information.
The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to accept the plea where the court knew that
a request for authority to move to transfer the juvenile for adult
prosecution was pending.
In Heinz v. McNutt, 582 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. Sept., 1978),
the court held that a Washington statute permitting automatic
parole revocation for parolees convicted of crimes while on parole
is an unconstitutional denial of due process. The court based its
holding on Morissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), where the
Supreme Court enunciated standards and procedures to be followed when parole is revoked.
In United States v. Edick, 597 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. May,
1979), the defendant was convicted on a two-count indictment of
possession of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun. The defendant
was first sentenced to three years on count one; his sentence of
five years on count two was suspended. Subsequently, he was
found to be in violation of his probation under count two. The
district court revoked his probation and imposed a new sentence
of three years imprisonment. The issue before the court of appeals was whether these consecutive sentences could be imposed
on the multiple counts where the firearms violations arose from a
single transaction. The court held they could not be so imposed
and, as a result, the illegal sentences had to be vacated and the
case remanded for rehearing.
In United States v. Knowles, 594 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. Apr.,
1979), the court dealt with the issue of government failure to
comply with the Jencks Act. The Jencks Act (18 U.S.C. § 35(0)
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requires that the government produce any statement by a witness which relates to the subject matter to which the witness has
testified. The Ninth Circuit held that a transcript of a witness's
testimony before a grand jury must be produced under the Act.
The court further held that failure to comply with the Jencks
Act does not per se require a new trial, but does call for a strict
application of the harmless error standard.
In United States v. Bergeman, 592 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. Jan.,
1979), the court held that although defendant's prior conviction
for receiving stolen property had been expunged by statute, defendant was still a "convicted felon" for purposes of the federal
statute. Section 922(h)(l) of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act (18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq.) makes it unlawful for
any person who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to receive
any firearm or ammunition that has been shipped or transported
in interstate or foreign commerce. Although acknowledging a
conflict within the Ninth Circuit on the issue of whether federal
or state law governs a person's status as a convicted felon, the
majority resolved the issue in favor of federal law. District Judge
Takasugi, sitting by designation, filed a dissenting opinion, arguing that this conflict has not yet been resolved. Judge Takasugi
would adopt the views expressed by the Fifth Circuit and resolve
the conflict in favor of the state's own definition.
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